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"... one does not argue about tastes for the same reason that one does not argue over
the Rocky Mountains—both are there, will be there next year, too, and are the same
to all men."
— Stigler and Becker (1977, p.76)
In "De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum" George Stigler and Gary Becker famously invoke
the Rocky Mountains to illustrate not only the futility of quarreling over individual tastes but
to argue more generally that assumptions of different or unstable tastes "really have only been
ad hoc arguments that disguise analytical failure" (p.89). Be this as it may, it always struck me
that their continued existence and their sameness unto all men are the least exciting qualities
of the Rocky Mountains. Surely a geologist would agree that there are much more enlightening
questions, such as: How did the Rocky Mountains come into existence? What environmental
forces sculpted them to look the way they do? What is their impact on the climate of North
America?
This dissertation encompasses three papers on the foundations of human nature and how
they interact with the world around us and the institutions we create to shape our actions. Just
as a geologist might survey the Rocky Mountains to understand whether their morphology in
Canada similar to that of their southern ranges, Chapter 2 presents a survey of our tendency
for honest behavior in 40 different countries. Where an earth scientist might ask whether plate
tectonic movement during the Laramide orogeny has raised the cordillera uniformly over the
entirety of the Rockies, we investigate whether civic honesty is equally affected by financial
incentives in each of the countries in our sample. Using a large-scale field experiment to mea-
sure how likely a supposedly lost wallet is returned, the paper documents a strong universal
tendency for honest behavior—in virtually all countries, wallets with cash were more likely to
be reported. Nevertheless, there are considerable differences in reporting rates. Observed civic
honesty correlates significantly with economic development and the quality of local institutions.
It is also shaped in predictable ways by deep-rooted environmental factors such as a country’s
geography and climate, and by historical indicators of essential cultural dimensions. Thus, even
though the near-ubiquity of civic honesty around the globe—the main finding of this chapter—is
a powerful reminder of our shared human nature, the degree to which it is manifest in different
places is moderated by the world around us.
While Chapter 2 offers a global perspective on civic behavior, Chapter 3 shows how individ-
uals’ honesty and local corruption jointly affect the effectiveness of government policy within a
country. In much the same way as our geologist might inquire what underlies the strong Bouguer
gravity anomalies in parts of the Colorado Rockies, this paper investigates why Brazil’s Bolsa
Família, a centrally administrated cash transfer program, performs significantly worse in mu-
nicipalities with higher local corruption. In the paper, I exploit the program’s central selection
process to estimate the causal effect of Bolsa Família on children’s school enrollment in differ-
ent municipalities, and I then use a second natural experiment to show that local corruption
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significantly reduces the program’s impact. A closer examination of the mechanism reveals that
the higher prevalence of families who misrepresent their income can account for the variation in
program effectiveness. This difference in income underreporting allows for two interpretations.
Local corruption could erode social norms and make residents less averse to dishonesty, or it
could leave people’s inclination to cheat unchanged and merely make it easier to get away with
misreporting one’s income. These two explanations are tested in an online and a field experi-
ment, respectively, and the results strongly favor the latter. This again goes to show that the
world around us influences to what extent our natural disposition to honesty is reflected in our
behavior.
The findings from Chapters 2 and 3 are compatible with a Rocky Mountains interpretation
of human nature: our preferences and tendencies are essentially the same for everyone; only
the environment determines their expression. In contrast, Chapter 4 shows that some of our
tastes are heterogeneous in profound ways. While these differences are not commonly observable,
they can be uncovered through novel technologies emerging from the natural sciences. In the
same manner as a geologist might use breakthroughs in mass spectrometry to unveil previously
hidden mineralogic diversity in the Rocky Mountains, the chapter uses genetic data to expose
fundamental and deep-seated inequality in individuals’ predisposition to consume alcohol. The
paper demonstrates how these genetic differences, fixed at conception, lead to heterogeneous
behavior in a similar environment and to diverging reactions to the same alcohol licensing policy.
While the other two chapters measure environmental influences at the level of municipalities or
even countries, the final chapter uses a fine-grained measure of local alcohol availability within
1000m of an individual’s place of residence, and a polygenic score constructed from their genetic
data for the predisposition to drink. With these tools, it shows that people with a high genetic
propensity to drink self-select into environments with easier access to alcohol, react less to
changes in the density of sales points, and respond less to restrictive licensing. The findings
demonstrate that the supply-focused licensing policy clashes with individual predispositions and
exacerbates genetic inequality, illustrating how advances in the natural sciences can enhance our
understanding of central questions in the social sciences. Thus, unlike the previous chapters,
the final chapter shows that not only does the environment moderate the expression of intrinsic
tendencies, but individual differences in genetic endowments also moderate our response to the
world around us.
In the remainder of this dissertation overview, I will briefly summarize each of the chapters,
before closing with a note on their shared methodological contributions.
Chapter 2, Civic Honesty around the Globe, reports the results of a large-scale field exper-
iment on civic honesty that I conducted together with Alain Cohn and Michel Maréchal.
Honest behavior is a central feature of economic and social life (Arrow, 1972; Algan and
Cahuc, 2013). Without honesty, promises are broken, contracts go unenforced, taxes remain
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unpaid, and governments become corrupt. Such breaches of honesty are costly to individuals,
organizations and entire societies. Although there is robust experimental literature on the con-
ditions that give rise to honest behavior (e.g., Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004; Mazar et al.,
2008; Gächter and Schulz, 2016; Gneezy et al., 2018; Abeler et al., 2019), little is known about
how material incentives impact civic honesty, particularly in field settings. Most of the exper-
imental literature on honest behavior involves modest financial stakes, has been conducted in
laboratory settings, and tends to rely on populations from Western, educated, industrialized,
rich and democratic societies (Henrich et al., 2010).
Theories of honesty make different predictions about the role of material incentives. Classic
economic models based on rational self-interest suggest that, all else equal, honest behavior will
become less common as the material incentives for dishonesty increase (Becker, 1968). Models of
human behavior that incorporate altruistic or other-regarding preferences also predict dishonesty
to rise with increasing incentives, as self-interest virtually always dominates concerns for the
welfare of others — we care about others but not as much as we care about ourselves (Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Fisman et al., 2007). As a result, self-interest will
play an increasingly prominent role in behavior as the material incentives for dishonesty grow.
Psychological models based on self-image maintenance predict that people will cheat for profit
so long as their behavior does not require them to negatively update their self-concept (Mazar
et al., 2008; Duval and Wicklund, 1972). However, it is unclear ex ante whether self-image
concerns will become more or less important as the incentives for dishonesty increase, and what
form that relationship will take.
In order to investigate this fundamental trade-off, we turned in more than 17,000 apparently
lost wallets (containing business cards, a shopping list, some money, and a key) at the reception
desks of public and private institutions in 40 countries. We varied the amount of money that
the wallets contained, including either no money, about 13 USD, or almost 100 USD.
We find that, on average, people are more likely to return wallets when they face a stronger
incentive to steal. Although there are substantial differences in civic honesty across countries,
the likelihood of returning a wallet is significantly higher in the majority of countries when the
wallet contains more money. This result is truly a global phenomenon—in virtually all countries
wallets with money were more likely to be reported, and the same is true for different institutions
(e.g., hotels, banks, police stations, etc.) and irrespective of the finder’s age and gender.
Despite this near universal tendency for honest behavior, it tends to take both non-experts
and professional economists by surprise. We conducted two online experiments where we asked
participants to predict the results of our study, one with a general online sample from Amazon
Mechanical Turk and one with economists who rank in the top 5% of their profession according
to RePEC. Both groups predicted incorrectly that rates of honesty decline as the financial stakes
increase. Rather than being the result of basic ignorance or of a déformation professionnelle,
this failure to appreciate the scope of civic honesty reflects a misplaced cynicism with regard to
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the honesty of others.
To identify the motives to keep or return the wallet, we conducted additional treatments
and nationally representative online experiments in three countries. Our results are consistent
with theoretical models that incorporate altruism and self-image concerns, but also suggest mod-
ification in that non-pecuniary motivations directly interact with the material benefits gained
from dishonest behavior. In the extensive appendix, we show that other motives such as finder’s
fees or the risk of detection have little explanatory power, and we build on a rich literature
of cross-country studies to explain the observed reporting rates. Wallet reporting rates are
positively correlated with GDP and negatively correlated with income inequality and various
corruption measures. Further analysis suggests that economically favorable geographic condi-
tions, inclusive political institutions, and cultural values that extend moral norms beyond one’s
in-group are also positively associated with civic honesty.
Understanding the relationship between civic honesty and material incentives is not only
practically relevant, but also theoretically important. In particular, our results indicate that
people not only consider what is right or wrong, but that their moral considerations are inherently
linked to the material benefits of dishonesty. When people stand to heavily profit from engaging
in dishonest behavior, the desire to cheat increases but so do the psychological costs of viewing
oneself as a thief—and sometimes the latter will dominate the former.
Chapter 3, Local Corruption, Income Underreporting, and Policy Effectiveness, examines
the interplay of local corruption and civic behavior. The paper demonstrates how corruption
negatively impacts policy effectiveness in a program that is explicitly designed to be unsuscep-
tible to bribery, clientelism, and the embezzlement of money: Brazil’s Bolsa Família program.
Bolsa Família pays a monthly benefit to approximately 14 million families provided that their
children attend school sufficiently often. Importantly, the program transfers funds directly to
beneficiaries so that local officials cannot embezzle the money. Moreover, local officials are also
bypassed in deciding who benefits from Bolsa Família; a central anonymized process selects
beneficiaries to prevent clientelism. However, even if effective safeguards against bribery, clien-
telism, and embezzlement are in place, government programs are not necessarily immune to the
corrosive impact of corruption.
One possible explanation for the negative effect of corruption is that it enables families to
underreport their income to gain or keep Bolsa Família; even if corrupt officials can not embezzle
funds, local corruption can make it easier for families to cheat. However, although it is generally
assumed that income underreporting decreases the effectiveness of programs like Bolsa Família,
this assumption has not previously been tested. This paper provides causal evidence linking local
corruption, families’ ability to successfully underreport their income, and lower causal treatment
effects of Bolsa Família on school enrollment.
The project uses data from the Cadastro Único, the official database of the program, which
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enables a novel identification strategy to estimate the causal effect of Bolsa Família on school
enrollment: I can reconstruct the algorithm’s priority strata to identify families on the margin of
the program that were randomly included or not included in Bolsa Família. The identification
strategy has several advantages: First, because it uses the same data as the selection algorithm,
there are no unobservable differences that affect who gets included in the program. Secondly, it is
robust to families’ strategic motives, and the estimated treatment effects are unbiased conditional
on self-reported income. Finally, unlike approaches that use variation in the program’s rollout
or geographic coverage, it can estimate the effectiveness of the program at the municipality level
and in different years.
The first main result of the chapter is that Bolsa Família is less effective in municipalities
with more corruption, even though local officials cannot divert money from the program and have
no say in the selection of beneficiaries. Using Brazil’s initiative to randomly audit municipalities
as an exogenous shock to corruption, I show that Bolsa Família’s effect on school enrollment
increases by about a third after a random audit.
I then test whether income underreporting can account for this result. Because munici-
palities are responsible for registering potential beneficiaries, local corruption can play the most
prominent role at the registration stage. I consider a simplified model of Bolsa Família’s regis-
tration process, where families decide what income to report, and the families with the lowest
self-reported incomes are included in the program. As predicted by the registration model,
fewer families claim to have zero income, and fewer families report an income that is eligible for
Bolsa Família after a municipality has been audited at random. Moreover, the treatment effect
increases most for families that are predicted to have the strongest incentives to misrepresent
their incomes.
As direct evidence for the income underreporting explanation, I conducted a field experi-
ment with 6,998 Bolsa Família registration centers. Fictitious applicants asked about the pos-
sibility of receiving Bolsa Família, and their characteristics were experimentally varied to make
them eligible or ineligible while holding everything else constant. Consistent with the income
underreporting mechanism, registration centers in audited municipalities are significantly less
likely to engage with ineligible families and to incorrectly state that a sender’s income is com-
patible with Bolsa Família. Taken together, these findings suggest that the effectiveness gains of
Bolsa Família are the result of improvements in the way the program is targeted to the families
that benefit from it the most.
Ruling out other alternative explanations, I demonstrate that changes in relevant local
social norms—about underreporting income, colluding with underreporters, and blowing the
whistle—are unable explain the results. I use the Krupka and Weber (2013) norm elicitation
task to show that social norms do not change significantly after the audits in an incentivized
online experiment with low-income participants from 424 municipalities, some of which had been
randomly selected for audits in the past. Nor can improved school attendance monitoring, ad-
7
ministrative processes, infrastructure, complementary programs, tighter governance, or increased
whistleblowing account for the increase in Bolsa Família’s effectiveness after a municipality has
been audited at random.
Taken together, these results suggest that income underreporting can explain how, despite
the program’s safeguards, local corruption undermines the effectiveness of Bolsa Família.
Chapter 4, Genes, Pubs, and Drinks: Gene-Environment Interplay and Alcohol Licensing
Policy in the UK, reports the results of joint work with Pietro Biroli that investigates how
genetic predisposition and local alcohol licensing policy interact and jointly influence people’s
alcohol consumption choices.
Debates about the relative influence of nature versus nurture on human behaviors are
amongst the oldest in the social sciences (Mulcaster, 1582; Hume, 1748; Darwin, 1859; Freud,
1930). In recent decades, however, it has become increasingly clear that pitting nature against
nurture should be relinquished in favor of a more systemic view that considers the complex
interplay that may exist between people’s genetic makeup and the environment in which they
develop (Hunter, 2005; Heckman, 2007).
Alcohol consumption is worth our attention because of its prevalence and its negative
consequences: it is estimated to be the third leading cause of preventable death, it has been
related to more than 60 medical conditions, and it accounts for a share of the global burden
of disease comparable to those of tobacco or hypertension (Mokdad et al., 2004; Room et al.,
2005). In other words, drinking alcohol is one of the leading health behaviors that contribute
to increasing health inequality. But what is the origin of this inequality? While recent research
shows that our genes affect how much alcohol we drink, it is unclear how our genetic propensity
influences our reaction to changes in the availability of alcohol and what this implies for effective
alcohol licensing policy.
Our paper shows that the genetic propensity to drink alcohol contributes to health in-
equalities in two ways: by promoting selection into unfavorable environments, and by decreas-
ing susceptibility to more restrictive licensing policies. Both negative selection and decreased
susceptibility lead to higher alcohol intake and, eventually, alcohol-related diseases.
We combine genetic information from the UK Biobank with geo-coded locations of pubs
and retailers, as well as data on alcohol licensing from local authorities in England and Wales.
Using information on 700,000 genetic variants, we estimate a polygenic score that proxies the
individual genetic propensity for alcohol consumption, and we use the coordinates of all pubs
and the major retailers in the UK to construct a fine-grained measure of local alcohol availability.
Our results show that both living in proximity to many alcohol sales points and a high
polygenic propensity for alcohol consumption are related to several drinking-related behaviors.
Individuals with a high genetic propensity to drink also react less to changes in the availability
of alcohol. Moreover, we find that individuals with a high polygenic risk self-select into envi-
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ronments with greater alcohol availability, leading to substantial gene-environment correlation
where carriers of similar genetic variants tend to cluster in the same area.
Turning to licensing policy, we show that individuals with a high polygenic risk respond
less to restrictive licensing. Importantly, local licensing committees in England and Wales are
not allowed to consider public health, much less the genetic predispositions of their residents,
which mitigates concerns of reverse causality. We estimate the effect of licensing policy on
alcohol consumption for individuals with low and high polygenic risk and find that a more
restrictive licensing policy leads to decreased alcohol intake on average, but individuals with
high polygenic risk are less responsive to policy change. Therefore, this public policy limiting
the supply of alcohol tends to amplify existing genetic inequalities: it is more effective for those
individuals who already have a low genetic predisposition to drinking, but it has less bite for
those individuals who might need it the most.
Finally, using information on physician-diagnosed medical conditions from the National
Health Service, we investigate the implication of our results from a public health perspective.
Our results show that individuals with a high polygenic risk are significantly more likely to
have an alcohol-related condition, including liver disease, psychological disorders, and various
afflictions of the digestive system. These results hold even if we control for self-reported alcohol
consumption, illustrating how incorporating genetic information can help us uncover relevant
dimensions of health-inequality that are not commonly observable.
The results of the paper demonstrate how genetic information can shed light on the de-
terminants and the dynamics of health inequalities, and how genetic endowments interact with
individual choices and public health policy. We show that the effectiveness of supply-focused
licensing policy as a tool to mitigate alcohol abuse can clash with individual predispositions and
might actually exacerbate genetic inequality, suggesting the need for a more targeted approach.
Together, the three chapters showcase the potential of an integrated, methodologically di-
verse empirical approach. Chapter 2 complements a field experiment with nationally represen-
tative online surveys and extensive cross-country data from institutional, cultural, and political
economics. While the field experiment provides external validity and global portability—a re-
ality check for theories about honesty—, incorporating the online surveys enables us to deepen
our understanding of the psychological underpinnings. Similarly, the extensive administrative
database and the natural experiments used in Chapter 3 are ideally suited to prove the detri-
mental effect of corruption on the Bolsa Família program. Once the main result is established,
the field and online experiments offer tailor-made tests to isolate income underreporting as the
mechanism. Finally, Chapter 4 combines polygenic prediction, a central instrument in personal
genomics, with geo-spatial data and regional policy information.
All three chapters push the boundaries of their respective fields by using unusually extensive
data sets. With more than 17,000 lost wallets and spanning 40 countries, the experiment in
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Chapter 2 is easily among the largest field experiments in behavioral economics. The experiment
in Chapter 3 pales in comparison, despite involving a respectable 6,998 Bolsa Família registration
centers. This is compensated for by the administrative data, which covers 20 million families for
up to six years and enables me to match families extremely precisely to obtain accurate estimates
of Bolsa Família’s effects in thousands of municipalities. Genetic data are almost proverbially
big, and the UK Biobank used in Chapter 4 is no exception, with hundreds of thousands of
genetic variants and vast medical histories for approximately 500,000 people. The sheer size of
this sample makes it possible to construct a polygenic score with sufficient predictive power for
behavioral traits. Likewise, it’s the comprehensive list of more than 50,000 pubs and thousands
of retail locations that allows me to construct a high-resolution measure of alcohol availability.
In short, when it comes to data, big is beautiful.
In conclusion, each of the Chapters offers insight into how our surroundings mitigate or
accentuate our inane tendencies—be it for honesty or dishonesty in the case of Chapters 2 and
3, or genetic predisposition in Chapter 4. As new data is unlocked for research and our arsenal
of methods for scientific exploration grows, so will our knowledge of human nature and how it
is interwoven with the world around us. To belabor the opening analogy one final time, one
might compare our understanding of human nature with the Rocky Mountains, as described in
the novel Centennial :
"The Rockies are therefore very young and should never be thought of as ancient.
They are still in the process of building and eroding, and no one today can calculate
what they will look like ten million years from now. They have the extravagant beauty
of youth, the allure of adolescence, and they are mountains to be loved."
— James A. Michener (2014, p.41)
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I. Introduction
Honest behavior is a central feature of economic and social life (Arrow, 1972; Algan and
Cahuc, 2013). Without honesty, promises are broken, contracts go unenforced, taxes remain
unpaid, and governments become corrupt. Such breaches of honesty are costly to individuals,
organizations and entire societies. For example, losses due to tax evasion in the US are estimated
in the hundreds of billions of dollars each year (IRS, 2016), and the global cost of corruption
and other illicit financial flows has been estimated at 1.3 trillion dollars annually—an amount
roughly equal in size to the gross domestic product of Australia (Kar and Freitas, 2011; Bank,
2017).
In this paper we examine how acts of civic honesty, where people voluntarily refrain from
opportunistic behavior, are affected by monetary incentives to act otherwise. Although there is
robust experimental literature on the conditions that give rise to honest behavior (Ellingsen and
Johannesson, 2004; Mazar et al., 2008; Shalvi et al., 2015; Gächter and Schulz, 2016; Gneezy
et al., 2018; Abeler et al., 2019), little is known about how material incentives impact civic
honesty, particularly in field settings. Understanding the relationship between civic honesty and
material incentives is not only practically relevant, but also theoretically important.
Theories of honesty make different predictions about the role of material incentives. Classic
economic models based on rational self-interest suggest that, all else equal, honest behavior will
become less common as the material incentives for dishonesty increase (Becker, 1968). Models of
human behavior that incorporate altruistic or other-regarding preferences also predict dishonesty
to rise with increasing incentives, as self-interest virtually always dominates concerns for the
welfare of others—we care about others but not as much as we care about ourselves (Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Fisman et al., 2007). As a result, self-interest will
play an increasingly prominent role in behavior as the material incentives for dishonesty grow.
Psychological models based on self-image maintenance predict that people will cheat for profit so
long as their behavior does not require them to negatively update their self-concept (Mazar et al.,
2008; Duval and Wicklund, 1972). However, it is unclear ex ante whether self-image concerns
will become more or less important as the incentives for dishonesty increase, and what form
that relationship will take. A further complication is that most of the experimental literature
on honest behavior involves modest financial stakes, has been conducted in laboratory settings
(where people understand their behavior is being observed), and tends to rely on populations
from Western, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic societies (Henrich et al., 2010).
II. Field Experiment
We visited 355 cities in 40 countries and turned in a total of 17,303 wallets. We typically
targeted the five to eight largest cities in a country, with roughly 400 observations per country.
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Wallets were returned to one of five societal institutions: (i) banks, (ii) theaters, museums, or
other cultural establishments, (iii) post offices, (iv) hotels, and (v) police stations, courts of law,
or other public offices. These institutions serve as useful benchmarks because they are common
across countries and typically have a public reception area where we could perform the drop-offs.
A. Design
Our wallets were transparent business card cases, which we used to ensure that recipients
could visually inspect without having to physically open the wallet (Figure A2.1 in Appendix
A2.I). Our key independent variable was whether the wallet contained money, which we randomly
varied to hold either no money or US $13.45 (“NoMoney” and “Money” conditions, respectively).
We used local currencies, and to ensure comparability across countries, we adjusted the amount
according to each country’s purchasing power. Each wallet also contained three identical business
cards, a grocery list, and a key. The business cards displayed the owner’s name and email address,
and we used fictitious but commonplace male names for each country. Both the grocery list and
business cards were written in the country’s local language to signal that the owner was a local
resident.
After walking into the building, one of our research assistants (from a pool of eleven male
and two female assistants) approached an employee at the counter and said, “Hi, I found this
[pointing to the wallet] on the street around the corner.” The wallet was then placed on the
counter and pushed over to the employee. “Somebody must have lost it. I’m in a hurry and have
to go. Can you please take care of it?” The research assistant then left the building without
leaving contact details or asking for a receipt. Our key outcome measure was whether recipients
contacted the owner to return the wallet. We created unique email addresses for every wallet
and recorded emails that were sent within 100 days of the initial drop-off. Complete methods
and results, including additional robustness checks such as testing for experimenter effects, can
be found in Appendix A2.
B. Results
As shown in the left half of Figure 2.1, our cross-country experiments return a remarkably
consistent result: citizens were overwhelmingly more likely to report lost wallets with money
than without. We observed this pattern for 38 out of our 40 countries, and in no country did
we find a statistically significant decrease in reporting rates when the wallet contained money.
On average, adding money to the wallet increased the likelihood of reporting a wallet from
40% in the NoMoney condition to 51% in the Money condition (P < 0.0001). This result
holds when controlling for a number of recipient and situational characteristics (Table A2.8 in
Appendix A2.III). Furthermore, while rates of civic honesty vary substantially from country to
country, the absolute increase in honesty across conditions was stable. As shown on the right
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Figure 2.1
Share of Wallets Reported in the NoMoney and Money Condition by Country
Notes. Left hand side: Share of wallets reported in treatments NoMoney (US $0) and Money (US $13.45) by country.
The amount of money in the wallet is adjusted according to each country’s purchasing power. Right hand side: Average
difference between treatment Money and NoMoney across quartiles based on absolute response rates in the NoMoney
condition. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
half of Figure 2.1, the average treatment effect is roughly equal in size across quartiles based on
absolute response rates.
Citizens displayed greater civic honesty when the wallets contained money, but perhaps
this is because the amount was not large enough to be financially meaningful. To examine
this possibility we also ran a “BigMoney” condition in three countries (US, UK, and Poland)
that increased the money inside the wallet to US $94.15, or seven times the amount in our
original Money condition. Shown in Figure 2.2, reporting rates in all three countries increase
even further when the wallets contained a sizable amount of money. Pooled across the three
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Figure 2.2
Reporting Rates as a Function of Monetary Stakes
Notes. Share of wallets reported in the NoMoney (US $0), Money (US
$13.45), and BigMoney (US $94.15) conditions.
countries, response rates increased from 46% in the NoMoney condition to 61% in the Money
condition, and topped out at 72% in the BigMoney condition (P < 0.0001 for all pairwise
comparisons; Table A2.9 in Appendix A2.III).
III. Mechanism
We next turn to the question of why people are especially likely to return a lost wallet
when it contains more, rather than less, money. Our study design allows us to rule out several
possible explanations. We first explored the possibility that recipients were worried about legal
penalties for failing to return a wallet, especially when the wallet contained increasing amounts
of money. To address this issue, we examined whether relative reporting rates were affected
by (a) the presence of other individuals when receiving the wallet, (b) the presence of security
cameras in the building, and (c) state-level variation in lost property laws within the United
States. Civic honesty should increase as a function of these variables if recipients were concerned
about possible punishment or probability of detection, yet we find that none of these factors
explain meaningful variation in reporting rates across treatment conditions (Tables A2.14-A2.16
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in Appendix A2.IV). A second explanation is that since we only measured whether recipients
reported a lost wallet, recipients in the money conditions may have been more likely to return
the wallets while pocketing the cash. We conducted an audit on a subset of wallets reported to us
and do not find support for this explanation: over 98% of the money in the wallets we collected
was returned. A third possible explanation is that recipients expected a larger “finder’s fee”
upon returning wallets with greater amounts of money. Using national representative surveys
conducted in the US, UK, and Poland, we asked respondents the size of the reward they would
expect upon returning a wallet with the amounts of money we used in our studies. We fail to
find evidence that people expect a larger reward for returning a wallet with more, rather than
less, money (Table A2.17 in Appendix A2.IV).
Having ruled out three possible explanations, we next formulate and test a simple behavioral
model that captures the pattern of results observed in the data (full model details can be found
in Appendix A2.II). In our framework, civic honesty is determined by the interplay between four
components: (i) the economic payoff of keeping the wallet, (ii) the fixed effort cost of contacting
the wallet’s owner, (iii) an altruistic concern for the owner’s welfare, and (iv) the costs associated
with negatively updating one’s self-image as a thief (what we will call “theft aversion”).
A key feature of our framework is that altruistic concerns are affected by the contents of
the wallet thought to be valuable to the owner, whereas concerns of theft aversion are only
affected by the contents of the wallet that are also valuable to the recipient (e.g., money). To
distinguish between these two motivations, we conducted a “Money-NoKey” condition in our
US, UK, and Poland locations with wallets identical to our Money condition but which did not
contain a key. Unlike money, the key is valuable to the owner but not to the recipient, and so
any difference between the Money and Money-NoKey conditions can be ascribed to altruistic
concerns. Shown in Table A2.10 in Appendix A2.III, recipients were on average 9.2 percentage
points more likely to report a wallet with a key than without (P = 0.0001 when results are
pooled across countries). This suggests that recipients reported a lost wallet partly because
recipients are concerned about the harm they impose on the owner.
The second part of our framework—and crucial to explaining the increase in reporting
rates for wallets with greater amounts of money—involves the aversion to viewing oneself as a
thief. Using nationally representative surveys conducted in the US, UK, and Poland, we asked
respondents to imagine receiving a wallet with the contents in our four conditions (NoMoney,
Money, BigMoney, and Money-NoKey) and rated the extent to which failing to return the wallet
would feel like stealing on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very much). Respondents reported
that failing to return a wallet would feel more like stealing when the wallet contained a modest
amount of money than when it contained no money, and that such behavior would feel even
more like stealing when the wallet contained a substantial amount of money (P ≤ 0.007 for
all pairwise comparisons; Table A2.11 in Appendix A2.III). This tells us that, consistent with
our behavioral data on wallet reporting rates, the self-image cost of failing to return the wallet
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likely increases with the amount of money in the wallet. By contrast, we fail to observe a
reliable difference in “feels like stealing” scores when comparing wallets that contained the same
amount of money but differed in whether they also contained a key (Money vs. Money-NoKey;
P = 0.259). This tells us that concerns of theft aversion are likely tied to contents valuable to
the recipient, such as the amount of money inside the wallet, but not to other contents that are
only valuable to the owner. Although survey responses do not always generalize to real behavior
and should be interpreted carefully, these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that larger
monetary payoffs for dishonesty are also associated with increased psychological costs, and that
the increase in psychological costs can outweigh the marginal economic benefits of dishonesty.
IV. Prediction Experiments
In a final set of studies, we investigated whether people anticipate this form of civic hon-
esty. We asked a sample of 299 participants to predict reporting rates in the US for wallets
that contained $0, $13.45, and $94.15 (corresponding to our NoMoney, Money, and BigMoney
conditions). To encourage accuracy, we notified respondents that the most accurate predictors
would receive a cash bonus. Shown in Figure 2.3 (middle), we find that respondents’ beliefs
were at odds with the behavioral data (Figure 2.3, left). Respondents predicted that rates of
civic honesty would be highest when the wallet contained no money (M = 73%, SD = 29),
lower when the wallet contained a modest amount of money (M = 65%, SD = 24), and lower
still when the wallet contained a substantial amount of money (M = 55%, SD = 29). The av-
erage predicted change in reporting rates from condition to condition was significantly different
from the actual change in reporting rates (P < 0.001 for all pairwise comparisons). As wallet
amounts increased, 64% of respondents incorrectly predicted reporting rates would decrease and
18% correctly predicted reporting rates would increase (P < 0.001 by a sign test). Additional
questioning suggests that respondents’ predictions reflected a mental model of human behavior
that exaggerates the role of narrow self-interest (Kruger and Gilovich, 1999; Miller and Ratner,
1998). When wallets contained more money, respondents expected self-interest to grow and
altruistic concerns for the owner to fade, and gave little weight to theft aversion in influencing
reporting rates (Table A2.13 in Appendix A2.III).
The general public incorrectly predicts how citizens will respond as the monetary value of
the wallet increases, but perhaps professional economists will be more accurate. We asked a sam-
ple of 279 top-performing academic economists to predict our results. Like our non-experts, this
sample also did not expect reporting rates to increase for wallets with greater amounts of money.
Shown in Figure 2.3 (right), respondents on average predicted that rates of civic honesty would
be higher in the NoMoney and Money conditions (M = 69%, SD = 25 and M = 69%, SD = 21,
respectively) than in the BigMoney condition (M = 66%, SD = 23). These predictions were
again significantly different from the actual changes we observe across conditions (P < 0.001
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Figure 2.3
Actual versus Predicted Reporting Rates
Notes. (left) Actual reporting rates in the US for each condition (N = 800). Error bars represent robust standard errors.
(middle) Average predicted reporting rates for the US by our non-expert sample (N = 299). Error bars represent robust
standard errors clustered by participants. (right) Average predicted reporting rates for the US by our expert sample of
academic economists (N = 279). Error bars represent robust standard errors clustered by participants.
for all pairwise comparisons). However, the degree of miscalibration among economists was
less severe than in our non-expert sample. As wallet amounts increased, 49% of economists
incorrectly predicted reporting rates would decrease and 29% correctly predicted reporting rates
would increase (P < 0.001 by a sign test).
V. Conclusion
We conducted field experiments in 40 countries to examine whether people act more dishon-
estly when they have a greater economic incentive to do so, and found the opposite to be true.
Citizens were more likely to return wallets that contained relatively larger amounts of money.
This finding is robust across countries and institutions, and holds even when economic incentives
for dishonesty are substantial. Our results are consistent with theoretical models that incor-
porate altruism and self-image concerns, but also suggest modification in that non-pecuniary
motivations directly interact with the material benefits gained from dishonest behavior. When
people stand to heavily profit from engaging in dishonest behavior, the desire to cheat increases
but so do the psychological costs of viewing oneself as a thief—and sometimes the latter will
dominate the former.
Our findings also represent a unique data set for examining cross-country differences in civic
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honesty. Honesty is a key component of social capital (Guiso et al., 2011), and here we provide
an objective measure to supplement the large body of work that has traditionally examined
social capital using subjective survey measures (Glaeser et al., 2000; Nannestad, 2008; Algan
and Cahuc, 2013; Alesina and Giuliano, 2015). Using average response rates across countries,
we find substantial variation in rates of civic honesty, ranging from 14% to 76%. This variation
largely persists even when controlling for a country’s gross domestic product, suggesting that
other factors besides country wealth are also at play. In Appendix A2.III, we provide an analysis
suggesting that economically favorable geographic conditions, inclusive political institutions,
national education, and cultural values that emphasize moral norms extending beyond one’s
in-group are also positively associated with rates of civic honesty. Future research is needed to
identify how these and other factors may contribute to societal differences in honest behavior.
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Abstract: This paper demonstrates how corruption negatively impacts policy effectiveness in
a program that is explicitly designed to be unsusceptible to bribery, clientelism, and the em-
bezzlement of money: Brazil’s Bolsa Família program. The program’s centralized beneficiary
selection process enables me to identify families that were randomly admitted or not admitted
to Bolsa Família and to estimate the program’s effectiveness in different years and municipali-
ties. Exploiting a second natural experiment, I then show that Bolsa Família’s effect on school
enrollment increases by a third after a municipality has been audited at random. Using a the-
oretical model, administrative data, and a field experiment with 6,998 registration centers, I
find that local corruption increases the probability that families successfully underreport their
income when registering for Bolsa Família, making it harder to target the families that benefit
most. Ruling out alternative explanations, I show that neither changes in social norms, im-
proved school attendance monitoring, administrative processes, infrastructure, complementary
programs, tighter governance, nor increased whistleblowing can account for the increase in Bolsa
Família’s effectiveness after a municipality has been audited at random. Taken together, these
results suggest that income underreporting can explain how, despite the program’s safeguards,
local corruption undermines the effectiveness of Bolsa Família.
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Corruption is costly. While the direct costs of corruption—money diverted, embezzled,
stolen—are substantial, they may well be outweighed by indirect effects (Kaufmann, 2005) such
as underinvestment in human capital (Mo, 2001), higher child mortality (Gupta et al., 2001),
decreased private investment (Mauro, 1995), lower returns to public investment (Tanzi and
Davoodi, 1998), and slower economic growth (Mauro, 1995, 2004). This literature has mostly
focused on two consequences of corruption: the effect of missing funds (through embezzlement,
graft, inappropriate procurement) and of preferential access to public goods and services (in
exchange for bribes, votes, or because of family or group membership). Leakage of funds and
preferential access to public goods reduces the effectiveness of governments to provide adequate
education (e.g., Reinikka and Svensson, 2005; Ferraz et al., 2012; Abdulai and Hickey, 2016), run
medical systems (e.g., McPake et al., 1999; Holmberg and Rothstein, 2011; Mostert et al., 2015),
enforce traffic regulation (e.g., Bertrand et al., 2007; Olken and Barron, 2009), and operate
poverty-relief programs (e.g., Olken, 2006; Penfold-Becerra, 2007). However, even if effective
safeguards against bribery, clientelism, and embezzlement are in place, government programs
are not necessarily immune to the corrosive impact of corruption.
This paper shows how corruption negatively impacts policy effectiveness in a program
that is explicitly designed to be unsusceptible to bribery, clientelism, and the embezzlement of
money. Brazil’s Bolsa Família promotes educational participation by paying a monthly benefit
to approximately 14 million families if their children attend school regularly. These funds are
transferred directly to the beneficiaries so that local officials cannot pocket the money. Not
only are local officials bypassed in the payment process, they are also not involved in selecting
the families that benefit from Bolsa Família; the selection of beneficiaries is anonymized and
conducted through a central process to prevent local officials from controlling access to the
program to extract rents or to benefit their supporters. As a result, Bolsa Família is generally
considered an exception to Brazil’s otherwise widespread clientelism (Sugiyama and Hunter,
2013).1
One possible explanation for the negative effect of corruption is that it enables families
to underreport their income to gain or keep Bolsa Família; even if corrupt officials can not
embezzle funds, local corruption can make it easier for families to cheat. Accusations of families
underreporting their income are common both in the media and in the political discussion
(e.g., Brazil, 2016; Caram, 2016; Fausto Macedo, 2016; OGlobo, 2016). However, although it is
generally assumed that income underreporting decreases the effectiveness of programs like Bolsa
Família, this assumption has not previously been tested. This paper provides causal evidence
1. The prevention of clientelism at the local level does not ensure that politicians at the federal level cannot
expand the program for electoral reasons. How large these electoral gains are and whether this constitutes a
form of clientelism is hotly debated (e.g., Hunter and Power, 2007; Zucco, 2009; Bohn, 2011; Daïeff, 2015) but is
beyond the scope of this paper.
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linking local corruption, families’ ability to successfully underreport their income, and lower
causal effects of Bolsa Família on school enrollment.
Estimating the impact of corruption on the effectiveness of government policy is challenging
for two main reasons: First, it requires that corruption varies sufficiently much between the
places or during the time where the programs are evaluated—with all the usual caveats about the
endogeneity of corruption. To address this challenge, I use a well-established natural experiment,
Brazil’s audit lottery program. These audits of randomly selected municipalities have been shown
to decrease corruption in subsequent years (Avis et al., 2018), thus providing exogenous variation
in corruption between different places and years.
The main challenge is to measure the causal effect of the policy on school enrollment in
different regions and times, so that changes in its effectiveness can be estimated. While it
is common to use the accuracy of targeting as a proxy for the effectiveness of anti-poverty
programs, this is primarily done because no appropriate measure of program effectiveness is
available (De Janvry et al., 2012). Indeed, as pointed out by Ravallion (2009), better targeting
does not guarantee that a program is actually more effective. Thus, even if there is plausibly
exogenous variation in corruption, one also needs a second identification strategy that provides
causal estimates of the effects of the policy in different regions or times.
To estimate the effectiveness of Bolsa Família in different regions and times, I develop a
novel identification strategy that makes use of the program’s central automated selection process.
By using data from the Cadastro Único, the official database used for beneficiary selection, I
can reconstruct the algorithm’s priority strata to identify families on the margin of the program
that were randomly included or not included in Bolsa Família. Because the beneficiary selection
process uses only data in the Cadastro Único, there are no unobservable differences that affect
who gets included in the program. This built-in conditional independence allows me to estimate
the causal effect of Bolsa Família on school enrollment for different years, priority strata, and
municipalities. The identification strategy passes several validation tests, and it successfully
recovers the positive impact of the program documented by others (e.g., Cardoso and Souza,
2003; Glewwe and Kassouf, 2012; Schaffland, 2012; De Brauw et al., 2015).
This identification strategy has several advantages over existing approaches to estimating
the effect of Bolsa Família. First, because it uses the same data as the selection algorithm, the
identification strategy can identify families that were actually on the margin of the program, un-
like many evaluations that rely on propensity scores to match families with similar probabilities
of being included in Bolsa Família (e.g., Cardoso and Souza, 2003; Schaffland, 2012). Second,
the estimated treatment effects are unbiased, conditional on self-reported income, because the
identification strategy uses the official database to identify marginal families based on their in-
come before they are included in Bolsa Família.2 Third, unlike approaches that use variation in
2. Self-reported incomes in other data sets are likely to differ from data in the Cadastro Único, where
families have stronger incentives to underreport their incomes. Moreover, relative to non-beneficiaries, beneficiary
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the program’s rollout or geographic coverage (e.g., Glewwe and Kassouf, 2012), it can estimate
the effectiveness of the program at the municipality level and at different times. Finally, while
De Janvry et al. (2012) measure policy effectiveness at the municipality level, they estimate
it for Bolsa Escola, Bolsa Família’s predecessor program. One crucial difference between the
two programs is that municipalities selected the beneficiaries for Bolsa Escola. As a result, the
critical assumption that future beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries have similar trends in educa-
tional participation, conditional on child characteristics, need not hold for Bolsa Escola,3 but it
is guaranteed by Bolsa Família’s centralized beneficiary selection process.
The first main result of the paper is that Bolsa Família is less effective in municipalities with
more corruption, even though local officials cannot divert money from the program and have no
say in the selection of beneficiaries. Using Brazil’s initiative to randomly audit municipalities
as an exogenous shock to corruption, I show that Bolsa Família’s effect on school enrollment
increases by about a third after a random audit. This finding is highly robust. Most importantly,
it persists if the sample is defined more restrictively and for different specifications of the two
natural experiments.
I then test whether income underreporting can account for this result. Because munici-
palities are responsible for registering potential beneficiaries, local corruption can play the most
prominent role at the registration stage. Using a theoretical model, administrative data, and a
field experiment, I show that local corruption increases the probability that families successfully
underreport their income. This makes it harder to target the families that benefit most from
Bolsa Família, which decreases the effectiveness of the program.
I consider a simplified model of Bolsa Família’s registration process, where families decide
what income to report, and the families with the lowest self-reported incomes are included in the
program. If a family’s reported income deviates too much from its actual income, it risks being
caught and the probability of detection is lower in municipalities with more corruption. The
first part of the registration model predicts that after a random audit income underreporting
decreases together with local corruption. As more families underreport their income, Bolsa
Família can no longer target the families that benefit most, and its effectiveness decreases.
Thus, the second part of the model explains how Bolsa Família becomes more effective after a
random audit and makes testable predictions about the profile of families that will see the most
substantial effectiveness gains.
households are more likely to underreport their incomes in other surveys in order to avoid detection, so that
methods that match or weight beneficiary and non-beneficiary families based on their reported income after
treatment assignment (e.g., Cardoso and Souza, 2003; De Brauw et al., 2015) are potentially biased. Strategic
income reporting is also problematic for regression discontinuity designs (e.g., Schaffland, 2012) that rely on
the assumption that families with a self-reported income around Bolsa Família’s income threshold are relatively
similar.
3. Indeed, as program effectiveness depends on selecting the children with the biggest expected gains from
inclusion, municipalities’ selections might well be affected by characteristics that are unobservable to the re-
searchers.
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As predicted by the registration model, fewer families claim to have zero income, and fewer
families report an income that is eligible for Bolsa Família after a municipality has been audited
at random. Moreover, just after a random audit the number of ineligible families that are
detected and excluded from the Bolsa Família program skyrockets, but then falls to a lower level
than before the audit, suggesting that the audits indeed increase the probability that ineligible
families are detected and discourage new registrants from underreporting their income. As the
second part of the model predicts, the treatment effect increases most for families that were not
visited by a social worker during the registration process and for families that have the strongest
incentives to misrepresent their incomes.
As direct evidence for the income underreporting explanation, I conducted a field experi-
ment with 6,998 Bolsa Família registration centers to show that local administrators are indeed
less likely to register ineligible families after a random audit. Fictitious applicants asked about
the possibility of receiving Bolsa Família, and their characteristics were experimentally varied to
make them eligible or ineligible while holding everything else constant. Consistent with the in-
come underreporting mechanism, registration centers in audited municipalities are significantly
less likely to engage with ineligible families and to incorrectly state that a sender’s income is
compatible with Bolsa Família. Taken together, these findings suggest that the effectiveness
gains of Bolsa Família are the result of improvements in the way the program is targeted to the
families that benefit from it the most.
The lower rates of income underreporting after a random audit might also reflect changes
in social norms, rather than differences in the difficulty of successfully misrepresenting one’s
income. For example, the experience of being audited and the revelation of the irregularities in
Bolsa Família might change citizens’ social norms about underreporting their income, condoning
public corruption, or reporting suspected fraud. To test this alternative hypothesis, I elicited
relevant social norms in an incentivized online experiment with 675 participants living in 424
municipalities, some of which had been randomly selected for audits in the past. Using the
Krupka and Weber (2013) norm elicitation task, I find no evidence that social norms change as
a result of a random audit.
Finally, I test several alternative explanations for the increased effectiveness of Bolsa Família
after a random audit. To show that embezzled or otherwise diverted funds can indeed not explain
the effect of local corruption on the program’s effectiveness, I quantify the maximum amount
of funding that local administrators can pocket through various strategies. Less than 0.0001%
of funds are paid to stolen benefit cards, and the rate of income underreporting is more than
ten times smaller among public servants than in the general population. Thus, the financial
damages are negligible and cannot account for the effectiveness gains. As municipalities are
also responsible for monitoring school attendance, I test whether improvements in monitoring
contribute to the effect. Moreover, data from Bolsa Família’s internal control programs show
that unintentional errors and outdated information do not account for the gains in program
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effectiveness. Similarly, neither changes in administrative processes, nor better-equipped regis-
tration centers can explain the results. Finally, I rule out that improved oversight is behind the
effectiveness gains, using data on municipalities’ social governance councils and Bolsa Família’s
whistleblowing systems.
To my knowledge, this paper presents the first evidence that links income underreporting
to lower treatment effects of Bolsa Família or a similar conditional cash transfer program. While
evidence for income underreporting is not new,4 showing that it can account for the negative
impact of corruption on the program’s effectiveness fills a significant gap in the literature given
the attention it receives in the public discussion of Bolsa Família and similar conditional cash
transfer programs. The results suggest that efforts to detect underreporting by Brazil’s federal
government (e.g., Brazil, 2016) probably increase the effectiveness of Bolsa Família in the long
run.
The previous research that the findings of this paper are most closely related to is De Janvry
et al. (2012), who study the effects of electoral incentives on the effectiveness of Bolsa Escola and
show that the program is more effective at reducing school dropout if a mayor faces reelection.
My paper differs from theirs in three essential aspects: First, the focus of my paper is on
the causal impact of corruption, whereas De Janvry et al. (2012) study electoral incentives.
Second, municipalities were in charge of selecting the beneficiaries under Bolsa Escola. Thus, my
paper shows that even with Bolsa Família’s additional safeguards against corruption, program
effectiveness is still affected by local corruption. Finally, as mentioned earlier, Bolsa Família’s
centralized selection process allows me to make a much stronger case against selection and
unobserved variable bias when estimating the program’s effectiveness. The results are also
related to a recent paper by Brollo et al. (2019), who provide evidence that mayors strategically
manipulate the enforcement of school attendance conditionalities for electoral reasons. While
I find no evidence that school attendance monitoring contributes substantially to the gains in
program effectiveness, the results reported by Brollo et al. (2019) suggest that electoral motives
might explain why some administrators are more lenient when verifying families’ incomes.
This paper contributes to the discussion of the effective targeting of social programs. The
discussion commonly focuses on the advantages and drawbacks of different targeting schemes
(e.g., Alderman, 2002; Ravallion, 2008; Alatas et al., 2012; Stoeffler et al., 2016) or the financial
consequences of mistargeting and elite capture (Alatas et al., 2019). However, better targeting
does not necessarily imply that anti-poverty programs also perform better (Ravallion, 2009), and
the actual implications of mistargeting for the effectiveness of these programs are rarely tested.
The evidence presented here makes a strong case that improved targeting indeed increases the
4. In addition to cases uncovered by the press and by government audits, there is also the alarming observa-
tion that the number of families receiving Bolsa Família exceeds the number of eligible families estimated from
the census in a significant share of municipalities (Fried, 2012). Moreover, Firpo et al. (2014) describe irregu-
larities in the distribution of reported incomes around the eligibility threshold that are consistent with income
underreporting or with a temporary reduction of labor supply to qualify for the program.
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effectiveness of Bolsa Família. Given the importance of accurate self-reporting and the challenges
of income verification for the effective targeting of Bolsa Família and similar programs, the
final section of this paper suggests possible interventions to increase the likelihood of accurate
reporting.
Taken together, the results of this paper suggest that income underreporting can explain
how—despite Bolsa Família’s safeguards against bribery, clientelism, and embezzlement—local
corruption undermines the effectiveness of the program. Even though Bolsa Família is often cited
as an example of how to safeguard anti-poverty programs against corruption, it is significantly
more effective after a random anti-corruption audit. Thus, the results highlight the positive
effect of government audits (e.g., Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2003; Olken, 2007; Bobonis et al.,
2016; Avis et al., 2018).
The paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the relevant institutional details of
the Bolsa Família program. Section III discusses how the beneficiary selection process can be
used to estimate the causal effects of the program. Section IV shows the main finding of the
paper, that local corruption decreases the effectiveness of Bolsa Família. Section V introduces
a theoretical model of how income underreporting affects the program’s effectiveness, which is
then tested using administrative data and a field experiment. Section VI addresses the limited
ways in which corrupt local officials can benefit financially from Bolsa Família. Section VII
examines to what degree other explanations can contribute to the effect. Section VIII discusses
the policy implications of the paper and concludes.
II. Institutional Background: Bolsa Família Program
Brazil’s Bolsa Família program bypasses local officials for both the payment and the ben-
eficiary selection process, making it a suitable setting to study effects of corruption other than
clientelism and embezzlement. This section describes four features of the Bolsa Família program
that are relevant for this study: First, I explain how Bolsa Família incentivizes educational par-
ticipation through conditional cash transfers, which allows me to use the program’s impact on
school enrollment as a measure of its effectiveness. Second, I turn to the centralized process to
select the families to include in Bolsa Família, which forms the backbone of the identification
strategy that allows me to identify the program’s effectiveness in different municipalities. I then
discuss Bolsa Famiília’s safeguards against embezzlement and abuse of the program for electoral
gains, before turning to its remaining vulnerabilities to other forms of corruption.
A. Bolsa Família’s Incentives for Educational Participation
Bolsa Família, the world’s largest conditional cash transfer program, covers approximately
14 million families and pays a monthly benefit provided that families comply with several con-
ditionalities, including regular school attendance. It is arguably Brazil’s main federal initiative
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to increase educational participation, both in terms of its size and its prominence in the public
discourse.
In addition to guaranteeing a minimum income for extremely poor households, Bolsa
Família seeks to combat the intergenerational transmission of poverty by conditioning some
of the payments on school attendance, vaccination, and medical checkups (Lindert et al., 2007).
To this aim, the program combines unconditional benefits to families in extreme poverty with
conditional transfers to poor households with pregnant women and children.5 The program was
created in early 2004 through a merger of four predecessor programs; Fome Zero and Bolsa
Alimentação were focused on nutrition, Auxílio Gas subsidized cooking gas, and Bolsa Escola
was a conditional cash transfer program to increase school enrollment.6 The consolidation of
Brazil’s anti-poverty initiatives began with the creation of a shared centralized database,7 the
Cadastro Único, in 2001 and culminated with the establishment of the Ministério do Desen-
volvimento Social (MDS) in 2004. The Cadastro Único serves as the main registry for data on
potential beneficiaries of Brazil’s anti-poverty programs and is maintained by the MDS and the
state-owned federal savings bank, the Caixa Ecônomica Federal (Caixa).
Under the original rules, households with a per capita income of less than R$ 50 (the ex-
treme poverty line) were considered extremely poor and received an unconditional basic transfer
of R$ 50, and all families with a per capita income of less than R$ 100 (the poverty line) were
eligible for variable benefits of R$ 15 for up to three pregnant women or children aged 0 to
15, provided that they comply with the educational and health conditionalities. Although most
closely associated with the government of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, every government since
has significantly expanded eligibility and benefits under the program: The eligibility thresholds
have subsequently increased to R$ 85 and R$ 170, the basic benefit has been increased to R$
89, variable benefits stand at R$ 41 are now paid for up to five children ages 0 to 15 and one
pregnant female, and additional benefits for adolescents (16 to 17) were introduced in 2012 (cur-
rently paying R$ 48 for up to two adolescents). Also introduced was an additional payment
individually calibrated such that beneficiaries’ post-transfer income per capita (including Bolsa
Família) reaches the extreme poverty threshold.
Once a family is included in Bolsa Família, it is required to adhere to a schedule of medical
checkups and vaccinations for pregnant women, nursing mothers, and young children, and to
ensure that children aged 6 to 15 attend school at least 85% of the time and adolescents at least
75% of the time. The exact conditionalities are decided by the ministries of health and education,
that then train municipal workers to monitor and report program compliance through the federal
government’s online systems. Failure to comply initially results in a warning. If during the next
5. For the purpose Bolsa Família, Lei n◦ 10.836 defines a family as a "nuclear family, possibly extended by
other individuals who have kinship or affinity with it, who form a domestic group, live under the same roof, and
support each other." I will use the terms family and household interchangeably.
6. Lei n◦ 10.836 (January 9, 2004)
7. Decreto no 3.877 (July 24, 2001)
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six months the family does not fulfill the conditionalities, the payment is withheld for one month
but can be withdrawn in the next if the family addresses the problem. A third or fourth month
of non-compliance results in a two-month suspension of the benefit. During this time no benefit
is paid and the family is on probation. Failure to comply during this period results in the
cancellation of the benefit and exclusion of the family from the program (MDS and SENARC,
2018).
The federal government can also impose sanctions if a family does not regularly update its
data, does not withdraw money for several months, reaches a per capita income that exceeds
half a minimum wage, or if it detects that a family has provided false information during the
registration process (MDS and SENARC, 2015).
B. Bolsa Família’s Beneficiary Selection Process
Partly as a result of Bolsa Família’s expansion, coverage of the program is not always uni-
versal. Thus, for the time of the analysis (2012-2017), the official database, the Cadastro Único,
contains data on both beneficiary families and eligible non-beneficiary families. The number
of available places in Bolsa Família depends on the federal funding provided for the program
and the municipality’s official poverty rate, which is only periodically updated. The program’s
beneficiary selection process guarantees that only family characteristics that are observable in
the Cadastro Único affect who is included in the Bolsa Família program. In Section III, I de-
scribe in detail how this process can be used to estimate the causal effects of Bolsa Família by
constructing otherwise identical treatment and control groups.
The allocation of benefits is split into four phases:
1. Registration: Families with an income of less than half a minimum wage (currently R$ 499)
register in the Cadastro Único, either at the Centro de Referência de Assistência Social
(CRAS), the local center for social assistance, or with a social worker during a home visit.
This step happens at the municipal level. A social worker then inputs the data into the
Cadastro Único, which is maintained by the Caixa Ecônomica Federal (Caixa). Families
have to update their data at least every other year.
2. Qualification: Once a month, Caixa generates aggregated reports for each municipality
with the number of qualifying families in different vulnerability categories. It first extracts
data on all qualifying families—families with an income below the current threshold for
Bolsa Família that have complete and updated information and are not excluded from
the program because of sanctions.8 These families are categorized by vulnerability (e.g.,
indigenous families, families with suspected child labor, families that benefit from another
8. Families can be excluded from Bolsa Família for at least a year for severe infractions, such as underreporting
their income. More on this in Section V.
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social program)9 and the Caixa then produces aggregated reports to determine the number
of benefits allocated to each vulnerability category in each municipality.
3. Selection: Based on these aggregate reports, the Secretaria Nacional de Renda de Cidada-
nia (SENARC) decides how many benefits it allocates to each vulnerability category and
each municipality. SENARC uses an algorithm that optimizes the allocation of benefits
to each category, subject to a budget constraint and additional parameters that allow the
SENARC to prioritize especially vulnerable categories.10 Once it has decided how many
benefits it allocates to families in each category, SENARC distributes the benefits across
municipalities and prioritizes places with a lower Bolsa Família coverage rate relative to
the official municipal poverty rates from the census. SENARC then instructs the Caixa
how many benefits to grant to families in each municipality and category.
4. Concession: In the final phase, the Caixa’s computer system determines the actual benefi-
ciaries in each vulnerability category and municipality based on families’ per capita income
and the number of children. Thus, conditional on being in the same vulnerability category
and in the same municipality, families with a lower per capita income are included first.
Conditional on also having the same per capita income, families with more school-aged
children are prioritized. When a family is formally included in the program, the Caixa sets
up an account for the family, starts the monthly payments, and issues a magnetic stripe
card that allows the family to access the benefits. Importantly, once a family is part of the
program, it continues to receive the benefits even if a more deserving family registers in
the Cadastro Único. Even if the family’s income increases above the threshold for Bolsa
Família, the family stays in the program for two more years.11
C. Bolsa Família’s Safeguards against Corruption
Bolsa Família was designed to minimize the influence of corruption—both at the federal
and the local level—and several government agencies operate whistleblowing systems and have
the power to investigate alleged abuse of the program.12
At the federal level, the main concern is the targeting of funds to municipalities and de-
mographic groups for electoral gains. The risk of geographical quotas being set for electoral
purposes is mitigated by tying the process to objective census data. Moreover, the federal gov-
9. The exact categories have changed over time.
10. The process is not standardized, a fact that has repeatedly been criticized by the Federal Court of
Accounts (e.g., TCU, 2006). Fortunately, while this introduces an undesirable human element in the allocation
of benefits between categories, the allocation of benefits within categories is unaffected. The estimation strategy
outlined in Section III uses only variation within categories.
11. This rule mitigates families’ incentives to underreport their income when they update their data. More-
over, due to the frequent increases of the income threshold, many families would otherwise leave the program
just to qualify again after the next increase.
12. For a detailed description of Bolsa Família’s anti-corruption efforts see Lindert et al. (2007).
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ernment has at various points been barred from issuing reports or publications about Bolsa
Família in the months leading up to an election.
At the local level, two concerns dominate the efforts: that local officials embezzle funds
from the program for personal gain and that they control the allocation process to trade ben-
efits for bribes or votes. The risk of embezzlement is greatly mitigated by transferring funds
directly to beneficiaries instead of making bulk payments to state or municipal governments.
To address the second concern, the centralized beneficiary selection process was put in place.
Moreover, municipalities are required to publish monthly lists of beneficiaries and the payments
they received, and all transfers, including full names of the beneficiaries, are also published by
the federal government on the Portal da Transparência.
The MDS employs a combination of control mechanisms and incentives for program ad-
ministrators. Self-reported incomes are compared to records of the department of labor and
lists of beneficiaries are cross-referenced with other administrative data such as motor-vehicle
registrations. As the majority of beneficiaries is not formally employed, per capita income often
cannot be readily verified and income underreporting will often only be detected if a family’s
lifestyle is incompatible with its reported income—for example, if the family buys a new car.
In addition to its verification efforts, the MDS assesses the quality of monitoring and registra-
tions every month and ties federal contributions to administrative costs to an index of municipal
management quality, the Índice de Gestão Descentralizada do Município (IGD-M).
In addition to the MDS’s internal monitoring initiatives, three other government agencies—
the Office of the Comptroller General (CGU), the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU), and the
independent public prosecutor’s office—are responsible for oversight of the program. The CGU
regularly selects municipalities at random to conduct in-depth audits of municipalities.13 The
CGU’s manuals specify the specific actions to be taken concerning Bolsa Família in randomly
audited municipalities: First, the auditors will verify the eligibility of a random sample of
beneficiaries in the municipality. Second, auditors will cross-reference public employment records
with lists of Bolsa Família beneficiaries. Third, payments and operations of the Caixa are
scrutinized. Amongst other things, auditors look for proof that benefit cards were delivered to
beneficiary families.14 Fourth, auditors examine monitoring systems for school attendance and
compliance with the medical conditionalities. For example, auditors cross-reference reported
attendance rates in the online system with entries in class books. Finally, auditors control
the existence and recent activities of local governance bodies such as the municipality’s social
control council. Moreover, the MDS, the CGU, and the Caixa all operate whistleblower systems
to report discrepancies and abuse of the program, and auditors investigate specific complaints
received through these systems.
13. This is described in more detail in Section IV.
14. This has become less important, as most of the payment cards are now sent directly to beneficiaries.
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D. Bolsa Família’s Vulnerabilities to Corruption
Despite these efforts, the number of families receiving Bolsa Família exceeds the number of
eligible families estimated from the census in a significant share of municipalities (Fried, 2012).
While Bolsa Família’s centralized beneficiary selection and payment systems are highly effective
at preventing outright embezzlement of money designated for beneficiary families, they do not
guarantee that the program is effectively administrated on site. Indeed, as others have pointed
out (e.g., Lindert et al., 2007), fraud, error, and political interference in Bolsa Família are most
likely at the municipal level. As a result, local corruption can affect the effectiveness of the
Bolsa Família program by influencing how diligently municipalities fulfill their responsibilities
in implementing the program.
A quick Google search reveals numerous news reports of irregularities uncovered by the
CGU audits. Common findings include families underreporting their income, schools maintaining
sloppy attendance records, social control councils that haven’t met for more than a year, delays
in the delivery of benefit cards, and the occasional public servant being listed as a member of
an unrelated beneficiary household. Note that this implies that local officials can still benefit
financially from Bolsa Família, albeit to a much smaller degree than if they could get their hands
on all of the payments. Section VI takes a detailed look at the remaining strategies for personal
enrichment and shows that the financial damages from these practices are relatively small and
cannot account for the differences in program performance.
Bolsa Família’s effectiveness in promoting school enrollment depends crucially on its ability
to target the families that have the worst expected outcomes in the absence of the cash transfer.
In places where corruption is rampant, the program’s targeting accuracy is likely to be lower:
families, particularly those with an income just above the eligibility threshold, have a strong
incentive to underreport their earnings, and corrupt local administrators, aware of this fact, can
turn a blind eye in return for a favor. Families whose gross income can be more readily verified
will occasionally misrepresent their household composition and include the children of relatives
or neighbors to achieve a lower per capita income. In a newsworthy example, a family received
monthly benefits for four-year-old Billy da Rosa Silva until a social worker sent to invite the
family to a routine health checkup discovered that Billy was a cat (Hider, 2014). There is also
evidence that some families deliberately reduce their labor supply leading up to their registration
(Firpo et al., 2014).15
15. Not all mistargeting is the result of intentional deception. Potential beneficiaries might provide weekly
instead of monthly wages and mistakes are made because an administrator’s fingers miss the mark on a keyboard
or sloppy handwriting on a form is incorrectly deciphered when digitizing the data. However, Section VII shows
that inadequate administrative processes alone cannot explain the differences in program performance.
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III. Estimating the Effectiveness of Bolsa Família
To measure the effectiveness of Bolsa Família in different municipalities, I reconstruct the
program’s priority strata to find families that were randomly admitted or not admitted, using
Bolsa Família’s official database and beneficiary selection algorithm.
A. Data—the Cadastro Único
The primary data used for the analysis is the Cadastro Único, the official database used to
select beneficiary families for the Bolsa Família program. As the selection algorithm uses only
the Cadastro Único, there can be no unobservable characteristics that affect who receives Bolsa
Família.
Families with a per capita income of less than half a minimum wage can register in the
Cadastro Único and are then required to update their data at least every other year. As reg-
istration is voluntary, one might worry that self-selection into the Cadastro Único leads to
non-representative estimates. However, this is hardly a concern in practice: for the period of
the analysis (2012-2017), the registration rate is close to 100%. So close in fact, that the MDS
stopped using the registration rate as a performance indicator in the IGD-M in July 2015 (see
Figure A3.6 in Appendix A3.V).
The Cadastro Único provides two types of files on each family. The personal files contain
information on each family member’s demographics, as well as information on literacy, education,
and employment. The family file contains information on the family income, participation in
other welfare programs, as well as information on the family’s living conditions, such as the
material of floors and walls, and access to public services such as water, electricity, sewage
systems, and garbage collection. As this additional data is not used to select beneficiaries, I can
use it to test whether the identification strategy successfully deals with spurious correlations.
While some data in the Cadastro Único is self-reported by families, other variables are
set by the MDS’s computer system. For example, the indicator of whether a family benefits
from Bolsa Família is automatically changed at some point after the family registered. Thus,
a cross-section from the Cadastro Único will contain data from different time-points. I address
this problem by considering a family’s Bolsa Família status at the beginning of the year. This
approach is conservative in that it overestimates the outcomes of supposedly unincluded families,
some of which might have benefited from Bolsa Família later in the year.
In addition to the Cadastro Único, this paper uses data from several other sources to
investigate how corruption affects the effectiveness of the Bolsa Família program. Data on
corruption and Brazil’s random audit program is from the Office of the Comptroller General
(CGU) and is discussed in more detail in Section IV. The Portal da Transparência publishes
expenditures by the Brazilian government, including lists of all the Bolsa Família payments made
in any given month and can be used to determine whether some payments have been withheld
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because of a failure to comply with the program’s conditionalities and whether a family has been
excluded from the Bolsa Família program. To better understand the mechanism, the paper uses
data from the annual census of social services (the Censo SUAS), quality control data from the
index of municipal management quality (IGD-M), and data on denunciations and complaints
received through the whistleblowing systems of the MDS.
B. Sample—Randomly Admitted Families
Having access to all the data that the selection algorithm uses, I can reconstruct the priority
strata to find families that were randomly included or not included in Bolsa Família. This allows
me to estimate the effects of the Bolsa Família program in different years and municipalities.
As Bolsa Família explicitly targets the most impoverished families, there are significant
differences between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. While some of these differences are
observable in the Cadastro Único, others are unobservable and cannot easily be controlled for
a regression. Fortunately, because the selection of beneficiaries is based solely on families’
information in the Cadastro Único, it cannot be affected by unobservable variables.16 Thus,
having access to both the selection algorithm and the database used to select the beneficiaries, I
can identify otherwise identical beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries who have not only the same
observable characteristics but also the same expected unobservable characteristics.
To understand how the selection algorithm can be used to find families that were randomly
admitted or not admitted to the Bolsa Família program, recall the four phases of the benefit
allocation process: In the registration phase, families register in their municipality, and their data
is entered in the Cadastro Único. In the qualification phase, the Caixa categorizes all eligible
families by vulnerability (e.g., indigenous families, families with suspected child labor) and sends
the aggregated numbers for each municipality to SENARC. In the selection phase, SENARC
decides how many benefits it allocates to each vulnerability category and each municipality. In
the final concession phase, the Caixa determines the actual beneficiaries in each category and
municipality based on families’ per capita income and the number of children.
The identification strategy closely mirrors the four phases of the beneficiary selection al-
gorithm: First, in line with the registration phase, only families that were never part of the
program are considered; these are mostly newly registered families and families that did not
previously qualify for the program but that now qualify after a change in the eligibility rules
of Bolsa Família. Second, mimicking the qualification phase and the selection phase, families
are matched based on the municipality and vulnerability category, and fixed effects are used to
exploit only variation between families of the same group. Finally, to capture the concession
phase, families are additionally matched based on their exact income and their household compo-
16. Lindert et al. (2007, p.45) write: "Application of eligibility criteria to family data is carried out automat-
ically by the Cadastro Único software, which compares self-reported incomes to the official eligibility thresholds,
prioritizing families and assigning benefits according to income and family composition."
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sition.17 At each point in time, only the marginal priority strata—those with both selected and
unselected families—are considered, leaving only strata where the algorithm randomly included
some but not all families in the Bolsa Família program.
While the selection algorithm does not per se prioritize families that have registered earlier,
these families have had more opportunities to be included than more recently registered fami-
lies. The most conservative approach is to include only families that register for the first time,
excluding those that only updated data from an earlier registration. This, however, takes quite
a toll on the number of families that can be sufficiently precisely matched—especially in smaller
municipalities. Alternatively, families can also be matched on the exact month of the registra-
tion or the update, but this tends to reduce geographic coverage by a comparable amount. As a
compromise, results are shown for all three samples: the most representative sample of all fami-
lies that can be sufficiently precisely matched irrespective of whether their current information is
from a new or an updated registration, the sample of families that are newly registered, and the
sample of families that is matched on the exact month of the registration or data actualization.
C. Estimating the Treatment Effects
Assume for a moment that there are only families belonging to the same vulnerability
category, with the exact same family income and number of children—i.e., all families are in
the same priority stratum—and living in the same municipality. Families are observed for two
periods:18 At t = 0, families register (or update their data) and none of the families receive
Bolsa Família. Over the next year, the algorithm includes some of the families in the Bolsa
Família program, while it cannot accommodate others due to the number of available funds for
this category and municipality. Thus, when outcomes are observed again at t = 1, some families
have been benefiting from Bolsa Família, while others have not.
The educational outcome Yi,f,θ,m,t of child i in family f of priority stratum θ living in
municipality m at time t can be modeled using the following potential outcomes framework:






tγ3 + ui,f,θ,m,t (3.1)
where Bolsa Famliaf,t is an indicator of whether family f is included in the Bolsa Família
program at time t, Xi,f is a vector of (unobservable) child and family characteristics that are
fixed over time, Wm is a vector of municipality characteristics, and Zt are time-varying external
factors such as changes in the educational system.
So far I have focused on only one priority stratum. I can estimate the causal effect of
Bolsa Família across several marginal priority strata using time × priority strata fixed effects
17. Note that this is the most conservative approach to address the preferential inclusion of poorer and larger
families.
18. Otherwise, repeated re-matching and the possibility of families leaving the program introduce unnecessary
complications. However, as shown later, the results are robust if the families are followed for an additional year.
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to account for the fact that different strata—and therefore families with different observable
characteristics—are on the margin at different points in time. Also, as a child’s family is fixed
a specification with child fixed effects can be used to account for observable and unobservable
child and family characteristics. This leads to the following specification:
Yi,f,θ,m,t = β Bolsa Famíliaf,t + αi + νm + µθ,t + εi,f,θ,m,t (3.2)
The treatment variable Bolsa Famliaf,t is an indicator that takes value 1 if a family gets
included in the Bolsa Família program. The specification includes municipality fixed-effects νm
and Y ear×Priority strata fixed effects µθ,t to account for both the randomization within strata
and, importantly, also for the fact that different priority strata are on the margin at different
points in time. In fact, the priority strata fixed effects non-parametrically control for thousands
of combinations of the month of registration, the household’s exact per capita income, and the
number of children. The error term εi,f,θ,m,t is allowed to cluster at the family and municipality
level to account for the selection of families into Bolsa Família and to facilitate comparison with
the results in Section IV, where the effect of changes in municipality-level corruption are studied.
As Bolsa Família is randomly assigned for these families, the coefficient β estimates the causal
change in children’s educational outcomes when their families are included in the Bolsa Família
program.
D. Validating the Identification Strategy
The identification strategy relies on the fact that the selection algorithm uses only data that
is observable in the Cadastro Único so that there can be no unobservable family characteristics
that affect which families get included in the Bolsa Família program. Moreover, as the selection
algorithm uses only income, household composition, and the vulnerability category, we can think
of other data in the Cadastro Único as observable to the researcher, but no to the selection
algorithm. This provides a test for whether the identification strategy successfully recovers the
random allocation of benefits within priority strata.
Table 3.1 shows that the identification strategy successfully deals with confounding family
characteristics that do not influence the selection of beneficiary families but are strongly cor-
related with per capita income, such as access to utilities, or the materials of the dwelling.19
Columns (1) and (2) show that these characteristics are relatively well-balanced between future
beneficiary and non-beneficiary households in the marginal priority strata. As a more stringent
test of balancedness (Pei et al., 2019), Column (3) reports the coefficient when the variable of
interest is regressed on an indicator of whether a family will be included in Bolsa Família and the
fixed effects, and tests whether these coefficients are jointly significant from zero. A significant
19. The results show the sample of families who have registered for the first time, to ensure that the Bolsa
Família indicator is set after the last observed data update.
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Table 3.1
Balancedness of Family Characteristics in Marginal Priority Strata
No Bolsa Família Bolsa Família LHS-test
(1) (2) (3)
Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation Coeff.
Location: urban 0.810 0.393 0.848 0.359 -0.001
Material: brick 0.754 0.430 0.789 0.408 0.003
Material: clay 0.025 0.156 0.018 0.133 -0.002
Material: timber 0.083 0.275 0.080 0.271 0.002
Material: surplus timber 0.028 0.165 0.030 0.169 -0.001
Material: straw 0.002 0.043 0.002 0.040 0.000
Sewage: canalization 0.394 0.489 0.470 0.499 -0.007+
Sewage: tank 0.153 0.360 0.144 0.351 0.000
Sewage: tank (rudimentary) 0.264 0.441 0.229 0.420 0.006+
Sewage: open ditch 0.024 0.152 0.024 0.153 -0.001
Sewage: river 0.008 0.088 0.011 0.103 -0.000
Piped water 0.788 0.408 0.832 0.374 0.007+
Water source: network 0.671 0.470 0.714 0.452 -0.005
Water source: spring 0.172 0.378 0.159 0.366 0.006
Water source: cistern 0.022 0.148 0.019 0.138 0.001
Indoor bathroom 0.847 0.360 0.883 0.322 0.000
Garbage: collected 0.767 0.423 0.817 0.387 -0.003
Garbage: burned or burried 0.125 0.330 0.099 0.299 0.004
Garbage: dumped on land 0.010 0.097 0.009 0.093 0.000
Garbage: dumped in river 0.001 0.025 0.001 0.023 -0.000
Light: electric (with meter) 0.804 0.397 0.821 0.383 0.001
Light: electric (without meter) 0.060 0.237 0.066 0.248 0.003
Light: oil or gas 0.014 0.118 0.011 0.106 -0.001
Light: candles 0.008 0.088 0.006 0.079 -0.001
F-test: χ2(24) 23.696
F-test: P-value 0.479
Observations 234757 238733 473490
Notes. This table reports on the balancedness of family characteristics that are not relevant for inclusion
in the Bolsa Família program. Columns (1) and (2) present the summary statistics for non-beneficiary and
beneficiary families. Column (3) uses a left-hand-side test (Pei et al., 2019) to check whether these characteristics
are predictive of a family’s inclusion in Bolsa Família in regressions of the form Xf,θ,m,t = α + βBFf,t +
µt,θ,m + εf,θ,m,t. The F-test tests whether these coefficients are jointly different from zero. Significance levels:
+P < 0.1,∗ P < 0.05,∗∗ P < 0.01,∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
test statistic suggests that these variables are jointly predictive of which families will be included
in the program. This is not the case (χ2(24) = 23.696, P = 0.479).
E. Bolsa Família Increases School Enrollment
Before progressing to the main question—whether corruption affects the effectiveness of
Bolsa Família—I show that the identification strategy can recover the positive effect of Bolsa
Família on school enrollment. Consider the expected impact of a program that pays families
for regular school attendance. While we would expect a positive effect, a naïve OLS approach
finds a negative effect, because the program was explicitly designed to target families with a low
baseline school enrollment. As a final validation of the identification strategy, I thus reestimate
the effect of Bolsa Família on school enrollment.
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Table 3.2








BF 1.006∗∗∗ 1.498∗∗∗ 0.919∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.122) (0.067)
Control mean 87.283 86.442 86.809
Child FE Yes Yes Yes
Year × strata FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.925 0.932 0.931
N(municipalities) 5,401 5,068 4,858
N(priority strata) 12,559 8,641 6,008
N(children) 2,573,117 590,630 747,786
N 5,146,234 1,181,260 1,495,572
Years 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017
Notes. This table reports the effect of inclusion into the Bolsa Família program on children’s school
enrollment. The dependent variable in all models takes on value 100 if a child is enrolled in school and
0 otherwise. “BF” indicates if a child’s family is included in the Bolsa Família program. Column (1)
presents the results for the most representative sample, where families are matched on the municipality,
vulnerability category, the exact income, the number of children, and the year the families last updated their
data. Column (2) uses the same definition, but only matches families who are newly registered. Column
(3) requires families to have last updated their data in the same month. All models include individual-level
child fixed effects, municipality fixed effects and “Year × Priority strata” fixed effects. For the fixed effects,
families in each priority stratum have the exact same income, the same number of children, belong to the
same vulnerability category, and have last updated their data in the same month. Standard errors are
clustered at both the family and the municipality level. Significance levels: +P < 0.1,∗ P < 0.05,∗∗ P <
0.01,∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
Table 3.2 shows the change in children’s school enrollment if a family gets included in the
Bolsa Família program. Column (1) shows the estimates for all families in marginal priority
strata, irrespective whether their information is from a new or updated registration. Column
(2) shows the estimates if only families that register for the first time are considered, and
Column (3) shows the estimates if families are matched on the month of their registration or
last data update. In the first sample, 2,573,117 children are in marginal strata that contain both
treated and untreated families. These children live in 5,401 municipalities, covering 97.5% of
the municipalities that are eligible for the random audits. If only newly registered families are
considered, only 590,630 children from 5,068 municipalities are included in the analysis, and the
geographic coverage drops to 91.5%. Likewise, when families are required to have registered in
the same month, only 747,786 children are included, and geographic coverage reduces to 4,832
municipalities or 87.7% (see Figure A3.7 in Appendix A3.V for maps of the geographic coverage
of each sample).20
Inclusion in Bolsa Família increases enrollment by 1.01 percentage points in the largest
sample (Column 1), by 1.50 percentage points in the sample that considers only families who
20. Unsurprisingly, the municipalities that are lost because families cannot be matched precisely enough tend
to be less populous. In terms of the population living in municipalities that are eligible for the random audits
the coverage is still quite high; 99.7%, 98.7%, and 97.8%, respectively, live in one of the municipalities that are
covered by the regressions.
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registered for the first time (Columns 2), and by 0.92 percentage points in the sample where
families are also matched on the month they registered (Column 3). The effects are highly signif-
icant (P = 0.000 for all samples) and robust to several alternative specifications (see Appendix
A3.II). However, there is considerable heterogeneity in the effectiveness of Bolsa Família across
different municipalities (see Figure A3.8 in Appendix A3.V).
These estimates are lower than those of previous evaluations of the program. For example,
in one of the earliest studies, Cardoso and Souza (2003) estimate that inclusion in Bolsa Escola,
Bolsa Família’s predecessor, increases school enrollment by 3 percentage points. Glewwe and
Kassouf (2012) find an increase of approximately 5 percentage points using data from 1998 to
2005, Schaffland (2012) documents gains of 4 percentage points using data from 2004 to 2006,
and De Brauw et al. (2015) find an effect of 8 percentage points for girls but no significant gains
for boys using data from 2009.
Three factors are likely to accounts for this quantitative difference: School enrollment rates
increased considerably over the last two decades, leaving less room for substantial gains. More-
over, the identification strategy uses only the marginal priority strata: as poorer families are more
likely to be included with certainty, the marginal strata consist of families with somewhat higher
incomes and higher baseline school enrollment. Finally, the use of child fixed effects appears
to depress the estimated treatment effects further. Indeed, without controls for individual-level
heterogeneity, point estimates are larger (see Table A3.17 in Appendix A3.VI).
IV. Local Corruption Affects Program Effectiveness
The first main result of the paper is that local corruption decreases the effectiveness of
Bolsa Família, even though local officials are bypassed in both the payment or the beneficiary
selection process. Using Brazil’s program to randomly audit municipalities as an exogenous
shock to corruption (Avis et al., 2018), I show that Bolsa Família’s effect on school enrollment
increases when municipalities become less corrupt.
A. Random Audits as Exogenous Shocks to Corruption
Since 2003, Brazil’s federal government operates an anti-corruption program that includes
audits of randomly selected municipalities. This audit lottery constitutes a uniquely compelling
natural experiment: a series of exogenous shocks, explicitly designed to combat corruption,
distributed all over Brazil, and spread over more than a decade. As several municipalities have
been audited more than once, it’s possible to estimate the effects of a previous audit on instances
of corruption detected in later rounds of the program.
In response to rampant abuse of federal transfers by municipal officials, the federal govern-
ment created the position of the Comptroller General, Controladoria Geral da União (CGU) in
2003. In the same year, the Programa de Fiscalização por Sorteios Públicos started to randomly
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select municipalities for comprehensive audits in a draw that is held in conjunction with the
national lottery. Municipalities with less than 500,000 are eligible for the lottery, whereas more
populous cities are subject to other audits.21 Once a municipality has been audited, it cannot
be selected again for some time.22
If a municipality is randomly selected, the CGU lists all federal transfers made to this
municipality in the previous years and randomly chooses a number of them for in-depth audits.
The CGU then issues an inspection order for each of the selected transfers and sends a team of 10-
15 auditors to the municipality, usually within less than a month after the lottery. Auditors are
highly qualified and competitively paid and, consequently, less susceptible to bribery than other
public employees (Avis et al., 2018). The auditors carefully examine expenditures associated
with the inspection order, verify the delivery of goods and services paid for by the transfer, and
check whether procurement and hiring decisions comply with the relevant laws. Auditors also
engage with the local community and with municipal councils to gather additional information
and register complaints (Ferraz and Finan, 2008). Once completed, the auditors share their
findings with federal prosecutors, the federal police, the local judiciary, and the city council.
Since round 17 of the audit lottery, the CGU focuses on specific sectors in each draw.23
As not all sectors are audited in every round, one might worry that some audits don’t have the
same corruption reducing effect on the Bolsa Família program. Fortunately, Bolsa Família was
subject to every round of the program since 2011.
Moreover, while the inclusion of all audits may underestimate the true impact on the Bolsa
Família program, there are several reasons why one should still expect an effect of the audits:
First, although auditors are not allowed to venture into other sectors, they report additional
suspicions back to the CGU, which can then take appropriate actions. Second, even though
the audited sectors differ, the people implicated will often be the same, as many municipalities
are dominated by a small political elite. Third, using evidence from municipalities that have
been audited more than once, Avis et al. (2018) show that, if anything, the corruption reduction
is somewhat weaker in the audited sector, suggesting that politicians assume that a sector is
now less likely to be audited again. Finally, there are spill-over and learning effects between
municipalities through local media and shared political networks (Avis et al., 2018) and it is
reasonable to expect that these effects are at least as important within a municipality. Indeed,
Table A3.18 in Appendix A3.VI shows that corruption in the Bolsa Família program and the
educational system more generally are highly correlated with corruption in other sectors.
21. This affects 31 municipalities, mostly state capitals, home to approximately 27% of the Brazilian popu-
lation.
22. The exact rules have varied over time. See Ferraz and Finan (2008) and Avis et al. (2018) for details of
the audit lottery program.
23. In round 27, for example, the auditors looked at transfers related to social assistance, agriculture, com-
merce and services, and culture in municipalities with a population of more than 100,000, and at all these sectors,
plus health and education-related transfers in municipalities with a population between 20,000 and 100,000 thou-
sand. In municipalities with less than 20,000 inhabitants, all sectors were audited.
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Figure 3.1
Timeline of Random Audits
Notes. This figure displays the timeline of random audits under 40 rounds of the Programa de Fiscalização em Entes
Federativos (2003-2015) and the random third cycle of its successor, the Programa de Fiscalização em Entes Federativos
(2016). Colors indicate whether a municipality is being randomly audited for the first time, the second time, or at least
the third time.
In 2016, the CGU was reconstituted as the Ministério da Transparência, Fiscalização e
Controladoria-Geral da União and the random audit lotteries were superseded by the Programa
de Fiscalização em Entes Federativos. While some audits remain random, the new program also
conducts non-random audits. So far, only the third cycle was lottery-based,24 while the first and
fourth cycle used insights from the previous program to select those municipalities deemed to
be the most vulnerable and the second cycle conducted comprehensive audits of state capitals.
B. Validating the Corruption Reduction after Random Audits
As several municipalities have been audited more than once, it’s possible to estimate the
effects of a previous audit on instances of corruption and mismanagement detected in later
rounds of the program (Avis et al., 2018). Since 2003, 1,956 municipalities with a population of
less than 500,000 were randomly audited; 285 of which were audited twice, 25 three times and
one municipality four times—2,267 random audits in total (Figure 3.1).
The treatment variable is an indicator, Past audit, whether a municipality has been ran-
domly audited in the past. For the construction of the treatment variable, I consider all munic-
ipalities with a population of less than 500,000 in the census of the year 2000 and I include all
40 rounds of the original Programa de Fiscalização por Sorteios Públicos as well as the random
24. Eligibility rules differed somewhat from previous lotteries. As a safeguard, I include only municipalities
that would have been eligible under the previous regime. Appendix A3.II shows that the results are robust if
only the original program is considered.
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third cycle of its successor, the Programa de Fiscalização em Entes Federativos.25 As a result,
the sample differs from the one used by Avis et al., who restrict their analysis to rounds 22 to 38
of the audit lottery program to focus on the two electoral terms from 2004 to 2012. Moreover, in
round 36, the audits of several selected municipalities were canceled less than three weeks later
due to a strike of the auditors.26 Avis et al. code these municipalities as having been treated.27
To validate the corruption-reducing effect of previous audits in the full sample, I re-estimate
Equation (16) in Avis et al. (2018):
log(Corruptionm,s,t) = α+ β Past auditm,s,t + Z
′
m,s,2000γ
+ f(Inspection ordersm,s,t) + νs + µt + εm,s,t
(3.3)
where the logarithm of the number of detected incidents in municipality m in round t of the
audits program, is regressed on the treatment variable Past auditm,s,t, that takes value 1 if a
municipality has been subject to a random audit in an earlier round of the program. Depending
on the specification, the model controls for socioeconomic factors Zm,s,2000: the logarithm of
population, the share of population living in an urban area, income inequality, log. income per
capita, and illiteracy rate—measured in 2000 before the inception of the audit program. Because
the number of transfers and programs auditors inspect, Inspection orders, directly affects the
number of uncovered incidents, it is controlled for either logarithmically or non-parametrically.
State fixed effects νs mirror the stratification of the lottery: different locations face different
probabilities of being audited depending on the number of municipalities in a state. Finally,
fixed effects for the round of the audits program µt account for the fact that the number of
municipalities that have been previously audited is necessarily weakly increasing over time and
that the sectors chosen for the audits vary across rounds. With the appropriate fixed effects in
place, the coefficient β can be interpreted as the causal effect of a previous audit on corruption.
Table 3.3 displays the effects of having previously been audited at random on the total num-
ber of irregularities, cases of mismanagement, and corruption28 in three different specifications:
using the logarithm of the number of inspection orders without controlling for sociodemographic
factors (Columns 1, 4, and 7), adding the sociodemographic factors (Columns 2, 5, and 8), and
including fixed effects for the number of inspection orders and control variables—the preferred
specification of Avis et al. (Columns 3, 6, and 9).
25. See Figures A3.9 and A3.10 in Appendix A3.V for the geographic distribution of the audits and the Past
audit variable over time.
26. Portaria n◦ 1.713 (August 10, 2012)
27. Appendix A3.II shows that the results are robust to alternative definitions of the treatment variable.
28. Since round 20 of the program, the CGU has coded the severity of its findings internally as either falha
formal, falha média, or falha grave—formal, moderate, and severe cases. As discussed by others (Avis et al.,
2018; Zamboni and Litschig, 2018), the distinction between moderate and severe cases is primarily a question
of the potential financial damage and says relatively little about the nature of the corrupt action. There is also
considerable overlap between losses judged as moderate and severe (see Figure A3.11 in Appendix A3.V); thus
I use the classification of Avis et al. (2018) and refer to formal errors as instances of mismanagement and to
moderate and severe findings as acts of corruption.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As in the restricted sample used in Avis et al. (2018), there is a clear difference between
mismanagement and corruption. For mismanagement, there is no effect of previous audits and,
other than population, none of the control variables has any predictive power. In contrast, there
are significantly fewer instances of corruption in audited municipalities, although the reduction
is slightly less pronounced in the full sample.
C. Estimating the Change in Treatment Effects
To estimate the change in the effectiveness of Bolsa Família after a municipality has been
randomly audited, Equation (3.2) can be appended with the audit indicator and an interaction
term:
Yi,f,θ,m,t = β Bolsa Famíliaf,t + γ Past auditm,t + δ (BF × Past audit)f,m,t
+ αi + νm + µθ,t + εi,f,θ,m,t
(3.4)
Both Bolsa Família and the audits are randomly assigned (once we correctly account for
stratification), and we can interpret the coefficient δ as the causal change in the effectiveness of
Bolsa Família after a municipality has been audited at random. All standard errors are clustered
at both the family and the municipality level, to account for the selection of families into Bolsa
Família and the selection of municipalities in the audit lotteries.
D. Bolsa Família Is More Effective after a Random Audit
After a random audit, Bolsa Família’s effect on school enrollment increases. This finding
is robust to a large number of alternative specifications.
Figure 3.2 shows that the school enrollment gains from inclusion in the Bolsa Família
program increase significantly after a municipality has been audited at random. In the most
representative sample, Bolsa Família is estimated to increase school enrollment by 0.90 percent-
age points in unaudited municipalities, but by in 1.18 percentage points in audited municipalities
(P = 0.031 for the interaction term). Thus, a random audit increases the effect of Bolsa Família
by 31%. The estimates are somewhat larger if only families who registered for the first time are
considered. Bolsa Família is estimated to increase school enrollment by 1.31 percentage points in
unaudited municipalities, but by 1.82 percentage points in audited municipalities, an increase of
39% (P = 0.032 for the interaction term). In the sample that matches families on the month of
registration, Bolsa Família is estimated to increase school enrollment by 0.81 percentage points
before an audit. The effect increases to 1.09 percentage points after a municipality has been
audited at random (P = 0.070 for the interaction term), a gain of about 34% relative to the
pre-audit level.
The effect is robust for several alternative specifications. For comparison, Column (1) of
Table 3.4 shows the initial estimate.29 The standard estimation follows each child for just two
29. The table shows the estimates for the most representative sample. However, the result is also robust
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Figure 3.2
Bolsa Família Is More Effective after a Random Audit
Notes. This figure displays the effect of inclusion into the Bolsa Família program and random audits on children’s
school enrollment. Treatment effects are estimates using the specification in Equation (3.4). Colors indicate whether a
municipality has been audited at random.
years to mitigate the problem of included families dropping out of Bolsa Família or unincluded
families gaining access to the program. However, it is conceivable that the beneficial effect of
the random audits is less pronounced after families have been included for some time. Column
(2) displays the estimates of an intent-to-treat approach that follows families for an additional
year and ignores (potentially non-random) dropout and new inclusions. As expected, ignoring
later entries and exists to the program leads to lower estimates of Bolsa Família’s effectiveness;
0.44 percentage points as opposed to 0.90 percentage points. However, the gains after a random
audit are slightly larger and continue to be statistically significant (P = 0.045).
Educational participation varies by age and gender, and there are several well-documented
patterns such as the delayed enrollment of younger children and the increased dropout rate for
older boys (De Brauw et al., 2015). Column (3) shows that the result is robust if Age × Sex
fixed effects are included. The interaction term continues to be significant (P = 0.044), and
the estimates of Bolsa Família’s impact are similar to the initial result—both before and after a
municipality is audited at random.
Bolsa Família has a special provision for children above the age of 15. These children have
a lower attendance requirement (75% instead of the usual 85%) and are legally able to work as
for all specifications in the sample of newly registered families and for almost all specifications in the sample of
families that are also matched on the month they updated their data. See Appendix A3.II for details on the
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part of an apprenticeship. Column (4) shows that although the point estimates are somewhat
smaller if older children are included, Bolsa Família continues to be significantly more effective
after a random audit (P = 0.040).
Although families within a priority stratum are randomly admitted to Bolsa Família, fam-
ilies in some strata have considerably higher probabilities of being included (see Figure A3.1 in
Appendix A3.II). To address this, Column (5) tests whether the result is robust if stabilized
inverse probability weights are applied to correct for the higher treatment propensities in some
strata.30 The estimates are of similar magnitude, and the interaction term continues to be sig-
nificant (P = 0.032). Column (6) tests whether the effect persists if families with a treatment
propensity of less than 10% or more than 90% are excluded from the analysis. The estimates
are again of similar magnitude, and the interaction term continues to be significant (P = 0.046).
In 2016, the Programa de Fiscalização por Sorteios Públicos was superseded by the Pro-
grama de Fiscalização em Entes Federativos. As the third cycle of the new program consisted
of a random audit lottery, it is included in the definition of the Past audit indicator. Column
(6) shows that the result is robust if only the 40 rounds of the original audit lottery are consid-
ered. The estimates are again of similar magnitude, and the interaction term continues to be
significant (P = 0.029).
Because the audit reports are often only published late in the calendar year or even at the
beginning of the next one, the Past audit indicator is defined to take value 1 if a municipality has
randomly been audited in a previous year. Column (7) relaxes this and considers municipalities
as having been audited in the past, even if the audit takes place in the current year. Despite
reclassifying 198 municipalities, the result does not change significantly: Bolsa Família is again
roughly 30% more effective after a municipality has been audited at random and the interaction
continues to be significant (P = 0.035).
Families are required to update their Cadastro Único registration at least every other year.
Thus, in a given year, the data of some families actually reflects information from previous years.
So far, this has been addressed by constructing priority strata so that families that potentially
have outdated information are in separate priority strata. However, Column (9) shows that the
result is robust if these priority strata are excluded (P = 0.034).
Finally, the data for this paper were obtained in late 2017, so the last year of the Cadastro
Único data represents the state in June 2017. As a result, families that registered towards the
end of the sample had less time to realize their gains, although the year fixed effects mitigate
this problem to some degree. Column (10) shows that the result persists if data from 2017
is excluded: Bolsa Família is again roughly 30% more effective after a municipality has been
audited at random and the interaction continues to be significant (P = 0.037).
30. The weights take the form w1,f =
Prob(BF)
Prob(BF|θ,m)
for families that get included and w0,f =
1−Prob(BF)
1−Prob(BF|θ,m)
for families that don’t get included, where Prob(BF | θ,m) denotes the conditional probability of being included
in Bolsa Família for a family in priority stratum θ and municipality m.
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V. Understanding the Mechanism
Because municipalities are responsible for registering potential beneficiaries, local corrup-
tion is most likely to play a role at the registration stage. This section shows how local corrup-
tion increases the chance that ineligible families benefit from Bolsa Família—using a theoretical
model, administrative data, and a field experiment—and how this mistargeting decreases the
effectiveness of the program.
Throughout the following sections, statements from the audit of Sete Quedas (MS) in March
2015 are used to illustrate the typical ways in which municipalities fall short of their responsibil-
ities, before testing whether these factors are likely to explain the observed performance gains.
With 10,780 inhabitants at the time of the last census, Sete Quedas ranks 2,821 out of 5,570
municipalities—very close to the median. However, the municipality is chosen not so much for its
demographic representativeness, but rather because the audit report is a relatively comprehen-
sive summary of findings that are frequently encountered in the audits of other municipalities.
It is worth noting that the municipality punches way below its weight in terms of educational
achievement; it ranks 5,290 out of 5,570 in school enrollment despite average salaries being in
the top quintile of the country.
A. Income Underreporting and Mistargeting
"We found beneficiaries of the Bolsa Família program with a per capita income higher
than that established in the program’s legislation." (CGU, 2015)
Bolsa Família targets those families that are most likely to underinvest in human capital:
low-income families, families with many children, and families in marginalized groups. The
program’s impact depends crucially on its ability to reach these families. High levels of corruption
make the program vulnerable to exploitation by families that don’t qualify under the rules of
the program. As the audit report puts it, "underreporting of income during the registration in
the Cadastro Único [...] may lead to undue receipt of benefits by families outside of the target
audience of government social programs and non-treatment of families in the target audience"
(CGU, 2015).
This suggests a straight forward explanation why Bolsa Família should be more effective
after a random audit: families that underreported their income are excluded from the program
and, going forward, the municipality pays closer attention to families’ incomes during the regis-
tration process. As a result, Bolsa Família is more likely to reach the families that benefit the
most.
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B. A Model of Income Underreporting
To better understand how income underreporting affects Bolsa Família’s effectiveness, con-
sider a simplified model of the registration process, where families decide what income to report,
and the families with the lowest self-reported income are included in the program. If a family’s
reported income deviates too much from its true income, it risks being caught. A key assumption
of the model is that the risk of detection is lower in high corruption municipalities. As more
families underreport their income, Bolsa Família can no longer target the families that benefit
most, and its effectiveness decreases.
The model’s structure is as follows: First, SENARC decides how many families to include
in Bolsa Família, based on income data from the census. After that, families register in the
Cadastro Único, potentially underreporting their incomes. The Caixa then includes the families
with the lowest incomes until all places are filled. Finally, a family that is included but has
underreported its income may be detected and face the consequences.
At the beginning, SENARC decides how many families to include in Bolsa Família. Let
there be N families of the same vulnerability category living in the same municipality. Because
SENARC sets separate numbers of beneficiaries for each category and municipality, it’s reason-
able to focus on just one such group when considering the strategic motives. It’s assumed that
the number of places M allocated by SENARC is such that not all families will be covered,
M < N . There are two possible interpretations of this assumption: there could be insufficient
funds to cover all families or the census implies that fewer than N eligible families live in the
municipality.
In the next step, families register in the Cadastro Único and decide what income y they
report. Families with an income below the eligibility threshold ȳ qualify for Bolsa Família. Each
family knows its own true per capita income x and the true distribution of income per capita,
modeled by the cumulative distribution function F (x) over the closed interval [0, x̄]. Thus, no
family has a negative income, but some families may have zero income.
The Caixa then selects the M families that report the lowest incomes below the eligibility
threshold ȳ from the Cadastro Único and pays them a fixed benefit of b > 0.
Once included in Bolsa Família, there is a risk of detection if a family underreported its
income, which is lower in high corruption municipalities. Let’s assume that underreporting one’s
income comes at an expected cost cm ·(x−y) that is increasing in the difference between the true
income x and the reported income y. This captures several possible mechanisms, for example,
that families are more likely to be found out if their true incomes—and their lifestyles—differ
more from their reported incomes or that the punishment for underreporting is proportional to
the deviation from the true income. The key assumption is that cm is lower in municipalities
where corruption is prevalent, either because the probability of being found out is smaller or
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because the expected punishment is less severe for a given degree of underreporting.31
Thus, when family i with income xi registers in municipality m, it decides what income yi
to report to maximize the expected utility:
max
yi ∈[0,xi]
U(yi|xi) = Prob(receiving BF|yi) (b− cm · (xi − yi)) (3.5)
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where B(m;n, p) denotes the cumulative binomial distribution that a binary event with probability
p occurs at most m out of n times and xr = ȳ+ b
cm
denotes the highest income that allows families
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B(M−1;N−1, F (x∗)) + M
NF (x∗) (1−B(M ;N,F (x∗)))
(3.7)
Proof. See Appendix A3.I.32
Figure 3.3 illustrates the optimal reporting function, which has several intuitive properties.
The amount of underreporting is stronger if the potential benefits b are higher, and it is lower
if the expected costs cm of being found out increase when a municipality becomes less corrupt.
The model also predicts that families at the lower end of the income distribution and families
with an income close to the eligibility threshold have the strongest incentives to underreport
their income. Specifically, the model predicts that a disproportionate number of families report
an income of zero—in line with the observed distribution of income in the Cadastro Único—and
that more (fewer) families report an income of zero or an income that makes them eligible for
Bolsa Família if the benefits b (costs cm) increase (see Appendix A3.I).
31. Because only one municipality is considered in solving the model, the subscript is omitted in the proofs
to simplify notation: c = cm.
32. The model resembles an auction where families underbid each other to win one of the places in the Bolsa
Família program. As a result, the proof is related to work in the theory of procurement auctions (e.g., Calveras
et al., 2004; Compte et al., 2005; Li and Zheng, 2009) and auctions with capped bids (e.g., Che and Gale, 1998;
Zheng, 2001; Gavious et al., 2002; Chen and Chiu, 2011). For convenience, it is assumed that families with an
income above xr = ȳ+ b
c
report truthfully. However, none of the model’s predictions depend on this assumption.
Any reporting behavior such that the family never qualifies for Bolsa Família, i.e., yi > ȳ, is an equilibrium.
Thus, the second discontinuity at xr in Figure 3.3 is not necessarily there, as families could in principle report
an income arbitrarily close to ŷ. See Claim 1 in Appendix A3.I.















Reported Income as a Function of True Income
Notes. This figure illustrates the relationship between a family’s true income xi and the
income it reports yi. The solid orange line is the optimal reporting function y(xi) if families
are constrained to report non-negative incomes. The dashed orange line is the unconstrained
optimal reporting function ŷ(xi). The dashed black line describes truthful reporting, yi = xi.
The model predicts that the true income of supposedly eligible families is higher than the
income reported in the Cadastro Único and that the difference is more pronounced in places
with more corruption, where families are less likely to be detected. Thus, even if the poorest
M families are included in each municipality, a family with a reported income of y in a place
with little underreporting is likely to be poorer than a family with the same reported income in
a high corruption municipality where underreporting is more prevalent.
If Bolsa Família has a stronger effect on families with a lower true income, the model
predicts that, conditional on the reported income, the treatment effects are smaller if there is
more underreporting. Suppose that school enrollment is increasing with diminishing returns in
the true family income33 including potential Bolsa Família benefits then:
33. This captures the empirical relationship between income and educational participation reasonably well,















Predicted Treatment Effects for Low and High Rates of Underreporting
Notes. This figure displays the relationship between the extent of income underreporting
and the predicted treatment effects of Bolsa Família. xpost denotes the true income after the
treatment assignment, i.e., xpost,i = xi + b if family i receives Bolsa Família and xpost,i = xi
otherwise. y−1
high
(yi) is the true income of a family that reports an income of yi in a munic-
ipality with a high degree of income underreporting. y−1
low
(yi) is the true income of a family
that reports an income of yi in a municipality with a low degree of income underreporting.
The function g(xpost) describes the relationship between school enrollment and income.
Proposition 2 Let xpost be the true income after the treatment assignment, i.e., xpost,i = xi+ b
if family i receives Bolsa Família and xpost,i = xi otherwise. Suppose that the function g(xpost)
describes the relationship between school enrollment and income and that it is twice continuously
differentiable with g′ > 0 and g′′ < 0. For yi > y(x∗):
1. The baseline school enrollment, g(y−1(yi)), is increasing in c.
2. The treatment effect on school enrollment, g(y−1(yi) + b)− g(y−1(yi)), is decreasing in c.
Proof. The first claim follows from the fact that y(xi) is decreasing in c. The second claim
additionally uses the concavity of g(xpost). 
Figure 3.4 illustrates the effect of underreporting on the expected treatment effects, condi-
tional on the reported income y.
Previously, the assumption was that all families underreport their incomes equally. If some
families are less able or willing to underreport, it needs no longer be the case that the M families
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that end up benefiting from the program are indeed the poorest M families.34 If this is the case,
the true income of some included families will exceed the true income of some families that
did not underreport to the same degree. As a result, the expected true income of the included
families will be even higher.
There are many situations where this is likely to be the case. For example, it is easier to
verify the income of a household with a member who is formally employed or receives additional
social assistance payments. Similarly, if a home visit is conducted to register some but not all
of the families, social workers might be able to judge the true income of the visited families
more accurately. Local corruption can compound the problem if some families have friends or
relatives with some influence on the income verification process. Moreover, understanding and
gaming the system requires information about its rules and is cognitively demanding, so some
families might not be aware of the strategic component.35 Finally, families and communities
might have different social norms about claiming government benefits despite not being entitled
to them.36
C. Testing the Model in the Administrative Data
The registration model makes an easily testable prediction about the distribution of re-
ported incomes as a municipality becomes less corrupt. In the aftermath of a random audit,
fewer families should report an income that qualifies them for Bolsa Família, and fewer families
should report an income of zero (see Claims 10 and 12 in Appendix A3.I).
Table 3.5 shows that this is indeed the case. The share of families in the Cadastro Único37
reporting an income below the eligibility threshold at the time of their registration falls by 1.09
percentage points (Column 1) and the share of families claiming to have an income of zero
decreases by 1.12 percentage points (Column 4). Consistent with the assumption that it is
harder to misrepresent one’s income if the registration happens during a home visit, neither the
share of families with a reported income below the eligibility threshold (Column 2) nor the share
of families reporting an income of zero change significantly for families who registered during a
home visit (Column 5). Although a home visit allows administrators to judge a family’s true
income more accurately, it is conceivable that it also makes it easier to bribe the responsible
social worker. Under this scenario, the absence of a significant change would not so much indicate
a low level of underreporting, but rather a continued high level of underreporting even after the
34. Note that this is already not guaranteed if M is such that the highest reported income of an included
family is less than y(x∗).
35. Recent research suggests that this presents a bigger challenge for poorer families (e.g., Shankar et al.,
2011; Mani et al., 2013), which might exacerbate the distortion.
36. The sixth wave of the World Value Survey included a question whether this is justifiable behavior. If
Brazilian states were countries, the relatively rich Espírito Santo would have the strongest norms of any country
against illegally claiming benefits (before the Netherlands), whereas the state of Alagoas would have the weakest
norms of any country (after Mexico).
37. The entire Cadastro Único, not just a sample of families on the margin of the program.
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Table 3.5
Underreporting Decreases after Random Audits
Eligible income (%) Income R$0.00 (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Home CRAS Total Home CRAS
Past audit -1.090∗ -0.219 -1.309∗ -1.115∗ -0.762 -0.997+
(0.506) (1.282) (0.543) (0.530) (0.904) (0.516)
Control mean 60.505 55.952 60.512 10.823 9.779 10.981
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.946 0.742 0.940 0.844 0.673 0.844
N(municipalities) 5539 5504 5539 5539 5504 5539
N 33226 31544 33226 33226 31544 33226
Years 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017
Notes. This table reports the effect of the random audits on the distribution of self-reported income
in the Cadastro Único. The dependent variable in Columns (1) to (3) is the percentage of families in a
municipality who report an income that made them eligible at the time of registration. The dependent
variable in Columns (4) to (6) is the percentage of families in a municipality who report having zero
income. Columns (1) and (4) present the results for all families in the municipality, Columns (2) and (5)
for families that were registered during a home visit, and Columns (3) and (6) for families that registered
at the CRAS. “Past audit” indicates that a municipality has been audited at random. All models include
municipality and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Significance
levels: +P < 0.1,∗ P < 0.05,∗∗ P < 0.01,∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
audits. This interpretation, however, is unlikely as reporting an income of zero and reporting a
qualifying income are both significantly less common for families registered at home (P = 0.000,
two-sided t-tests).
In the case of Sete Quedas, CGU auditors cross-referenced data on formal employment
and pensions with data from the Cadastro Único and inspected the homes of 31 families with
inconsistent records. The per capita income of seven of these families made them ineligible for
Bolsa Família. Three of these families reported an income of zero, while the others reported
incomes that are close to the extreme poverty or the eligibility threshold at the time of their first
registration. Further investigations revealed that most families deliberately "forgot" to mention
a source of income or to register a family member who receives a pension. The families have
subsequently been excluded from the program.
This anecdote suggests an additional test of whether income underreporting and mistar-
geting decrease after a municipality has been audited at random. Immediately after the audit,
exclusions from Bolsa Família should increase, before dropping to a lower level than before the
audit, as municipalities inspect self-reported income more closely and are less likely to admit
ineligible families. As predicted, Figure A3.14 in Appendix A3.V shows that exclusions from the
program increase immediately after a municipality has been audited at random, before dropping
to a lower rate than before the audit (P = 0.106 and P = 0.047, respectively; see Table A3.20
in Appendix A3.VI). After a random audit, municipalities are also somewhat more likely to
conduct home visits as part of the registration process, although the increase is not statistically
significant (P = 0.156, two-sided t-test).
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Figure 3.5
Program Effectiveness Increases Most for the Lowest and Highest Self-Reported Incomes
Notes. This figure displays the estimated effect of inclusion in the Bolsa Família program on children’s school enrollment
by income brackets. Treatment effects were jointly estimated in the most representative sample by interacting the treatment
indicators in Equation (3.4) with an indicator for the family’s income bracket. Error bars indicate standard errors of the
estimated treatment effect and are clustered at both the family and municipality level.
The second part of the model illustrates how income underreporting translates into lower
expected treatment effects. If the effectiveness gains are driven by improvements in the targeting
of low-income families and if it is easier for families to underreport their income if no home visit
is conducted as part of the registration process, the effectiveness gains should be concentrated
among families that registered at the registration center (CRAS), where income verification is
more effortful. In families that registered at home, Bolsa Família is expected to be equally
effective at incentivizing school enrollment irrespective of the audits. Table A3.19 in Appendix
A3.VI shows that this is indeed the case: while the treatment effect increases by at least 25%
for families registered at the registration center (P = 0.025, P = 0.037, and P = 0.065, for
the three samples), there is no change for families who registered during a home visit—point
estimates for the interaction are much smaller and not statistically significant.
The families that underreported their income in Sete Quedas fell in two categories: families
that report an income of zero and families that report close to the eligibility threshold. The
theoretical model indeed predicts that families with incomes close to zero and families with
relatively high incomes have the strongest incentives to underreport. Figure 3.5 shows that, in
line with these predictions, the effectiveness gains after a random audit are concentrated at the
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lower and the upper end of the income distribution.38 In unaudited municipalities, families in
the lowest income bracket are only 1.19 percentage points more likely to send their children to
school once they are included in Bolsa Família. In contrast, after a municipality has been audited
at random, Bolsa Família increases school enrollment by 1.66 percentage points, a relative gain
of almost 40% (P = 0.004). While there are no significant gains for families in the next three
income brackets, treatment effects increase by 50% (P = 0.095), 95% (P = 0.082), and 45%
(P = 0.084), respectively, for the three highest income brackets. Note that this is compatible
with increased income underreporting close to the eligibility cut-off, as the income threshold was
less than R$ 100 when the earliest families in the sample registered and has since been increased
several times.
Thus, the income underreporting model is consistent with the observed patterns in the
administrative data: immediately after a random audit ineligible families are excluded from
the program and, going forward, fewer families report an eligible income or an income of zero.
As a result, the Bolsa Família can be more precisely targeted, and its effectiveness increases,
especially for the income levels with the highest predicted misreporting.
D. Testing the Model in a Field Experiment
To see if local administrators are indeed less likely to register ineligible families in municipal-
ities that have been audited at random, I conducted a field experiment with 6,998 Bolsa Família
registration centers (CRAS).39 Registration centers were contacted asking about the possibility
of receiving Bolsa Família and the information provided in the message was experimentally varied
to make the sender eligible or ineligible while holding other characteristics constant. Consistent
with the income underreporting explanation, centers in audited municipalities differentiate more
between eligible and ineligible families: they are less likely to engage with ineligible families and
to incorrectly state that a sender’s income is compatible with Bolsa Família. For a more detailed
description and additional results of the field experiment, see Appendix A3.III.
Over several months, three emails were sent to registration centers that provided an email
address as part of their official contact details. The emails asked about registering for the Bolsa
Família program and provided information that makes the sender either eligible—per capita
income < R$ 170—or ineligible (see Table 3.6). Relative to the "Ineligible" treatment, "Eligible
I" varied the number of children and "Eligible II" reduced the reported income.40
38. Note also that while Bolsa Família increases school enrollment at all income levels, the poorest families
gain most from the program, in line with the assumptions of the model.
39. The experiment was approved by the Human Subjects Committee of the Faculty of Economics, Busi-
ness Administration, and Information Technology at the University of Zurich (OEC IRB # 2019-010 ) and was
preregistered at the AEA RCT registry under the number AEARCTR-0004151.
40. Emails were sent in three waves at the beginning of May, June, and July 2019. Within waves, emails
were sent at a random time on a workday between 9:00 and 17:00 in the centers time zone. The order of the
emails and their timing was randomized at the municipality level and block-randomized with respect to states
and whether a municipality has been audited at random. Roughly a quarter of emails could not be delivered
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Figure 3.6
Response Rate to Requests from Eligible and Ineligible Families
Notes. This figure displays the difference in response rates in the three experi-
mental conditions of the field experiment. Error bars indicate standard errors and
are clustered at the municipality level.
Table 3.6
Email Text by Treatment
Eligible I Eligible II Ineligible
Greetings,
My family recently moved here,
and I would like to register for
Bolsa Família. I make around R$
450 a month and I live alone with
my two children. Can you help
me to register?
Thank you in advance.
Greetings,
My family recently moved here,
and I would like to register for
Bolsa Família. I make around R$
300 a month and I live alone with
my child. Can you help me to
register?
Thank you in advance.
Greetings,
My family recently moved here,
and I would like to register for
Bolsa Família. I make around R$
450 a month and I live alone with
my child. Can you help me to
register?
Thank you in advance.
Notes. This table displays the three experimental conditions in the field experiment.
and returned an error message from the host. This failure rate is independent of the wave of the experiment
and whether a municipality has previously been audited or not (χ2(5) = 3.248, P = 0.662; see also Figure
A3.2 in Appendix A3.III). For most of the analysis, these messages are excluded. However, Table A3.11 in
Appendix A3.III shows that treating delivery errors as non-responses does not alter the results.
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Figure 3.6 shows that registration centers were significantly more likely to reply to requests
from eligible families. Consistent with the hypothesis that local corruption makes it easier for
ineligible families to gain access to the program, the effect is significantly larger for centers in
municipalities that have previously been audited. In unaudited municipalities, requests from
ineligible families were less likely to receive a response than requests from eligible families—1.68
percentage points relative to the Eligible I treatment (P = 0.012) families and 1.73 percent-
age points relative to the Eligible II treatment (P = 0.010). The differences increase to 4.15
percentage points (P = 0.000) and 4.07 percentage points (P = 0.000), respectively, if a munic-
ipality has been audited at random. The treatment effects are significantly stronger in audited
municipalities (P = 0.024 and P = 0.031 for the comparisons with Eligible I and II conditions,
respectively). Because the response rates are relatively low, these numbers imply that requests
about registration with ineligible details were approximately 12% less likely to receive a response
in unaudited municipalities, but roughly 30% less likely to receive a response in municipalities
that have previously been audited.41
Because municipalities are randomly selected for audits within states, I pre-registered that
I would run the regression with state fixed effects to account for the stratification. Table 3.7
shows that the effect persists if state fixed effects are used (Column 1), if only within registration
center variance is exploited (Columns 2 and 3), and if the control variables from Avis et al. (2018)
are used, as specified in the pre-analysis plan (Columns 4 and 5). In addition, Columns (3) and
(5) control for extensive design fixed effects: the order of emails, the different subject lines,
the day of the week and the exact time of day the emails were sent. Table A3.13 in Appendix
A3.III shows that the effects persist if the two control treatments are included separately in the
regressions.
As each center receives three similar emails, responses to emails in later waves might be
affected by the emails in earlier waves: the email might look familiar to social workers or be more
likely to end up in a spam filter.42 To address these concerns, I pre-registered a robustness check
to show that the effect persists if only the first wave of emails is used. The effect is even more
pronounced in the first wave of the experiment. Request from ineligible families are significantly
less likely to receive a response in municipalities that have been randomly audited in the past—
7.35 percentage points compared to the Eligible I treatment (P = 0.000) and 6.36 percentage
points compared to the Eligible II treatment (P = 0.001). In unaudited municipalities, the effects
are much weaker—2.78 percentage points compared to the Eligible I treatment (P = 0.061) and
0.91 percentage points compared to the Eligible II treatment (P = 0.524). The treatment
effects are significantly stronger in audited municipalities (P = 0.049 and P = 0.016 for the
comparisons with Eligible I and II, respectively). See also Table A3.12 in Appendix A3.III.
41. For a discussion of why the response rates are relatively low, see Appendix A3.III.
42. The response messages were screened for signs of suspicion. Overall, fewer than 1% of the responses
showed any sign of suspicion. However, this rate increases with each round from 0.27% in the first round to
1.52% in the final round.
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Table 3.7
Response Rates to Requests from Eligible and Ineligible
Families
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ineligible -1.708∗∗ -1.526∗ -1.500∗ -1.672∗∗ -1.686∗∗
(0.589) (0.597) (0.602) (0.589) (0.591)
Past audit 0.455 0.250 0.330
(1.000) (0.932) (0.932)
Ineligible × Past audit -2.396∗ -2.703∗∗ -2.694∗∗ -2.435∗∗ -2.512∗∗
(0.932) (0.938) (0.944) (0.932) (0.942)
Population (Log.) 3.510∗∗∗ 3.509∗∗∗
(0.488) (0.489)
Income inequality (Gini) -11.855+ -12.170∗
(6.139) (6.167)




Urban population -0.707 -0.532
(2.234) (2.244)
Control mean 14.303 14.371 14.371 14.303 14.303
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Center FE No Yes Yes No No
Order FE No No Yes No Yes
Subject line FE No No Yes No Yes
Day FE No No Yes No Yes
Time FE No No Yes No Yes
R2 0.039 0.599 0.606 0.068 0.078
N 15891 15736 15736 15891 15891
Notes. This table reports the difference in response rates to requests from eligible and
ineligible families in the field experiment. The dependent variable is an indicator that takes
value 100 if the registration center replied to a request and 0 otherwise. “Ineligible” indicates
that the details in the request made a family ineligible for Bolsa Família, “Past audit” indi-
cates that a municipality has been audited at random, and “Ineligible × Past audit” is the
interaction of the two treatments. “Population (Log.)”, “Income inequality (Gini)”, “Income
per capita (Log.)”, and the rates of “Illiteracy” and “Urban population” control for munici-
pality characteristics in 2000, before the inception of the audits program. Columns (2) and
(3) include registration center fixed effects. Columns (3) and (5) include fixed effects for the
order of emails, the different subject lines, the day of the week and the exact time of day the
email was sent. All models include state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level. Significance levels: +P < 0.1,∗ P < 0.05,∗∗ P < 0.01,∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
Even if the response rates in different experimental conditions were the same, employees
of registration centers might still discern between eligible and ineligible families when they
compose their reply. Thus, in addition to testing for differences in the response rate, each
response was also coded to analyze the content of the message. Table A3.10 in Appendix A3.III
test for differences in the content of the emails, using a two-step Heckman selection model to
control for the different response rates in the experimental conditions and in previously audited
municipalities. Responses in the Ineligible treatment were 6.74 percentage points more likely to
contain an incorrect assessment of the family’s eligibility, i.e., to state that the family qualifies for
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Bolsa Família (P = 0.024). However, this effect is driven exclusively by unaudited municipalities;
it is fully offset by the negative 7.41 percentage point interaction term (P = 0.027), suggesting
that audited municipalities indeed pay more attention to families’ incomes. Messages do not
significantly differ in how much practical information they include, nor is there a difference in
whether they explain the eligibility criteria of Bolsa Família. Finally, emails were also screened
for direct offers of collusion and for less overt signals of corruption, such as suggesting that the
rules are flexible. However, none of the messages contained such a smoking gun.
Although responding to emailed requests is an imperfect proxy for the likelihood of in-
cluding a family in the Cadastro Único, the results of the field experiment are consistent with
the income underreporting mechanism: randomly audited municipalities pay closer attention to
families’ eligibility.
E. Social Norms on Income Underreporting
The lower rates of income underreporting after a random audit might reflect changes in
social norms, rather than differences in the difficulty of successfully misrepresenting one’s in-
come. For example, the experience of being audited and the revelation of the irregularities in
Bolsa Família might change citizens’ social norms about underreporting their income, condoning
public corruption, or reporting suspected fraud. To test this alternative hypothesis, I elicited
relevant social norms in an incentivized online experiment43 with 675 participants living in 424
municipalities, some of which had been randomly selected for audits in the past.44 However,
there is no evidence that social norms change as a result of a random audit. For a more detailed
description and additional findings of the online experiment, see Appendix A3.IV.
In the experiment, I presented participants with three short vignettes (see Table 3.8): First,
a family that underreports its income to qualify for Bolsa Família. Second, a local administra-
tor who suspects that the family underreports their income but turns a blind eye. Finally, a
neighbor who calls the local registration center to blow the whistle on the family. Participants
are then asked to rate the behavior in the scenario, given four choices: very wrong, somewhat
wrong, somewhat right, very right. To avoid that participants give socially desirable but un-
truthful responses, I used the method developed by Krupka and Weber (2013): instead of asking
participants for their opinion, they are incentivized to try and give the same response as another
randomly selected participant. At the end of the experiment, one of the three vignettes was
randomly selected for payment, and participants received R$ 10 if the responses matched. This
43. The experiment was approved by the Human Subjects Committee of the Faculty of Economics, Business
Administration, and Information Technology at the University of Zurich (OEC IRB # 2019-008 ).
44. Participants were recruited through Facebook to achieve maximum geographic coverage while maintaining
relatively precise targeting. Participation was restricted to resemble the typical Bolsa Família beneficiary: women
aged 18 to 50, who have an interest in Bolsa Família and are accessing Facebook on their mobile device. The 31
municipalities that are too populous for the random audits were excluded. Summary statistics for participants
are displayed in Table A3.14 in Appendix A3.IV.
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Table 3.8
Vignettes and Elicited Social Norms
Underreporting one’s income Turning a blind eye Blowing the whistle
The family of Sônia would like to
receive money through the Bolsa
Família program. She knows that
their income is too high to qualify,
so she reports a lower income when
she registers in the Cadastro Único.
The employee at the CRAS sus-
pects that Sônia’s income is higher
than what she reports. He makes
a deal with Sônia so that she can
nevertheless benefit from the Bolsa
Família program.
Now suppose that her neighbor
knows that the family of Sônia
makes too much money to qualify
for Bolsa Família. The neighbor de-
cides to report it to the social coun-
cil.
Notes. This table displays the three vignettes used in the norm elicitation game.
transforms the question into a coordination game in which the social norm serves as a focal
point.
Figure 3.7 demonstrates that social norms do not significantly change after a random audit.
The distribution of responses is almost identical in previously audited and unaudited municipal-
ities for all three vignettes (χ2(3) = 0.162, P = 0.984; χ2(3) = 1.543, P = 0.672; χ2(3) = 0.406,
P = 0.939, χ2-tests). Using ordered logistic regression, Table A3.15 in Appendix A3.IV shows
that the participants from audited municipalities are just as accepting of these behaviors, and
that this result is robust to controlling for state fixed effects, individual participant characteris-
tics, and the usual controls for municipalities’ socioeconomic development.
Additional tests in Appendix A3.IV show that there is also no shift in participants’ beliefs
about the prevalence of these behaviors (Table A3.16) and that there is no change in general
rule-following, measured by an incentivized Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) honesty game
(Figure A3.5). Moreover, there are only minor differences in municipality and participant char-
acteristics between audited and unaudited municipalities in the online sample (Table A3.14).
Figure 3.7
Social Norms Don’t Change after a Random Audit
Notes. This figure displays the distribution of responses in the Krupka and Weber (2013) norm elicitation game.
Error bars indicate standard errors and are clustered at the municipality level.
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Thus, there is no evidence that changes in social norms can explain the lower levels of
income underreporting after a municipality has been audited at random.
VI. Financial Gains from Bolsa Família
In this paper, I argue that Bolsa Família has reasonably effective safe guards against clien-
telism and embezzlement. This claim is based primarily on the program’s design—payments
directly to beneficiaries’ cards instead of bulk payments to the local administration and an
anonymized central process to select beneficiaries. While this prevents outright embezzlement
of funds and the trading of program access for bribes or votes, it does not completely rule out
the possibility of financial gains from the program.
If local officials want to benefit financially from the program, they are left with three
options: retaining benefit cards, registering themselves in the Cadastro Único, and diverting
other funds connected to local registration centers or the complementary programs municipalities
are required to offer for Bolsa Família recipients. In this section, I show that while each of these
practices has been known to happen, they cannot account for the effectiveness gains of Bolsa
Família after a municipality has been audited at random.
A. Retaining Benefit Cards
Retaining benefit cards allows a corrupt official to withdraw the payments from the account
of legitimate beneficiary families. This was a major concern in the early years of the program
but has since become very uncommon.
Once a family is admitted to the Bolsa Família program, the Caixa provides it with a
magnetic stripe card that can be used to withdraw the benefits at branches of the Caixa, special
ATMs, lottery points, postal offices, and certain shops. Most cards are delivered through the
postal system and beneficiaries need to sign a receipt. If this is not possible, the cards are
returned to the Caixa that then attempts to deliver them through other channels, e.g., by
inviting families to pick them up at the nearest Caixa branch or by sending them to another
location specified by the beneficiary. Once families have received their card, they have to register
their PIN number at the nearest Caixa branch before they can access any benefits.
There are several ways a corrupt official can take possession of a families card. Prior to 2006,
local branches of the Caixa were responsible for distributing the cards to beneficiary families
and there were several incidents where cards were not immediately delivered to beneficiaries or
where there was no proof of receipt (Lindert et al., 2007). Now that most cards are delivered
through the postal system, fewer cards are vulnerable to this kind of fraud. Alternatively, a
corrupt administrator can seize the card under a pretext or a store owner can refuse to return
the card to a customer to force her to spend the benefits at his store. Finally, in remote areas,
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some people will offer to go to town and collect the payments for multiple families for a cut of
the benefits.
The MDS receives 10-20 reports of retained cards per year—relatively few considering the
almost 14 million benefit cards in circulation. Sete Quedas is representative in that the MDS has
never received a complaint about retained cards since they started to collect this information
in 2010; in an average year, the MDS receives not a single complaint from more than 99.7% of
municipalities. As the financial damages incurred through this form of corruption are roughly
proportional to the number of retained cards, the total losses are relatively minor. Even if
we assume that only one in a hundred affected cards is being reported, 99.99% of payments
would still be unaffected. Thus, funds stolen by retaining benefit cards cannot account for the
effectiveness gains of Bolsa Família.
B. Self-Registration in the Cadastro Único
"Beneficiary families with a member employed by the city hall underreported their
income." (CGU, 2015)
Like any other citizen, corrupt officials can benefit by registering themselves or a family
member in the Cadastro Único and providing inaccurate information that increases the probabil-
ity of being included. Unlike most families, however, local officials and program administrators
can potentially exert control over the registration and income verification process. Because of
this, the MDS and the CGU periodically cross-check beneficiaries with databases on elected
officials and public employees. Billy the cat, who made a brief appearance in Section II, actually
belonged to a local program administrator (Hider, 2014).
The financial impact of this strategy, however, is relatively small. The fraction of payments
syphoned to public employees can be quantified based on audits where CGU auditors cross-
referenced public employment records with data from the Cadastro Único. In the case of Sete
Quedas, for example, CGU auditors discovered one Bolsa Família beneficiary who had been
employed by the municipality for over a decade and earned a monthly wage of more than R$
2,100. Despite some news-worthy cases, less than 0.75% of payments are affected in any given
year.45
To put this number into perspective, we can compare it to the average share of families
uncovered to have underreported their income in the random samples of families investigated
by the CGU (see Figure A3.12 in Appendix A3.V). This share varies from 8.5% (in 2014) to
23.9% (in 2010). This is in line with the findings from similar programs in Indonesia (Alatas
et al., 2019) where local elites had significantly more control over the allocation of benefits; while
45. The number of cases was manually extracted from the CGU reports by a Brazilian research assistant and
it covers municipal, state, and federal employees. The estimate is conservative, as it also includes cases where
public employees were entitles to some, but not all of the benefits they received.
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local elites capture some of the benefits, the effect is not economically large and tends to pale
in comparison to the costs of other targeting errors.
C. Embezzling Complementary Funds
Diverting other funds from local registration centers can potentially be quite lucrative
compared to the other two strategies. If corrupt officials embezzle funds that are designated for
the local registration centers, the resulting infrastructure and staff shortages might affect the
performance of the Bolsa Família program. Moreover, municipalities are required to offer com-
plementary programs designed to help Bolsa Família recipients to comply with the program’s
conditionalities and to realize lasting improvements in the standard of living. Here too, signifi-
cant amounts can go missing. Section VII discusses these points in more detail and shows that
changes in infrastructure, registration center employment, and the availability of complementary
programs cannot account for the gains in program effectiveness.
VII. Alternative Explanations
Until now, the analysis has focused primarily on income underreporting and the resulting
mistargeting as an explanation for the effectiveness gains of Bolsa Família after a random au-
dit. In this section, I show that while common findings from the CGU’s audit reports provide
anecdotal evidence for several additional mechanisms how random audits might affect the ef-
fectiveness of the Bolsa Família program, none of these candidates—closer school attendance
monitoring, higher data quality, changes in administrative processes, better infrastructure and
funding, complementary social programs, tighter governance, or increased whistleblowing—can
explain the increase in Bolsa Família’s effectiveness.
A. School Monitoring
"School attendance records of students benefiting from the Bolsa Família program
entered in the Projeto Presença system by the municipality’s program manager are
in disagreement with those found in class books." (CGU, 2015)
Municipalities’ other major responsibility, besides registering families, is collecting the data
to monitor compliance with Bolsa Família’s conditionalities—most importantly children’s school
attendance. However, there is no evidence that school attendance records become more accurate
after a random audit.
Bolsa Família depends on municipal administrators to report if children of beneficiaries
fail to attend school regularly enough to comply with the program’s conditionalities. Teachers
record students’ absences in the class book, which is in turn used by the school administrators
to report attendance in the ministry of education’s Projeto Presença system. As the auditors
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explain, insufficient monitoring risks that Bolsa Família provides only short-term relief but no
sustainable progress in the fight against poverty and social marginalization (CGU, 2015). Thus,
Bolsa Família will be less successful if corrupt administrators don’t fulfill their responsibility or
collude with families to overstate compliance with conditionalities.
In the case of Sete Quedas, several students were given 99% attendance scores in the
monitoring system despite having insufficient attendance rates for the two months scrutinized
during the audit. Sete Quedas’ negligence to adequately monitor school attendance is relatively
benign compared to the failures uncovered in some other municipalities, where "class books are
not traceable", "students who benefit from Bolsa Família cannot be located", and school officials
"lack knowledge of their responsibilities", "report on the attendance of students enrolled in other
schools", or "report 100% attendance for all students without any documentation."
Unfortunately, the Cadastro Único does not contain information on students’ school atten-
dance rates. However, the audit reports can be used to see whether school monitoring improves
in municipalities that have been audited at random. Using the specification in Equation (3.3),
there is no significant change in the number of irregularities related to attendance monitoring in
municipalities that have previously been audited (P = 0.960). Additionally, temporary blockage
of benefits due to non-compliance with the conditionalities of Bolsa Família, most importantly
school attendance, can be used as a proxy for how closely families are monitored. Table A3.20
shows that even though the number of families with temporarily blocked benefits increases sig-
nificantly immediately after a random audit (P = 0.032), this is not a lasting change and there
is no significant change in the long run (P = 0.811). Thus, improvements in school monitoring
are unlikely to explain the lasting effectiveness gains of Bolsa Família after a municipality has
been audited at random.
B. Data Inconsistencies
"[...] the local manager should update the registry entries of the beneficiaries indi-
cated in the inspection report, to adjust the data recorded in the CadÚnico with the
real family structure." (CGU, 2015)
Mistargeting can originate not only from deliberately misleading statements during the reg-
istration process but also from unintentional errors and outdated information in the database.
Because the MDS relies on local administrators for the registration and monitoring of beneficia-
ries, it reimburses municipalities with a payment per household per month if the municipality
fulfills its responsibilities sufficiently well.
To assess municipalities’ implementation of Bolsa Família, the MDS constructs a monthly
index of municipal management quality (IGD-M) based on the consistency of data in the Cadas-
tro Único and the school and health monitoring systems. The index is a weighted sum of the
rates of school monitoring (the fraction of children in beneficiary families with updated entries
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in the Projeto Presença system), health monitoring (the fraction of families subject to medical
conditionalities that is covered in the health monitoring system), and the fraction of up-to-date
entries in the Cadastro Único. Until July 2015, the estimated coverage rate of the Cadastro
Único also contributed to the index.46 If the IGD-M and its subindices exceed a certain thresh-
old and some additional administrative requirements are satisfied, municipalities receive IGD-M
× R$ 3.25 per valid registration, plus additional incentive payments, for example, to follow up
on families with suspended benefits.
If Bolsa Família becomes more effective because municipalities improve their data manage-
ment, this will be reflected in the IGD-M and its components. Table A3.21 in Appendix A3.VI
shows that this not the case. The index is unchanged, as are the subindices for health, data
updating, and the coverage rate of the registry. If anything, school monitoring worsens slightly.
The absence of changes in these indicators, however, conceals significant changes in both the
nominators and the denominators that make up these fractions: There are fewer children whose
school attendance is monitored, but also fewer children in beneficiary families. There are fewer
families whose medical checkups are monitored, but also fewer families required to do the check-
ups (see Table A3.22 in Appendix A3.VI). In short, significantly fewer families are registered as
being eligible, again suggesting that municipalities exclude ineligible families in the aftermath
of an audit and are more careful going forward.
C. CRAS Processes
"[...] the identified problems are caused by the lack of pre-established and properly
formalized routines for verifying and monitoring compliance with the legislation that
governs the program." (CGU, 2015)
When asked to explain irregularities in the income of registered families, municipal admin-
istrators in Sete Quedas resorted to case-by-case explanations and tried to place the blame solely
on the families. According to the auditors, they did not sufficiently appreciate that these cases
are symptomatic of inadequate processes at the local registration center (CGU, 2015).
The IGD-M is a rather crude tool to monitor the registration centers and it is mostly used
to incentivize consistency between the interlinking computer systems. More informative about
the actual processes and practices is the annual census of social assistance, Censo SUAS, that
is completed by the social assistance centers (CRAS). The survey collects basic information
on employees and detailed information on physical infrastructure, technical equipment, and
administrative processes—including how the Cadastro Único is updated. Questions include
whether the CRAS updates the registry,47 which employees work with the database, and more
46. Later, the coverage rate was so close to 100% that the MDS stopped using this information. See Figure
A3.6 in Appendix A3.V.
47. Not all centers input data in the Cadastro Único because some lack the necessary infrastructure and
training or focus on other forms of social assistance.
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recently also in what format data is initially collected.
The results in Table A3.23 in Appendix A3.VI suggest that the auditors’ well-meaning
advice is largely ignored: centers continue to update the Cadastro Único in pretty much the
same way as before the audit. Centers are equally likely to update the Cadastro Único, just
as likely to have a special team to work with the registry, and individual employees are equally
likely to handle the database. When collecting information on families, CRAS centers that do
update the Cadastro Único stick to the method they have always used and are just as likely to
rely on paper or to enter the data digitally than before the audit.
Table A3.24 in Appendix A3.VI fails to find any significant change in the composition of
the 80,000-strong workforce at the CRAS. Employees have the same age and gender profile, the
same experience, similar working hours, and the same educational level: the shares of employees
with at most completed primary education, secondary education, some college, a college degree,
or a post-graduate qualification all remain unchanged. There is also no change in the legal
aspects of the employment relationships: employees are just as likely to be hired under the rigid
Consolidation of Labor Laws (CLT) after an audit as before, and the same holds for civil servant
appointed by the mayor under the discretionary rules of Art. 37.
Finally, CRAS centers in audited municipalities are also not more likely to seek citizen
participation to ensure that their activities suit the needs of their clients. Table A3.25 in
Appendix A3.VI shows that if anything, centers are less likely to invite citizen participation to
improve the center’s services: the share of centers that report not soliciting any input from the
population—formal or otherwise—increases by 7.59 percentage points, albeit not significantly
(P = 0.163). Moreover, centers are 2.51 percentage points less likely to have elected citizen
representatives (P = 0.076) and 5.44 percentage points less likely to have a citizen committee
after a random audit (P = 0.095), making it unlikely, that increased citizen participation is
behind the observed performance gains.
Overall, changes in practices at the CRAS are insufficient to account for the improved
performance of Bolsa Família after a municipality has been audited at random.
D. CRAS Infrastructure and Funding
"Used and broken toys were delivered to the Tia Solíria Day Care Center." (CGU,
2015)
One way by which local corruption can hinder the effectiveness of government policy is
through its effect on municipal infrastructure: even if the money from Bolsa Família payments
reaches beneficiaries, the program could be less effective if the CRAS centers lack the infrastruc-
ture to properly serve families in the municipality.
In the previous rounds of the audit program, the infrastructure at the CRAS centers in
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several municipalities was inspected and found lacking.48 Unfortunately, the auditors did not
inspect the infrastructure at the CRAS in Sete Quedas, but the mechanism is well-illustrated
by a curious incident involving a woman the auditors identify as "the first-lady of Sete Quedas"
(CGU, 2015): About half a year before the audit, the municipality spend R$ 4,614.78 it had
received from the National Fund for Education Development to buy educational toys and sport-
ing equipment for the Tia Solíria Day Care Center. At the time of the audit, the toys were
in the nursery, but they were in two garbage bags—unpacked, dirty, broken, and incomplete.
Asked about the garbage bags, the head of the nursery said that they had been delivered in
the previous week by the first lady of the municipality. Having initially given the toys to other
unidentified families, she scrambled to retrieve them when she learned of the impending audit.
However, as shown in Figure A3.15 in Appendix A3.V, major changes in center infras-
tructure are as conspicuously absent as changes in the workforce and practices of registration
centers: For the 37 analyzed survey items in the Censo SUAS—covering everything from the
physical infrastructure (number and type of rooms), whether they comply with the norms for
accessibility in public buildings (ABNT NBR9095), the ownership of the premises, IT and other
technological infrastructure, vehicles available to the CRAS staff, to whether the center has
a toys and sporting equipment at its disposal—, there is not a single significant change after
correcting for multiple hypothesis testing (FDR; Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995).49
Similarly, one might wonder whether municipalities allocate more funds for the proper
administration of their social programs. However, Tables A3.26 and A3.27 in Appendix A3.VI
show that neither the amount municipalities spend on social programs and their administration
nor the amount they spend on education increases significantly after a municipality has been
audited at random. This result holds irrespective whether expenditure is analyzed in absolute
numbers, per capita, or as a share of the total municipal budget. If anything, municipalities
decrease per capita social expenditure by about 4.1% (P = 0.061). Thus, neither changes in the
infrastructure nor the funding for social programs can account for the increased effectiveness
after a random audit.
E. Complementary Actions and Programs
"[...] it was verified that the Municipality did not offer complementary programs to
Bolsa Família." (CGU, 2015)
Complementary programs for beneficiary families—literacy classes, occupational training,
microcredits, and guidance in accessing government services—are an important ingredient of
Bolsa Família’s strategy to overcome poverty in a sustainable way (CGU, 2015). Municipalities
48. Common findings include lack of computers (e.g., CGU, 2014a), problems with of accessibility (e.g., CGU,
2014b), and absence of sufficiently large rooms for communal activities (e.g., CGU, 2014c).
49. Without multiple hypothesis correction, only one item changes significantly at the 5% level: after an
audit, centers are more likely to occupy a building owned by the municipality (P = 0.035).
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play a key role in the development of these services and are especially called upon to assist
families that are in breach of their Bolsa Família conditionalities. It is straightforward to see
how improvements in these programs after a random audit might account for the effectiveness
gains that we observe. This explanation, however, is not supported by the data; there is no
significant change in complementary programs after a random audit.
While the Census SUAS does not explicitly ask about complementary programs for Bolsa
Família, it does ask about activities and programs aimed at vulnerable families in general through
the Serviço de Proteção e Atendimento Integral à Família (PAIF). Although PAIF does not
exclusively serve families in Bolsa Família, a large number of its activities focus on low-income
families (Afonso et al., 2013) so that PAIF activities are a good proxy for the existence of
complementary programs.
Figure A3.16 in Appendix A3.V shows the effect of a random audit on 23 programs and
activities targeted at vulnerable families. None of the changes are significant at the 5% level,
even without correction for multiple hypothesis testing (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995). Centers
don’t change their outreach programs to welcome new families, don’t offer different programs
and activities, don’t provide more specialized coaching for families in various life situations, and
are just as likely to refer families to other social and public services than before the municipality
has been audited. Most relevantly for Bolsa Família, there is no evidence that CRAS centers
are more likely to coach families that are in breach of their conditionalities (P = 0.909), nor
that they are more likely to help families to register or update their data in the Cadastro Único
(P = 0.950).
F. Governance and Oversight
"The Municipal Council of Social Assistance does not fulfill its obligations to monitor
and inspect the programs and services." (CGU, 2015)
Brazilian municipalities are required to establish a Council for Social Assistance (CMAS)
to monitor the local provision of social services. More conscientious governance could account
for the effectiveness gains of Bolsa Família if social councils monitor programs more closely after
a random audit. This explanation, however, is not consistent with the data from the Censo
SUAS.
Although the social council’s powers and responsibilities vary from place to place, they
usually involve approving plans and budgets for local social services, establishing the rules to
grant special relieve to families hit by certain life-events, and monitoring and overseeing the
various social and welfare programs. Social councils should be composed of representatives of
the municipal administration and other organizations providing social assistance, as well an
equal number of members from civic organizations, program beneficiaries, and other represen-
tatives of the public. In many cases, the regulations specify that the presidency rotates between
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representatives of the administration and the public.
In the case of Sete Quedas, the social council is formally responsible for monitoring all
aspects of Bolsa Família—the registration and data management in the Cadastro Único, the
monitoring of compliance, the temporary blockages of benefits, and the development of comple-
mentary programs.50 When asked by the auditors, however, the members of the social council
in Sete Quedas confirmed not only that they had not carried out any inspections of the munic-
ipality’s social programs in the previous year but that they had not even met during this time
(CGU, 2015).
Figure A3.17 in Appendix A3.V shows that social councils are unlikely to account for the
increased effectiveness of Bolsa Família after a random audit: social councils are equally likely
to be responsible for the program and its monitoring, to discuss results from inspections in
meetings, to include a beneficiary representative, to have a commission specifically for Bolsa
Família, or to receive and discuss alleged misconduct and abuse of the program. More generally,
councils discuss the same topics, engage in the same activities, and are governed by the same
rules. Among 53 items in the annual census of social councils, there is not a single one that
changes significantly after correcting for multiple hypothesis testing (Benjamini and Hochberg,
1995).51
G. Social Control
"Civic participation in the control of the Bolsa Família Program is restricted due to
non-disclosure of the list of beneficiaries of the program by the municipal adminis-
tration." (CGU, 2015)
Municipalities are required to publicly post lists of all Bolsa Família beneficiaries with their
names and social security numbers, similar to the disclosure made by the federal government
through the Portal da Transparência. Publication of this lists, it is assumed, enables members
of the public to denounce families that illegitimately claim benefits: "it should be emphasized
that the disclosure of the list of Bolsa Família beneficiaries is important to make the program
transparent, to identify irregularities and to allow possible denunciations by citizens" (CGU,
2015). These complaints against families and officials received through whistleblower systems
are investigated as part of the audits.
In the case of Sete Quedas, the MDS did not record any denunciations of illegitimate
payments from citizens or program administrators, nor any complaints against employees of the
CRAS. Subsequent inspections of the public areas at the city hall and the CRAS uncovered that
the municipality had failed to publish the list of beneficiaries.
50. This is increasingly the case: 73.3% of social councils had this responsibility in 2011, and the number has
increased to 91.8% in 2017.
51. Without the correction, only one item is significant at the 5% level: social councils may be somewhat
more likely to organize town-hall meetings (P = 0.047).
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There is, however, no evidence that more citizens blow the whistle after a municipality has
been audited at random. Table A3.28 in Appendix A3.VI shows that there is no change in the
number of denunciations the MDS receives from beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, or program ad-
ministrators, nor is there a change in the number of complaints about the CRAS or its employees.
Naturally, not every complaint will be made through the MDS’s system and complaints with
local authorities are not collected centrally. Although it cannot directly be observed whether
the number of complaints made to local authorities increases significantly after a random audit,
municipalities report whether they have a special ombudsman to deal with denunciations, and
whether their social council received and discussed any denunciations over the last year. None
of these items change significantly after a municipality has been audited at random.52 Thus,
increased social control is unlikely to explain the improved performance of Bolsa Família after
an audit.
VIII. Conclusion
This paper shows how corruption negatively impacts the effectiveness of government policy
in a setting where bribery, clientelism, and embezzlement play at most a negligible role. Despite
Bolsa Família’s strong safeguards against corruption, local corruption significantly reduced its
effectiveness. After a municipality has been audited at random, Bolsa Família becomes roughly
30% more effective at increasing school enrollment. Thus, even though Bolsa Família bypasses
local governments for the allocation and payment of benefits to minimize the potential for
corruption (Lindert et al., 2007), local corruption can still affect the effectiveness of the program
if it leads to more income underreporting.
These effectiveness gains are largely driven by better targeting of the program to families
that benefit the most. The mechanism is illustrated using a theoretical model of the registration
process where families decide how to report their income: underreporting one’s income increases
the probability of being included in Bolsa Família and detection is less likely in high corruption
municipalities. The model is consistent with patterns in the distribution of reported incomes and
administrative data on the effects of home-visits during the registration process and the number
of families excluded from the program due to income underreporting. A field experiment with
registration centers provides additional evidence that income underreporting is easier in munici-
palities that have not been audited. In contrast, an online experiment with low-income families
rules out that changes in social norms explain the shift in income reporting. Other explanations
such as tampering with benefit cards, closer monitoring of school attendance, better administra-
tive processes, improvements in infrastructure and funding for social assistance, complementary
52. See Figure A3.17 in Appendix A3.V for the result on social councils. The result on special ombudsmen
is based on a regression with state fixed effects, as the question was only included in the Censo SUAS 2017,
precluding the use of the more rigorous specification with municipality and time fixed effects.
74 CHAPTER 3
programs for beneficiary families, and tighter governance and social control cannot explain the
results.
Although using Bolsa Família’s official database offers many advantages over secondary data
sets, it limits which policy outcomes can be studied. The Cadastro Único is not a particularly rich
dataset when it comes to educational outcomes and it includes little that can be used to study
the program’s health priorities. For example, it does not include information from the school
attendance and health systems used to monitor compliance with the program’s conditionalities.
Using data from the ministries of health and education, future research could show whether local
corruption also reduces Bolsa Família’s effectiveness in promoting its health and nutritional goals
and whether the school enrollment gains translate into improved test scores and better labor
market outcomes.
The results of this paper speak to the positive effects of government audits (e.g., Di Tella
and Schargrodsky, 2003; Olken, 2007; Bobonis et al., 2016; Avis et al., 2018): while the focus of
government audits is to reduce the embezzlement of funds, they have second-order effects such
as stimulating economic activity (Bologna et al., 2015; Colonnelli and Prem, 2017; Giannetti
et al., 2017), improving educational attainment through better school funding (Ferraz et al.,
2012) or, in this case, improved targeting of social programs. However, it is worth noting that
the random audits not exclusively investigate whether municipalities can account for their use
of federal funds and whether the goods and services they pay for have been delivered. As the
audits look specifically for evidence of ineligible families in the Bolsa Família program, it is
an open question whether the same gains would be observed if the auditors focused solely on
municipalities’ use of funds.
The results of the paper also have implications for the effective targeting of social programs.
Bolsa Família’s increased effectiveness after a municipality has been audited appear to be driven
solely by the fact that the program is more likely to reach the families that respond most to the
program. Borrowing from the field of personalized medicine (Kent et al., 2018), one promising
approach to poverty alleviation focuses on predicting families’ heterogeneous treatment responses
to maximize the effectiveness of anti-poverty programs (e.g., McBride and Nichols, 2018).
Given the importance of accurate self-reporting and the challenges of income verification
for the effective targeting of Bolsa Família and similar programs, future research should explore
interventions that increase the likelihood of accurate reporting. Studies in other settings provide
encouraging evidence of significant improvements in the honesty of self-reports from remedies
as simple as having people sign at the beginning rather than at the end of a self-report (Shu
et al., 2012), including a moral appeal or a reminder about the possibility of detection (Bott
et al., 2017), and priming participants’ religious (Randolph-Seng and Nielsen, 2007), professional
(Cohn et al., 2014), and social identify (Cohn et al., 2015). Approaches could also focus on
the administrator’s duty to verify families’ incomes, possibly inspired by interventions to curb
physicians’ overprescription of antibiotics (e.g., Meeker et al., 2014, 2016). This research should
REFERENCES 75
focus on those design aspects of Bolsa Família that might inadvertently increase underreporting:
As underreporting only increases the probability of being included, there is a moral wiggle room
to think that underreporting not necessarily leads to illegitimate benefits (Dana et al., 2007).
Similarly, some families who would not underreport if the social worker made the inclusion
decision directly might do so if an impersonal process in the capital decides (Mazar et al., 2008).
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Chapter 4
Genes, Pubs, and Drinks:
Gene-Environment Interplay and
Alcohol Licensing Policy in the UK
Pietro Biroli and Christian Zünd
Abstract: Are we genetically destined to behave poorly, or can a well-designed policy and a
nurturing environment prevail over our instincts? This paper analyzes the interplay of public
policy and individuals’ genetic endowments, demonstrating how people’s genetic propensity to
drink moderates their consumption behavior in response to alcohol availability and licensing
policy. We combine data from the UK Biobank with geo-coded data on pubs and retailers, as
well as data on alcohol licensing from local authorities in England and Wales. This allows us to
construct a fine-grained measure of local alcohol availability for each one of the approximately
500,000 participants in the UK Biobank. Our results show that individuals with a high genetic
propensity to drink self-select into environments with easier access to alcohol, react less to
changes in the number of sales points, and respond less to restrictive licensing. Importantly,
while local licensing authorities are allowed to consider the effects of pubs on children, crime,
or public disturbance, they cannot base their decision on public health factors, which mitigates
concerns of reverse causality. Using information on physician-diagnosed medical conditions from
the National Health Service, we quantify the effect from a public health perspective, showing
that the polygenic score predicts alcohol-related disease even when we control for self-reported
drinking behavior. Thus, we show that supply-focused licensing policy to mitigate alcohol abuse
can clash with individual predispositions and might exacerbate genetic inequality, suggesting
the need for a more targeted approach.
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Genes load the gun. Lifestyle pulls the trigger.
— Dr. Elliott Joslin
I. Introduction
Are we genetically destined to behave poorly, or can a well-designed policy and a nurturing
environment prevail over our instincts? Debates about the relative influence of nature versus
nurture on human behaviors are amongst the oldest in the social sciences (Mulcaster, 1582;
Hume, 1748; Darwin, 1859; Freud, 1930). In recent decades, however, it has become increasingly
clear that pitting nature against nurture should be relinquished in favor of a more systemic view
that considers the complex interplay that may exist between people’s genetic makeup (“nature”)
and the environment in which they develop (“nurture”) (Hunter, 2005; Heckman, 2007). In this
paper, we evaluate how genetic predisposition and local alcohol licensing policy interact and
jointly influence people’s alcohol consumption choices.
Alcohol consumption is worth your attention because of its prevalence and its negative
consequences: it is estimated to be the third leading cause of preventable death, it has been
related to more than 60 medical conditions, and it accounts for a share of the global burden
of disease comparable to those of tobacco or hypertension (Mokdad et al., 2004; Room et al.,
2005). In other words, drinking alcohol is one of the leading behavioral factors that contribute
to increasing health inequality. But what is the origin of this inequality? Recent research shows
that our genes affect how much alcohol we drink, but it is unclear how our genetic predisposition
influences our reaction to changes in the availability of alcohol and what this implies for effective
alcohol licensing policy.
Our paper shows that the genetic propensity to drink alcohol contributes to health in-
equalities in two ways: by promoting selection into unfavorable environments, and by decreas-
ing susceptibility to more restrictive licensing policies. Both negative selection and decreased
susceptibility lead to higher alcohol intake and, eventually, alcohol-related diseases.
To better understand the genetic origin of differences in health behaviors and inequality,
we combine individual genetic data with measures of local alcohol availability for approximately
500,000 participants in the UK Biobank, an extensive and detailed prospective study of British,
Welsh, and Scottish participants aged 40 to 69 years recruited between 2006–2010. Using the
coordinates of all pubs and the branches of all the major retailers in the UK, we construct a fine-
grained measure of local alcohol availability. Using information on 700,000 genetic variants, we
estimate a polygenic score that proxies the individual genetic propensity for alcohol consumption.
First, we show that both living in proximity to many alcohol sales points and a high poly-
genic propensity for alcohol consumption are associated with several drinking-related behaviors.
Moreover, we find that individuals with a high polygenic score self-select into environments with
greater alcohol availability. This is evidence of considerable gene-environment correlation: carri-
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ers of similar genetic variants tend to cluster in the same area. Similar forms of gene-environment
correlation have recently been demonstrated to contribute to inequality in health, socioeconomic
status, and education (Belsky et al., 2018, 2019; Abdellaoui et al., 2018).
Second, we evaluate the effectiveness of alcohol licensing policy in tackling health inequal-
ity. Since the Licensing Act of 2003, the decision of who should be allowed to own a license to
sell and distribute alcohol in the United Kingdom is in the hands of 350 local licensing commit-
tees. This subsidiarity leads to substantial geographic variation in the restrictiveness of alcohol
distribution. Importantly, while the Licensing Act provides local authorities with significant
licensing flexibility, it prohibits them from considering public health, much less the genetic pre-
dispositions of their residents, when deciding whether to grant a license. This policy limitation
mitigates concerns of reverse causality. Using the data on local licensing activity, we estimate
the effect of licensing policy on alcohol consumption for individuals with a low and high poly-
genic score. We find that a more restrictive licensing policy leads to decreased alcohol intake on
average, but individuals with a high genetic propensity to drink are less responsive to a policy
change. Therefore, this public policy limiting the supply of alcohol tends to amplify existing
genetic inequalities: it is more effective for those individuals who already have a low genetic
predisposition to drinking, but it has less bite for those individuals who might need it the most.
In the final part, we investigate the implication of our results from a public health perspec-
tive, using information on physician-diagnosed medical conditions from records of the National
Health Service. Our results show that individuals with a high genetic propensity to drink are sig-
nificantly more likely to have an alcohol-related condition, including liver diseases, psychological
disorders, and various afflictions of the digestive system. These results hold even if we control
for self-reported alcohol consumption, demonstrating how incorporating genetic information can
help us uncover relevant dimensions of health-inequality that are not commonly observable.
Our results demonstrate how measures of genetic predisposition can shed light on the
determinants and the dynamics of health inequalities. Genetic predispositions interact with
individual choices of location and health behaviors, and with public health policies. Our results
contribute to the recent literature estimating how the genetic endowment of individuals can mute
or exacerbate the causal effect of public policies such as the increase of minimum schooling age
(Barcellos et al., 2018), mandatory war draft (Schmitz and Conley, 2016b, 2017), or late-career
job loss (Schmitz and Conley, 2016a). We show that the effectiveness of supply-focused licensing
policy as a tool to mitigate alcohol abuse can clash with individual predispositions and might
actually exacerbate genetic inequality, suggesting the need for a more targeted approach.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II describes our empirical approach. We provide a
brief overview of the UK Biobank, our measure of local alcohol availability, and the licensing
data. We then describe the construction of the polygenic score for the number of alcoholic drinks
per week. Section III presents our results. We show that a higher polygenic score is associated
with increased alcohol consumption, self-selection into areas with easier access to alcohol, and
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a weaker relationship between the proximity of alcohol sales points and intake. Turning to the
effects of licensing policy, we show that individuals with a strong genetic predisposition react less
to restrictive licensing. Finally, we show that a high genetic propensity to drink predicts alcohol-
related diseases, even if we control for self-reported drinking. Section IV concludes our analysis
and discusses its policy implications, limitations, and possible extensions in future research.
II. Empirical Methods
This paper combines genetic and alcohol consumption data from the UK Biobank with geo-
coded data on pubs and retailers that sell alcohol, as well as information on alcohol licensing
from all local licensing authorities in England and Wales. Using the coordinates of all pubs and
the branches of all the major retailers in the UK, we construct a fine-grained measure of local
alcohol availability for each one of the approximately 500,000 participants in the UK Biobank.
Our measure of genetic propensity for alcohol consumption is a polygenic score (PGS) for the
number of alcoholic drinks per week (DPW).
A. The UK Biobank
Genetic information, measures of alcohol intake, and medical data for the participants
are collected by the UK Biobank (UKB).1 Around the time that the first human genome was
sequenced in 2003, the UK’s Medical Research Council and the Wellcome Trust launched an
ambitious project to collect biological samples from 500,000 people (Collins, 2012). In addition
to the genetic information, the UKB also includes data on health-related behaviors, including
several measures of alcohol intake, as well as some measures of socioeconomic status (e.g., ed-
ucation, income, occupation). Being tightly integrated with the UK National Health Service
(NHS), the UKB also contains extensive information on medical histories and can follow partici-
pants long after their initial inclusion. Importantly for the purpose of this paper, health records
include data on the location of participants. This combination of genetic information, data on
health-related behaviors, and reasonably good geographic information makes the UKB a unique
resource to study gene-environment interactions.2
Between 2006 and 2010, approximately 500,000 individuals aged 40 to 60 underwent an
initial assessment at one of the UKB’s 23 assessment centers.3 At the initial assessment, par-
1. This paper is part of the Gene-Environment Interplay in the Generation of Health and Education Inequal-
ities (GEIGHEI) collaboration, approved by the UKB as project #41382.
2. Indeed, the ability to studying gene-environment interactions was a key motivation for building a compre-
hensive biobank and features prominently in the first sentence of the UK Biobank’s protocol: “Scientists have
known for many years that our risks of developing different diseases are due to the complex interplay of different
factors: our lifestyle and environment; our personal susceptibility (genes); and the play of chance (luck)” (UKB,
2006, p.3).
3. The UKB aims to improve “the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of a wide range of serious and life-
threatening illnesses—including cancer, heart diseases, stroke, diabetes, arthritis, osteoporosis, eye disorders,
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ticipants completed a series of questionnaires and a computer-assisted interview. Professional
healthcare practitioners collected physical and functional measures as well as blood, urine, and
saliva samples. Over the last ten years, subsets of participants completed additional assessments:
a follow-up assessment (2012 to 2013), an imaging assessment with magnetic resonance imag-
ing of the brain, heart, and body, ultrasound of the carotid arteries, and X-ray absorptiometry
imaging of bones and joints (since 2014), repeated 24hr dietary recalls (2011 to 2012), and a
mental health module (2016 to 2017).
While the UKB was conceived as a prospective study with an initial cross-section of mea-
surements and subsequent observation of medical histories (Sudlow et al., 2015), the additional
assessments enable us to observe alcohol intake at multiple points in time for a subset of par-
ticipants. Table A4.1 in Appendix A4.II displays the summary statistics, including the number
of observations, for drinking-related behaviors in each of the assessments. Reassuringly, these
variables are highly correlated (see Table A4.2 in Appendix A4.II.)
Concerning the UKB’s geographic resolution, there are two noteworthy caveats. First, the
location of assessment centers was chosen such that at least 150,000 potential participants in
this age group live within less than 10 miles of each center (UKB, 2006, p.49). As a result, the
vast majority of participants live in urban areas (see Figure A4.1 in Appendix A4.I for a map of
UKB participants). Second, information on a participant’s location is rounded to a 1000m grid
for privacy reasons. While this is considerably more precise than similar data sources that only
provide information on the state or municipality of residence, it has important implications for
the construction of our individual-level measure of alcohol availability.
B. Alcohol Availability
Our primary measure for alcohol availability is the number of pubs located within 1000m of
a participant’s residence. This measure of pub density was constructed using a comprehensive
list of pubs and their location from The Good Pub Guide. The the UK’s longest-running
publication of this kind, The Good Pub Guide has been printed since 1982 and is arguably the
most complete list of all pubs in the UK.4 In addition to reviews from its staff, The Good Pub
Guide enables license holders to provide additional information on their businesses and allows
registered and verified users to suggest other pubs for review and inclusion. As a result, it is the
most comprehensive and up to date list, containing information on the locations of 52,500 pubs
and similar venues in the UK.5
depression and forms of dementia” (UK Biobank, https://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk, accessed on December 18,
2019). To this end, the UK Biobank focuses on healthy individuals in age groups that are at a high risk of
developing one of these conditions throughout the study.
4. It also maintains an extensive online presence since 2009 https://thegoodpubguide.co.uk, accessed on
October 18, 2018.
5. The British Beer and Pub Association counts 48,350 pubs. The Campaign for Real Ale (CAMRA) uses
data on 47,500 pubs in their reports. Using a more restrictive definition of pubs, the Office of National Statistics
estimates that there are only around 39,000 pubs in the UK (ONS, 2018). As our measure aims to quantify the
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Figure 4.1
Distribution of the Alcohol Availability Measures
Notes. This figure displays the distribution of our alcohol availability micro mea-
sures. The top panel shows the distribution for the number of pubs within 1000 m of
a UKB participant’s place of residence (truncated at 100). The bottom panel shows
the distribution for the number of retailers (truncated at 10).
While pubs have a prominent place in the UK’s drinking and leisure culture, buying alcohol
outside of a pub might be cheaper. The on-trade price for a pint in a pub has increased much
more quickly than the off-trade price for beer in supermarkets, which has contributed to the
growing share of alcohol purchased outside of pubs, culminating in 2015, when off-trade sales
overtook on-trade sales for the first time (BBPA, 2016). Therefore, we construct a similar
measure for the density of retailers within 1000m, using a panel of the locations of the UK’s
largest retailers since 2014.6
As shown in Figure 4.1, 83.9% of participants live within 1km of at least one pub, and
58.2% live within 1km of a major retailer. These relatively high numbers are not surprising
given the concentration of UKB participants in urban areas. There is significant variation in
accessibility of alcohol, a broader definition is more appropriate for our analysis.
6. These include all locations of Tesco, Sainsbury’s, Co-op Food, M&S, ASDA, ALDI, LIDL, Morrisons,
Waitrose, and a number of regional chains. The data is provided by Geolytix, https://geolytix.co.uk, accessed
on November 22, 2018.
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pub density both between and within local authorities. The average participant living in the
City of London7 gets to choose between more than 450 venues within 1000m. In contrast, none
of the 189 participants in the Richmondshire local authority has more than three pubs in their
neighborhood, averaging just 0.61 pubs within a 1000m radius. In addition to the differences
between local licensing areas, there is also substantial heterogeneity within areas. For example,
in the area governed by the Westminster City Council, pub density ranges from 6 to 408 pubs
within a 1000m radius. In general, differences between local authorities explain just under 30%
of the variance in pub density.
C. Local Licensing Policy
Since the Licensing Act of 2003, responsibility for licensing in England and Wales has
been decentralized to 350 local licensing authorities.8 This has led to considerable geographic
variation in the restrictiveness or permissiveness of policy.
Each local licensing authority appoints a committee of 10 to 15 members who determine
licensing policy in consultation with other stakeholders such as the police or fire and rescue
authorities. The licensing committee outlines its strategy for a five year period and conducts
regular evaluations. While regulating the sale of alcoholic beverages is a central part of the
Licensing Act, the responsibility of licensing committees extends to “licensable activities” more
broadly.9 In addition to granting, reviewing, refusing, or revoking licenses, the licensing commit-
tees have several other tools at their disposal. They can restrict the sale of alcohol to purchases
for consumption on-premise or off-premise only, they can limit opening and sales hours, and
they can grant the license for entertainment only but prohibit the sale of alcohol entirely. They
can also define cumulative impact areas where stricter licensing rules apply, for example, in
the vicinity of schools. Applicants for a license to sell alcohol within one of these zones need
to prove that they will not negatively impact the objectives of the licensing policy (Martineau
et al., 2013).
While the Licensing Act provides local authorities with significant flexibility to shape their
policy, it puts strict limits on the factors they can and cannot take into account in their decision
making. The act requires licensing committees to consider four specific objectives: the prevention
of crime and disorder, public safety, the prevention of public nuisance, and the protection of
7. London’s historic center, governed by the City of London Cooperation and local authority. However, the
four local authorities where participants have the next highest average pub density are all also located in central
London: the City of Westminster, Camden, Islington, and Kensington and Chelsea.
8. The area of responsibility for a licensing committee usually corresponds to the area of a local government—
non-metropolitan districts, metropolitan districts, London’s boroughs, or unitary authorities responsible for the
provision of local services. For convenience, we will usually refer to these areas as local authorities. Alcohol
licensing law differs in Scotland, where they are governed by the Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005, and in Northern
Ireland, which has a fixed quota for the number of pubs and new businesses have to wait for an existing premise
to surrender its license.
9. These include regulated entertainment such as performances of plays, dances, live and recorded music,
boxing matches, and indoor sports and entertainment more generally.
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children from harm. Importantly for the purpose of our analysis, local licensing authorities in
England and Wales are not allowed to take public health into consideration, which mitigates
concerns of reverse causality.10 This is made explicit by the Home Office in its binding guidance
for local authorities:
“Any conditions imposed must be appropriate for the promotion of the licensing
objectives; there is no power for the licensing authority to attach a condition that
is merely aspirational. For example, conditions may not be attached which relate
solely to the health of customers rather than their direct physical safety” (Home
Office, 2012, p.74).11
Although restricting licensing committees to these four objectives does not imply that
licensing policy is exogenous, it does at least imply that policy is not explicitly conditioned
on the (expected) genetic predisposition to consume alcohol. Figure A4.4 in Appendix A4.I
suggests that this is indeed not the case; policy measures are uncorrelated with our measure of
genetic predisposition of UKB participants living in the local authority. Moreover, Table A4.3
in Appendix A4.II shows that these policy measures are well-balanced between local authorities
with an average genetic propensity below and above the median. As a more stringent test of
balancedness, we conducted a Pei et al. (2019) test to check whether licensing policy is predictive
of the local genetic predisposition. This is not the case (χ2(3) = 3.500, P = 0.321).12
D. Polygenic Scores (PGS)
Following the most recent literature in social science genomics (Benjamin et al., Forthcom-
ing; Braudt, 2018; Freese, 2018), individuals’ genetic predisposition for alcohol consumption is
quantified using a polygenic score (PGS), a summary of the effects of more than 700,000 genetic
variants that contribute to an individual’s tendency to drink. The polygenic score employed
in this paper predicts drinking based on a weighted sum of single-nucleotide polymorphisms
(SNPs), the most common form of genetic variation present in the human genome.13
10. This is not the case in Scotland. In addition to the four objectives in England’s licensing act, Section
4 of the Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005 lists “protecting and improving public health” as an additional objective
(Scottish Parliament, 2005). This public health provision increases the scope for endogeneity, as licensing policy
might be determined in response to local alcohol consumption and potentially to counteract a suspected genetic
predisposition. We thus focus on England and Wales in our analysis.
11. Naturally, licensing conditions imposed for reasons other than public health might nevertheless have a
positive impact on public health. However, this should not be the objective of the policy: “There will of course
be occasions when a public safety condition could incidentally benefit a person’s health more generally, but it
should not be the purpose of the condition as this would be outside the licensing authority’s powers (be ultra
vires) under the 2003 Act.” (Home Office, 2012, p.11)
12. The test estimates the coefficients when the policy variable is regressed on the polygenic score, the first 40
principal components of the genetic data, and the fixed effects: Xi,s = α+βPGSi +PCi + f(agei, sexi)+ εi,s. It
then uses an F-test whether these coefficients are jointly significant from zero. A significant test statistic would
imply that these policy variables together can predict the local genetic predisposition.
13. The human genome is a series of about 3 billion letter pairs (A,G,T,C) which compose an individual’s
DNA code. While most of the DNA sequence is the same from one person to the next, there are some parts
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where gi,j ∈ {0, 1, 2} is individual i’s genotype (the number of reference alleles) at SNP j, and
β̂GWASj is the weight of SNP j estimated from a genome-wide association study (GWAS) of the
form:
Yi = α+ β
GWAS
j gi,j + f(agei, sexi) + PCi + εi,j
where the outcome of interest Yi is regressed on a single SNP j, (non-parametric) controls for
age and sex, and the first 40 principal components of the genetic data. This regression is run
J times, one per each SNP. We use β̂GWASj as weights in our polygenic score.
14 The polygenic
score is normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one to facilitate interpretation.
As there are no sufficiently powered publicly available GWAS summary statistics for alcohol
consumption that do not include the UKB, we run our own GWAS to construct the weights. To
mitigate the problem of overfitting that arises whenever individuals are part of both the sample
used to calculate the weights and the sample for polygenic prediction, we use a cross-fitting
approach. We create ten random folds of the sample Fk, k ∈ {1, ..., 10}.15 For each fold Fk, we
construct a polygenic score using weights ŵ−k,j obtained from running a GWAS on the other




ŵ−k,jgi,j , ∀i ∈ Fk
Our polygenic score predicts Drinks per Week, defined by Liu et al. (2019) as the aver-
age number of drinks a participant reported drinking, summed over all types of alcohol. The
outcome is log-transformed using log(x+ 1) prior to the GWAS to reduce the effect of outliers
on the estimated weights. Figure 4.2 displays the distribution of the polygenic score for UKB
participants and a binned scatter plot that illustrates how the average number of drinks per
week increases for individuals with a higher polygenic score.
of the DNA that differ across people. The most common form of genetic variation are SNPs, Single Nucleotide
Polymorphisms, and they represent a difference in a single nucleotide (one DNA-“letter”). There are roughly 10
million SNPs in the human genome. Each SNPs has two alleles, i.e. two letters, one for each chromosome: the
one inherited from the dad, and the one inherited from the mom. These two letters identify your genotype, the
genetic type of a particular person at a precise genetic locus.
14. Alternatively, the estimated coefficients β̂j could be adjusted for linkage disequilibrium—the correlation
between nearby SNPs—using LDpred (Vilhjálmsson et al., 2015) to obtain the weights wj .
15. This approach is discussed in (Mak et al., 2018). A similar approach is used in (Machiela et al., 2011).
See Dudbridge (2013) for a critical review of this and other methods to increase the power of polygenic scores.
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Figure 4.2
Distribution and Predictive Power of the Polygenic Score
Notes. This figure displays the distribution of the polygenic score and the expected number
of drinks per week for UKB participants with different levels of genetic predisposition. The
density function is truncated at the 1st and 99th percentile of the polygenic score. The
orange points represent the mean number of drinks per week and the mean polygenic score
for 20 equally sized bins of UKB participants. The yellow line and the shaded gray area
show a fitted polynomial of degree three and the associated 95% confidence interval.
E. Empirical Specification
We run three main analyses: the first to validate that the PGS predicts drinking (pre-
diction); the second to evaluate the extent of self-selection into unhealthy locations (gene-
environment correlation); the third to understand whether the PGS moderates the effect of
alcohol availability (gene-environment interaction).
First, we validate that individuals with a strong genetic predisposition indeed drink more.
We run the following regression:
Yi,s = α+ β PGSi + PC
′
i θ + f(agei, sexi) + νs + εi,s (4.1)
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where Yi,s are different measures of alcohol intake for UKB participant i living in local authority
s, and PGSi is the polygenic score for individual i—which is constant over time regardless of
where they live.
To test the robustness of our results, we control for genetic stratification, demographic
differences, and local authority fixed effects. We use the first 40 principal components PCi of the
full genetic data to account for systematic differences in ancestry and population stratification,
i.e., the difference in allele frequencies between (sub)populations which might be spuriously
associated with the outcome of interest (Price et al., 2006; Rietveld et al., 2014). To rule out
that our findings simply reflect well-documented age and gender patterns in alcohol consumption
(e.g., Wilsnack et al., 2000; Grant et al., 2004; Wilsnack et al., 2009), we non-parametrically
control for f(agei, sexi) = Age× Sex indicators. Our most comprehensive model also includes
local authority fixed effects νs to account for the considerable heterogeneity in alcohol availability
and other unobservable regional differences.16 The error term εi,s is allowed to cluster at the
local authority level, where the alcohol licensing policy is determined.
Second, we address the question of whether participants with a high genetic propensity to
drink self-select into environments with more alcohol sales points, a measure of gene-environment
correlation. We run the following regression:
Ei,s = α+ β PGSi + PC
′
i θ + f(agei, sexi) + νs + εi,s (4.2)
where Ei,s are different measures of alcohol availability in i’s environment in local authority
s, such as the number of pubs, retailers, or alcohol sale licenses. Again, depending on the
specification, we add different levels of controls.
Third, in our principal analysis, we test to which extent the polygenic score moderates the
association between the environment—the density of alcohol sales points or various licensing
policies—and alcohol consumption. This allows us to estimate the extent of gene-environment
interaction. We do this by regressing the outcome of interest on the polygenic score, a measure
of the environment, and the interaction of the two using the following econometric specification:
Yi,s = α+ β PGSi + γ Ei,s + δ (PGS × E)i,s + PC ′i θ + f(agei, sexi) + νs + εi,s (4.3)
where the Yi,s, the outcome of interest for UKB participant i living in local authority s, is
regressed on the polygenic score PGSi, a measure of the environment Ei,s, and their interaction
(E × PGS)i,s. The coefficient δ measures the extent to which the polygenic score moderates
the association between the environment and the outcome of interest. Again, depending on the
specification, we add different levels of controls.
16. We cannot include local authority fixed effects in our analysis of policy effectiveness, because licensing
policy is set at the local authority level.
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III. Results
A. Genetic Predisposition and Alcohol Consumption
Figure 4.2 already shows that individuals with a higher PGS report drinking more alcoholic
beverages; this is reassuring but not novel: it merely shows that the score can predict the
outcome it was constructed to predict. Continuing from this, we test whether the polygenic
score is predictive of the other measures of alcohol consumption in the UKB.
Figure 4.3 shows the effects of a one standard deviation increase in the PGS on each of the
alcohol-related outcomes in the UKB, using false-coverage rate adjusted confidence bands (Ben-
jamini and Hochberg, 1995) to account for multiple hypothesis testing. The PGS is significantly
associated with each outcome at the 99% level.17 Several things are noteworthy:
First, the results are very much as expected. Participants with a higher polygenic score
drink more, drink more frequently, and are more likely to go to the pub at least weakly. Even
among participants who don’t drink alcohol, those with a higher PGS are significantly more likely
to report drinking in the past. Questions from the mental health module show that respondents
with a high PGS not only drink more often but also drink more in a typical drinking spell, and
that they report more problems with addictive behavior. The only outcome that is negatively
associated with the PGS measures whether participants usually only drink alcohol with a meal,
where, unsurprisingly, scoring high on the PGS is associated with more drinking outside of
mealtimes.
Second, the associations are consistent and robust. For most outcomes, one standard
deviation increase in the PGS predicts a 0.1-0.2 standard deviation change in the outcome
variable. The results are consistent, no matter whether participants complete a comprehensive
24h dietary recall or whether they simply report about an average week. They hold for traits
measured on very short time-horizons (e.g., “Drank yesterday”) and over much more extended
periods (e.g., “Drinks more than 10 years ago”).
Third, the effects are stable in later rounds of the assessment, even-though the PGS has been
constructed from drinking behavior around at the time of the first assessment. This stability is
particularly important as a person’s genetic endowment is fixed at conception. While there might
be some variation in how specific genes influence an individual’s behavior over the life-cycle, we
would not expect much change for the UKB cohort, aged 40 to 69 at the first assessment.
Indeed, the fact that the polygenic score is equally able to predict alcohol consumption later in
life suggests that it is indeed capturing a stable genetic component of these traits.
17. Figure A4.3 in Appendix A4.I displays the increase in R2 from including the PGS on top of non-parametric
controls for age and gender.
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Figure 4.3
Relationship between the Polygenic Score and Drinking Behavior
Notes. This figure displays the relationship between the polygenic score and drinking-related outcomes in the
UKB. The white diamonds show the estimated effect from 38 regressions where drinking-related outcomes in the
UKB are regressed on the polygenic score for the number of drinks per week, the first 40 principal components of
the genetic data, “Age × Sex” fixed effects, and local authority fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
local authority level. Colors indicate false coverage rate adjusted 90%, 95%, 99%, and 99.9% confidence intervals
(Benjamini and Yekutieli, 2005).
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B. Genetic Predisposition and Self-Selection
Any analysis of the local environment on individuals’ behaviors needs to acknowledge that
many people self-selected their place of residence from the options that were available to them.
Consider a genetic variant that is associated with higher educational attainment: as universities
and career opportunities for university graduates tend cluster in metropolitan areas, we would
expect the variant to be more common in urban samples. These forms of gene-environment
correlation (Plomin et al., 1977) have been shown for genetic markers associated with education
(e.g., Belsky et al., 2019), BMI (e.g., Haworth et al., 2018), substance use (e.g., Harden et al.,
2008) and other behaviors (e.g., Abdellaoui et al., 2018).
The top left panel of Figure 4.4 shows that there is indeed a correlation between the number
of pubs within 1000m of participants and their PGS. On average, a participant with a PGS one
standard deviation below the mean lives around 7.5 pubs. In contrast, participants with a PGS
one standard deviation above the mean average 9.0 pubs in their neighborhood. To test whether
UKB participants actively select into areas with high pub density, we first compare the number
of pubs at their current place of residence with the number of pubs around their place of birth.
The top right panel of Figure 4.4 illustrates that while the PGS varies relatively little with the
pub density at the birthplace, there is a strong gradient with respect to the pub density at their
current place of residence. The results for the number of retailers are comparable. On average,
a participant with a PGS one standard deviation below the mean lives around 1.25 retailers,
whereas a participant with a PGS one standard deviation above the mean has about 1.5 (Figure
4.4, bottom left). Although the smaller number of major retailers leads to a somewhat patchy
heat map (Figure 4.4, bottom right), we can again see that the PGS correlates more with the
retailer density at the current place of residence.
Table 4.1 shows that the ratio between the number of alcohol sales point at their place
of residence and their place of birth is significantly higher for individuals with a high PGS. At
the time of the UKB assessment, a participant with a polygenic score one standard deviation
above the mean lives around 11.6% more pubs relative to his place of birth (P = 0.018). When
we control for the first 40 principal components of genetic stratification and for demographic
characteristics, the ratio shrinks to 8.2%, but the effect continues to be highly significant (P =
0.006). The same is true for the number of retailers, where a polygenic score one standard
deviation above the mean is associated with 3.2% more retailers relative to the place of birth
without controls (P = 0.001), and 1.7% more retailers with controls (P = 0.002). This suggests
that participants with a high PGS actively select into areas with easier access to alcohol.
As a final test, we investigate whether a mismatch between a participant’s PGS and the pub
density around their place of residence at the time of the first UKB assessment (i.e., someone
with a high PGS living in a neighborhood with very few pubs or vice versa) predicts whether
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Figure 4.4
Evidence of Gene-Environment Correlation
Notes. This figure displays the relationship between the polygenic score and the self-selection of UKB participants
into areas with high and low alcohol availability. The top row shows results for the density of pubs within 1000m
of UKB participants. The bottom row shows results for the density of retailers. Panels on the left illustrate
the relationship between the number of alcohol sales points and participants’ genetic propensity. The orange points
represent the mean number of sales points and the mean polygenic score for 20 equally sized bins of UKB participants.
The yellow line and the shaded gray area show a fitted polynomial of degree three and the associated 95% confidence
interval. Panels on the right show a heat map of the genetic propensity for different combinations of the number
of sales points around the current location and the number of sales points around the place of birth. Lighter colors
indicate lower values of the polygenic score; darker colors indicate stronger predisposition.
indeed a small interaction effect that is consistent with the hypothesis that gene-environment
mismatch predicts moving. The interaction is even stronger for retailers (see Table A4.6 in
Appendix A4.II).
The finding that individuals seem to select their place of residence partially for proximity
to pubs might initially seem unlikely. The willingness to move for access to public goods such as
schools and higher education, or to relocate for employment is well-documented (e.g., Nechyba,
2000; Banzhaf and Walsh, 2008; Hensen et al., 2009) and unsurprising given the potentially
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Table 4.1
Self-Selection into Areas with Higher Alcohol Availability
Ratio of pubs Ratio of retailers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PGS-DPW 0.115∗ 0.081∗∗ 0.082∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.017∗∗
(0.049) (0.030) (0.030) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant 1.436∗∗∗ 1.443∗∗∗ 1.435∗∗∗ 0.575∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ 0.581∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.130) (0.128) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034)
First 40 PCs No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Age X Sex No No Yes No No Yes
R2 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.006
N 371687 371687 371686 318381 318381 318380
Notes. This table reports the effect of genetic predisposition on the ratio of alcohol availability at a participant’s
place of residence and place of birth. Columns (1) to (3) report the effect on the ratio between the number of pubs
within 1000m of a participant’s place of residence and their place of birth, Columns (4) to (6) on the ratio between
the number of retailers. “PGS-DPW” denotes the polygenic score for the number of drinks per week. Columns (1)
and (4) include no additional controls. Columns (2) and (5) control only for genetic stratification using the first 40
principal components of the genetic data. Columns (3) and (6) control for genetic stratification and additionally
include “Age × Sex” fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the local authority level. Significance levels:
+P < 0.1,∗ P < 0.05,∗∗ P < 0.01,∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
considerable gains in life-time earnings (Bowles, 1970; Yankow, 2003; Kidd et al., 2017). But
surely few students would turn down a place at the University of Oxford (pub density18: 15.2;
THE Ranking19: 1st) solely for the higher pub density around the University of Brighton (pub
density: 41.0; THE Ranking 600-800th)? However, given the local nature of our measure—pubs
within 1000m—we would expect that self-selection happens at the level of intra-urban mobility
(Simmons, 1968; Brown and Moore, 1970). Thus, a better way to think about this decision is
whether a student with a place at the University of Oxford would rather live in the lively Jericho
neighborhood (pub density: 87) or in quiet, residential Marston (pub density: 1).
C. Genetic Predisposition and Elasticity of Demand
Figure 4.5 displays the relationship between the number of pubs within 1000m and nor-
malized alcohol consumption for participants with a PGS above and below the median. We
consider four drinking-related outcomes: the self-reported drinking frequency on a 6-point scale
(top left), whether a participant reports drinking each day (bottom left), the number of alcoholic
drinks per week (top right), and the amount drunk in a typical session (bottom right).
UKB participants who live in an area with a high number of pubs drink significantly more
than participants in areas with a low pub density. The elasticity of consumption with respect
to availability, however, is considerably lower for participants with a high genetic propensity to
drink. In areas with almost no pubs, the difference between the average consumption of the
18. The average number of pubs around UKB participants in the local authority.
19. Times Higher Education Ranking 2020.
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Figure 4.5
Drinking Behavior and Alcohol Availability by Polygenic Score
Notes. This figure displays the relationship between drinking behavior and the number of pubs within 1000m of UKB
participants with a polygenic score above and below the median. The orange and yellow lines and the shaded gray areas
show the polynomial fit and the associated 95% confidence interval for UKB participants with high and low polygenic
scores, respectively. The figure was constructed using kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing. All models control
for genetic stratification using the first 40 principal components of the genetic data, “Age × Sex” fixed effects, and local
authority fixed effects.
two groups is roughly one standard deviation for the four outcomes. This gap shrinks as we
consider areas with higher and higher pub density; in areas with 75 pubs within 1000m, the
average consumption of the two groups is essentially the same. Table A4.4 in Appendix A4.II
shows that both the number of pubs and the PGS are significantly positively correlated with
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alcohol intake, but that there is a negative and significant interaction effect.
Figure A4.5 in Appendix A4.I shows that the pattern is similar if we instead use the
number of retailers within 1000m. As with pub density, UKB participants with a low genetic
predisposition who live in an area with a large number of retailers have significantly higher alcohol
intake than similar individuals in an area with fewer retailers. For retailers, consumption seems
to decrease slightly as the number of sales points increases from zero to one, before increasing
again as we consider areas with more and more retailers. Table A4.4 again confirms the positive
correlation of drinking with retailer density and the PGS, as well as the existence of a significant
negative interaction.
Although these estimates are likely affected by the reported self-selection, the lower elas-
ticity for high PGS participants is in line with the documented low price-elasticity for alcoholic
beverages due to their addictive nature (Anderson and Baumberg, 2006).
D. Genetic Predisposition and Licensing Policy
Having observed that individuals with a high genetic propensity for alcohol consumption
drink more, self-select into environments with greater alcohol availability, and have less elastic
demand for alcohol consumption, we now turn to the question of what these behaviors imply
for effective alcohol licensing policy. If individuals with a high genetic predisposition react much
less to changes in the availability of alcohol, supply-focused alcohol policy—reducing the number
of licenses, restricting hours of sales, or even taxation—might reduce alcohol consumption on
average, but have only a negligible effect on the individuals who would benefit most from drinking
less.
Tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 show the effect of the number of premise licenses, no-sales licenses,
and 24h supermarket licenses on the same four (normalized) outcomes: the self-reported drinking
frequency, whether a participant reports drinking each day, the number of alcoholic drinks per
week, and the amount drunk in a session. In each case, we first test the effect of the policy on its
own, before including the polygenic score and its interaction with the policy measure. For each
outcome and licensing measure, the interaction term counteracts the policy—often significantly
so. Thus, we find that a higher PGS is associated with a smaller reaction to the policy.
We first test whether the number of premises with a license to sell alcohol affects the
drinking behavior of UKB participants in the local authority (Table 4.2). As local authorities
differ in population, we use the number of licensed per 1,000 residents as our policy measure.
A more lenient licensing policy, characterized by more licensed premises, is associated with
increased alcohol consumption. Self-reported drinking frequency increases significantly (P =
0.022), as does the proportion of participants that report drinking daily (P = 0.015), and the
number of drinks per week (P = 0.035), but not the typical amount (P = 0.404). Turning to
the interaction models, we find that, unsurprisingly, the PGS is significantly associated with
increased alcohol consumption for all outcomes. More interestingly, UKB participants with a
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Table 4.2
Gene-Environment Interaction for Licensing Policy (Licensed Premises)
Drinking frequency Daily drinker Log. drinks per week Typical amount
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
On-premise licenses (per 1,000) 0.237∗ 0.241∗ 0.268∗ 0.271∗ 0.177∗ 0.177∗ 0.016 0.022
(0.106) (0.104) (0.114) (0.111) (0.085) (0.084) (0.029) (0.026)
PGS-DPW 0.168∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
On-premise licenses (per 1,000) × PGS-DPW -0.060∗∗ -0.049∗∗ -0.037∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.016) (0.011) (0.007)
Constant -0.049∗ -0.048∗ -0.044+ -0.043∗ -0.045∗∗ -0.047∗∗ -0.013+ -0.014+
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.017) (0.017) (0.008) (0.007)
First 40 PCs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age X Sex Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.090 0.097 0.028 0.033 0.130 0.138 0.104 0.110
N 391831 391797 392310 392276 301404 301379 119511 119505
Notes. This table reports the effect of the number of licensed premises on four alcohol-related outcomes. Columns (1) and (2) shows the
effect on the normalized drinking frequency (6-point scale), Columns (3) and (4) on the normalized probability of drinking daily, Columns
(5) and (6) on the normalized log. number of alcoholic beverages consumed per week, and Columns (7) and (8) on the normalized amount
of alcohol drunk in a typical drinking session. “On-premise licenses (per 1,000)” indicates the number of premises per capita allowed to sell
alcohol on-premise (including premises permitted to sell alcohol both on- and off-premise). “PGS-DPW” denotes the polygenic score for the
number of drinks per week. “On-premise licenses (per 1,000) × PGS-DPW” is the interaction of the policy with the polygenic score. All
models control for genetic stratification using the first 40 principal components of the genetic data and “Age × Sex” fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the local authority level. Significance levels: +P < 0.1,∗ P < 0.05,∗∗ P < 0.01,∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
high genetic propensity to drink react much less to the policy. A one standard deviation increase
in the PGS reduces the effect of the policy in by roughly a quarter for the drinking frequency
(P = 0.002), daily drinking (P = 0.002), and the number of drinks per week (P = 0.001), and
we find a negative and significant interaction for the typical amount drunk (P = 0.000). Figure
A4.6 in Appendix A4.I displays the relationship between the number of licensed premises and
the four outcomes for UKB participants above and below the median PGS.
As licensing committees also control other forms of entertainment, we can use the number
of no-sales licenses—premises allowed to offer licensable entertainment, but not to sell alcohol—
as a measure for licensing policy explicitly aimed at reducing alcohol sales. Using the number
of no-sales licenses per 1,000 residents, we find that more restrictive licensing is associated with
a decrease in alcohol consumption for all outcomes (Table 4.3). Residents drink less frequently
(P = 0.014) and fewer report that they drink daily (P = 0.007). They also report that they
consume fewer alcoholic beverages a week (P = 0.009) and that they drink less in a typical
drinking session (P = 0.005). The interaction models again show that UKB participants with a
higher genetic propensity drink significantly more and react less to the policy. A one standard
deviation increase in the PGS roughly halves the effect on the drinking frequency (P = 0.002),
reduces the change in daily drinking by about a quarter (P = 0.042), and cuts the effect on
the amount of alcohol consumed by a third for the weekly amount (P = 0.056) and the typical
amount, although not significantly (P = 0.147). Figure A4.7 in Appendix A4.I displays the
relationship between the number of no-sales licenses and the four outcomes for UKB participants
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Table 4.3
Gene-Environment Interaction for Licensing Policy (No-Sales Licenses)
Drinking frequency Daily drinker Log. drinks per week Typical amount
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
No-sales premise licenses (per 1,000) -0.809∗ -0.764∗ -0.841∗∗ -0.812∗∗ -0.596∗ -0.571∗∗ -0.638∗∗ -0.596∗∗
(0.328) (0.321) (0.303) (0.301) (0.234) (0.216) (0.215) (0.213)
PGS-DPW 0.136∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011)
No-sales premise licenses (per 1,000) × PGS-DPW 0.345∗∗ 0.214∗ 0.210+ 0.224
(0.110) (0.105) (0.109) (0.154)
Constant 0.045+ 0.044+ 0.057∗ 0.056∗ 0.023 0.020 0.027+ 0.025+
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
First 40 PCs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age X Sex Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.089 0.097 0.027 0.032 0.129 0.137 0.105 0.111
N 385443 385409 385900 385866 296467 296442 122009 122003
Notes. This table reports the effect of the number of premises allowed to provide licensable entertainment but not permitted to sell alcohol on
four alcohol-related outcome. Columns (1) and (2) shows the effect on the normalized drinking frequency (6-point scale), Columns (3) and (4) on
the normalized probability of drinking daily, Columns (5) and (6) on the normalized log. number of alcoholic beverages consumed per week, and
Columns (7) and (8) on the normalized amount of alcohol drunk in a typical drinking session. “No-sales premise licenses (per 1,000)” indicates the
number of premises per capita allowed to provide licensable entertainment but not permitted to sell alcohol. “PGS-DPW” denotes the polygenic
score for the number of drinks per week. “No-sales premise licenses (per 1,000) × PGS-DPW” is the interaction of the policy with the polygenic
score. All models control for genetic stratification using the first 40 principal components of the genetic data and “Age × Sex” fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the local authority level. Significance levels: +P < 0.1,∗ P < 0.05,∗∗ P < 0.01,∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
above and below the median PGS.
In addition to controlling the number of alcohol sales points, the Licensing Act relaxed the
traditional 11 a.m. to 11 p.m. window for alcohol sales and granted licensing committees the
power to restrict or extend the hours that pubs and supermarkets are allowed to sell alcohol.
While we do not have sufficient data on pub opening hours to test directly for the impact of
this policy, we do have a proxy in the form of 24h sales licenses for supermarkets (Table 4.4).
Unlike in the previous analysis, the evidence on the direct effect of the policy is somewhat mixed.
While the estimates point in the expected direction, only the proportion of daily drinkers changes
significantly (P = 0.008). The results of the interaction model are nevertheless consistent with
the results from the other policy measures: we find significant and seizable negative interactions
for the drinking frequency (P = 0.024), daily drinking (P = 0.019), and the number of drinks per
week (P = 0.020). Figure A4.8 in Appendix A4.I displays the relationship between the number
of 24h licenses and the four outcomes for UKB participants above and below the median PGS.
While the interaction between the number of pubs and retailers and the PGS might be
strongly affected by participants’ self-selection into particular areas, this is less of a concern for
licensing policy, which is measured at the local authority level. Indeed, while an individual’s
genetic propensity to drink is predictive of movement within local authorities, we do not find
evidence that the decision to move between local authorities is affected by the fit between
participants’ genetic predisposition and the local licensing policy (see Table A4.7 in Appendix
A4.II). Moreover, as licensing committees are not allowed to determine their policy to advance
public health objectives—much less in response to citizens’ genetic endowments—, these results
III. RESULTS 101
Table 4.4
Gene-Environment Interaction for Licensing Policy (24h Supermarkets)
Drinking frequency Daily drinker Log. drinks per week Typical amount
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
24h supermarket licenses (per 1,000) 4.268 4.470 8.712∗∗ 8.824∗∗ 4.084 4.143 1.698 1.435
(3.595) (3.630) (3.270) (3.315) (2.727) (2.734) (1.998) (1.927)
PGS-DPW 0.162∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006)
24h supermarket licenses (per 1,000) × PGS-DPW -2.138∗ -1.494∗ -1.827∗ -0.486
(0.943) (0.635) (0.781) (0.839)
Constant -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.018+ -0.020∗ -0.018∗ -0.016+
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
First 40 PCs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age X Sex Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.088 0.095 0.027 0.032 0.127 0.135 0.105 0.111
N 418654 418619 419158 419123 322719 322694 123743 123738
Notes. This table reports the effect of the number of supermarkets licensed to sell alcohol 24h a day on four alcohol-related outcomes. Columns
(1) and (2) shows the effect on the normalized drinking frequency (6-point scale), Columns (3) and (4) on the normalized probability of drinking
daily, Columns (5) and (6) on the normalized log. number of alcoholic beverages consumed per week, and Columns (7) and (8) on the normalized
amount of alcohol drunk in a typical drinking session. “24h supermarket licenses (per 1,000)” indicates the number of supermarkets per capita
licensed to sell alcohol 24h a day. “PGS-DPW” denotes the polygenic score for the number of drinks per week. “24h supermarket licenses (per
1,000) × PGS-DPW” is the interaction of the policy with the polygenic score. All models control for genetic stratification using the first 40
principal components of the genetic data and “Age × Sex” fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the local authority level. Significance
levels: +P < 0.1,∗ P < 0.05,∗∗ P < 0.01,∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
are strong evidence that the individuals with the highest propensity to drink react least to
supply-focused alcohol policy.
E. Genetic Predisposition and Public Health
Although there is no truly safe level of alcohol consumption (Department of Health, 2016;
Burton and Sheron, 2018), a disproportionate share of the public health burden is driven by those
individuals with the heaviest drinking behavior (Burton et al., 2017). In the final part of our
analysis, we show that the polygenic score can identify UKB participants with the highest risk of
developing an alcohol-related disease, even if we control for self-reported alcohol consumption.
Being primarily designed to study the contribution of genetic predisposition and exposure
to environmental risk factors to disease in late adulthood, the UKB encodes comprehensive
information from participants’ NHS health records, including high-quality data on physician-
diagnosed medical conditions. These conditions are coded according to the ICD-10 classification
system (WHO, 2007), allowing us to test explicitly for the effect on alcohol-related diseases. We
restrict our analysis to conditions described as alcohol-related or alcohol-induced in the ICD-10
with at least 25 diagnosed cases in the UKB.
We find a significant positive relationship between the PGS and alcohol-related medical con-
ditions of the liver (see Table A4.8 in Appendix A4.II). Relative to the mean incident rate, a one
standard deviation increase in the polygenic score is associated with a +40.3% rise (P = 0.000)
in the prevalence of alcohol-related liver diseases (ICD-10 K70). This association persists even
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if we control for participants’ self-reported drinking frequency (+42.3%, P = 0.000). This holds
for each of the three most common alcohol-related liver conditions in the UKB—alcoholic hep-
atitis (ICD-10 K70.1, +32.8%, P = 0.027), alcoholic liver cirrhosis (ICD-10 K70.3, +26.2%,
P = 0.033), and alcoholic liver failure (K70.4, +36.4%, P = 0.031)—as well as for other un-
specified alcohol-related liver diseases (ICD-10 K70.9, +54.0%, P = 0.000), but not for alcoholic
fatty liver (ICD-10 K70.0, +68.0%, P = 0.115).
While afflictions of the liver are the most widely known consequences of excessive drink-
ing, alcohol also has significant long-run effects on mental health. Repeating our analysis for
psychological disorders, we find that the PGS is significantly associated with heightened rates
of alcohol-related mental health conditions (see Table A4.9 in Appendix A4.II). A one standard
deviation increase in the polygenic score is associated with a +39.6% rise (P = 0.000) in mental
and behavioral disorders due to use of alcohol (ICD-10 F10). Again, this relationship remains
quantitatively similar and significant if we control for self-reported alcohol intake (+40.4%,
P = 0.000). A more detailed look reveals that the effect is largely driven by the most common
conditions: acute intoxication (ICD-10 F10.0, +29.9%, P = 0.001), harmful use (ICD-10 F10.1,
+33.1%, P = 0.027), alcohol dependence syndrome (ICD-10 F10.2, +54.8%, P = 0.000) and
alcohol withdrawal state (ICD-10 F10.3 and F10.420, +49.3%, P = 0.000), there is no significant
association with the much rarer alcoholic psychotic disorder (ICD-10 F10.5, +46.4%, P = 0.144)
or other unspecified alcohol-related mental disorders (ICD-10 F109, +58.4%, P = 0.179).
Finally, we tested the relationship with a number of alcohol-related afflictions in other
ICD-10 code classes (see Table A4.10 in Appendix A4.II). Again controlling for self-reported
drinking, we find significant associations for alcoholic gastritis (ICD-10 K29.2, +56.1%, P =
0.003) and alcohol-induced chronic pancreatitis (ICD-10 K86.0, +63.4%, P = 0.000, although
not for alcohol-induced acute pancreatitis (ICD-10 K85.2, +42.2%, P = 0.245) or alcoholic
degeneration of the nervous system (ICD-10 G31.2, +49.2%, P = 0.145).
What accounts for the predictive power of the polygenic score on top of self-reported drink-
ing behavior? While the polygenic score may capture genetic markers that directly contribute
to the pathogenesis of these health conditions, it is more likely that the polygenic score is a
more accurate measure of life-time alcohol intake than the consumption measures in the UKB.
This is partly by design—participants are asked about their current drinking behavior—but we
cannot rule out that it is also driven by the self-reported nature of the measures, as people tend
to underestimate their alcohol consumption (Poikolainen, 1985; Gmel and Rehm, 2004; Gual
et al., 2017).
Taken together, our final results show that individuals with a high PGS are significantly
more likely to have diagnosed alcohol-related medical conditions, including liver diseases, psy-
chological disorders, and various afflictions of the digestive system. Moreover, these results hold
even if we control for self-reported alcohol consumption, illustrating how incorporating genetic
20. Withdrawal state without and with delirium.
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information can help us uncover relevant dimensions of health-inequality that are not commonly
observable.
IV. Conclusion
Overall, our results demonstrate how genetic information can shed light on the determinants
and the dynamics of health inequalities and how genetic endowments interact with individual
choices and public health policy. We show that the effectiveness of a supply-focused licensing
policy as a tool to mitigate alcohol abuse can clash with individual predispositions and might
actually exacerbate inherited inequality.
By combining genetic data with fine-grained geographical measures of alcohol availability,
we show that individuals with a high genetic propensity to drink self-select into environments
with easier access to alcohol, react less to changes in the availability of alcohol, and respond
less to restrictive licensing. As the same people also account for a disproportionate share of
the alcohol-related public health burden, our results suggest that supply-focused alcohol policies
are less effective precisely for the people who might need them the most. Demand-side policies
that focus on an individual’s willingness to engage in unhealthy behaviors—such as nudges,
support groups, or individual therapies—might be more effective at curtailing health inequality
and helping those more predisposed for such behaviors.
Our work suffers from some limitations. The need for geographic variation restricts our
analysis to policy determined at the local level in England and Wales. This excludes some
advocated policy tools such as higher alcohol taxes (Cook, 1982; Anderson and Baumberg,
2006; Wagenaar et al., 2010) or additional taxes on selected alcohol beverages (Müller et al.,
2010), business-led initiatives such as the “Billion Units Pledge” (Department of Health, 2011;
Gornall, 2014; Knai et al., 2015), minimum unit prices (Purshouse et al., 2010; Brennan et al.,
2014; Holmes et al., 2014), as well as changes in the legal drinking age (Toomey et al., 1996;
Carpenter and Dobkin, 2011) and their enforcement (Wagenaar and Wolfson, 1994; Retail of
Alcohol Standards Group, 2014), and bans on promotions (Anderson, 2009). It remains an
open question whether these other policy measures can mitigate the effects of genetic inequality
instead of compounding them.
Finally, our finding that the polygenic score predicts alcohol-related disease, even after
controlling for self-reported alcohol consumption, suggests a more targeted approach as a possible
remedy. Future research should explore the use of genetic information to identify individuals at
risk of alcohol dependence and to provide targeted interventions to address health-inequality.
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I. Materials and Methods
A. Lost Wallet Experiments
We visited 355 cities in 40 countries and turned in a total of 17,303 wallets between July 2013
and December 2016. Table A2.1 provides an overview of the study design, including the countries
and cities covered, the amount of money included in the wallets, the names on the business cards,
the items on the shopping list, and the number of observations. Our study was approved by
the Human Subjects Committee of the Faculty of Economics, Business Administration, and
Information Technology at the University of Zurich.
B. Selection of Countries and Cities
We selected our sample of countries based on several factors, most important being that
the country have a sufficient number of large cities. As a rough guide during the planning
process we aimed for populations of at least 100,000, but used this rule flexibly as availability of
feasible drop-off locations varied substantially even when restricting ourselves to large cities. In
addition to city size, a country had to be relatively easy to visit and safe enough for our research
assistants to perform the wallet drop-offs. Customs, immigration, and banking regulation also
played a role because research assistants needed to either import or withdraw sufficient money
to place in the wallets.
For each country we typically chose five to eight cities to perform the wallet drop-offs. We
took the largest cities of a country as a starting point and adapted the list to accommodate
safety concerns, cover the main regions of a country, and avoided cities that belong to the
same metropolitan area. As cities differed in their size, the number of drop-offs in a city was








∗N targetC , (A2.1)
where Ni is the number of drop-offs in city i, POPi is city i’s population size, k is a
city sampled from country C, and N targetC is the target sample size for a given country. This
adjustment was designed to avoid a single city dominating our estimates of a country’s response
rate, while also giving greater weight to more populated cities as they represent a greater fraction
of a country’s total population (and so tend to be more influential politically, culturally, and
economically).
C. Number of Drop-Offs
We usually collected 400 observations per country, but there were exceptions to this rule.
For some countries we set a different target sample size, and for other countries we ended up
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with deviations from the targeted sample size due to unforeseen circumstances or minor errors
in the data collection process.
We collected a greater number of observations in the US, UK, and Poland since we ran two
additional treatment conditions (BigMoney and Money-NoKey conditions) in these countries.1
In the United States, we collected 300 wallets each in the NoMoney and Money conditions
and 200 wallets each in the Money-NoKey and BigMoney conditions, yielding a total sample
of 1,000 observations. In the UK, we turned in 200 wallets each in the NoMoney, BigMoney,
and Money-NoKey condition, and 600 wallets in the Money condition. We were unable to track
email responses for 67 wallets in the Money condition and one wallet in the BigMoney condition
due to a procedural error, leaving us with a total of 1,132 observations in the UK. In Poland, we
turned in 200 wallets in each of our four conditions, yielding a total sample of 800 observations.
For eight countries—Croatia, Denmark, Ghana, Israel, Kenya, Norway, Serbia, and Russia—
we set a sample size target of 300 drop-offs due to either a limited number of sufficiently large
cities or due to safety concerns. For India, we made a last minute change by replacing Chennai
with Coimbatore due to severe flooding that took place in February 2015. In Kenya we did not
carry out data collection in the last city visited (Malindi) because the research assistant was
arrested and interrogated by the military police for suspicious activity. In Chile, four wallets
had to be excluded from the analysis because of a handling mistake which made it impossible
to ascertain the location of where the wallets were turned in.
Additional minor deviations from the target sample size occurred due to rounding errors in
the allocation of drop-offs to different cities or because experimenters could not find a suitable
replacement for a closed drop-off location in time. Countries with minor deviations are marked
by a footnote in Table A2.1.
D. Selection of Drop-Off Locations
We focused on five types of institutions as drop-off locations: (i) banks, (ii) theaters,
museums, or other cultural establishments, (iii) post offices, (iv) hotels, and (v) police stations,
courts of law, and other public offices. While we aimed at an equal distribution of institutions,
this was not always feasible. In particular, post offices were sometimes hard to find near city
centers as they are often spread over geographic regions. Our final distribution was 23% for
banks, 20% for cultural establishments, 14% for post offices, 22% for hotels, and 21% for public
offices.
Drop-off locations were always planned in advance. To find appropriate locations, we used
1. In the US, UK, Poland, France, Italy, and Spain we also conducted additional treatment arms which were
orthogonal to our NoMoney and Money conditions. These additional treatment arms mostly involved changing
subtle characteristics about the owner of the wallet. We plan to report these results in a separate paper. For
France and the UK we observed no significant effect on the reporting rate across these additional conditions, so
we pool the data for those two countries here to increase the precision of our estimates. Excluding this additional
data from the analysis has virtually no effect on the results we report below.
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official websites (e.g., for police stations), travel guides (e.g., for hotels and museums), and
Google Maps. To reduce travel time, we advised research assistants to select drop-off locations
close to a city center and to choose drop-off locations within walking distance of each other.
To avoid suspicion, we excluded drop-off locations that were next to or across the street from
one another. We also advised research assistants to select locations that were far enough away
from a given police station as to reduce the risk that multiple recipients would turn in wallets to
the same police station. When available, we used Google Street View to verify that a location
still existed and that the location was easily accessible from the street. Prior to performing the
drop-offs, research assistants also checked for national and local holidays, opening hours, and
specific working culture (e.g., siesta in Spain).
E. The Wallets
Our wallets were transparent business card cases (see Figure A2.1). We used transparent
cases to ensure that recipients could inspect the wallet’s contents without having to open it.
Each wallet contained the same personal items: (i) three identical business cards, (ii) a grocery
list, and (iii) a key. The business cards displayed the owner’s name, email address, and job title.
Their purpose was to identify the owner and provide contact details.
The business cards and shopping list serve to identify the owner as a local resident, signaling
that it would be relatively easy to contact the owner and return the wallet. For the business
cards, we typically created three fictitious male owners for each country using common local
names. We used several sources to assemble lists of common first and last names, which we then
checked to avoid names used as references for generic or unidentified persons (e.g., John Doe),
were shared with celebrities, or led to a single user-profile on Facebook. The business cards
provided the owner’s email address, and identified him as a freelance software engineer (to avoid
attempts by recipients to reach the owner through his place of employment).
There were some exceptions to how we generated business cards and shopping lists for our
wallets. In Switzerland and the Czech Republic, we used the real name of research assistants so
that we would be able to collect reported wallets for our internal validation check. For these two
countries we also decided to use only two identities (rather than three) so that we could pick up
a larger share of the wallets. In Canada and India, different names were used for some cities to
accommodate for the local language. Due to South Africa’s history of race relations, we used
two discernibly white and two discernibly black names, leading to a total of four names.2 We
made occasional changes to the shopping lists to accommodate local customs, such as using rice
instead of pasta or substituting milk with some other beverage where lactose intolerance was
common. Table A2.1 provides a comprehensive list of names and shopping lists.
2. In South Africa reporting rates were remarkably similar between Black and White names. Reporting rates
were always between 32% and 35%, with no significant difference in reporting rates between the four identities
(χ23 = 0.255, P = 0.968).
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Figure A2.1
Example Lost Wallet
Notes. Example of a wallet used in our field experiments. All wallets belonged to a male software
developer with country-specific names (see Table A2.1 for the complete list of names). We placed the
business cards in the wallets so that this information was visible to all participants. The wallet dimensions
were 93mm x 59mm x 5mm and it weighed approximately 24 grams in the NoMoney condition.
F. Drop-Off Procedure
We recruited eleven male and two female research assistants to perform the drop-offs. All
research assistants were recruited from two German speaking universities and born between 1985
and 1993.3 Research assistants were carefully trained and received detailed manuals on how to
carry out the drop-offs. After walking into a building, research assistants were instructed to
approach an employee at the counter and say: “Hi, I found this [showing the wallet] on the
street just around the corner.” Then, they put the wallet on the counter and pushed it over to
the employee: “Somebody must have lost it. I’m in a hurry and have to go. Can you please
3. In the Robustness Checks section on page 179 we assess the influence of research assistants and find no
evidence that differences between experimenters are driving our main results.
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take care of it? ”4 The research assistant subsequently left the building without leaving their
contact details or asking for a receipt.5 This interaction was designed to minimize recipients’
concerns about being punished, since there was no written proof that a wallet had been turned
in. Furthermore, by telling recipients that the wallet was found outside the building around the
corner, we avoided possible concerns that the owner might come back and look for the wallet in
that exact location.
G. Experimental Conditions
Our primary experimental manipulation varied the amount of money in the wallet. In the
“NoMoney” condition, the wallets only contained business cards, a shopping list, and a key. In
the “Money” condition, the wallets also contained the equivalent of US $13.45. We used local
currencies, and to ensure comparability across countries we adjusted the amounts for purchasing
power parity using data from the International Monetary Fund. Table A2.1 provides the exact
amounts of money used in each country.
In three countries (the United Kingdom, Poland, and the United States), we conducted
two additional treatment conditions. We ran a “BigMoney” condition that was identical to the
Money condition but with the equivalent of US $94.15 in the wallets (i.e., seven times the amount
found in the Money condition). We also ran a “Money-NoKey” condition identical to the Money
condition but the wallets did not contain a key. Because the key is only valuable to the owner,
the Money-NoKey condition only varies the harm caused to the owner relative to the Money
condition. This treatment therefore allows us to isolate the role of altruism in people’s decision
to return a lost wallet.
We randomly assigned treatments and owner identities to drop-off locations. Tables A2.2-
A2.5 provide descriptive statistics and demonstrate that individual characteristics and situa-
tional factors are well balanced across treatments.
H. Measuring Civic Honesty
Our key outcome measure was whether a recipient contacted the owner to return the
wallet. We created our own email server to collect responses. The business cards in each
wallet had a unique email address that allowed us to automatically assign incoming emails to
its respective drop-off location and to automatically send a reply message in the local language.
4. Recipients were always approached in English, but research assistants also used a translator app on their
cell phones in case a recipient was not conversant in English.
5. Recipients rarely refused to take the wallet. The median rejection rate was less than 0.4%, with only
five countries exhibiting rejection rates above 1% (and none greater than 5%). Columns (1) and (2) in Table
A2.6 shows that rejection rates did not significantly differ between the Money, NoMoney, and Money-NoKey
conditions. We find a marginally significant difference (t2884 = 1.77, P = 0.077) between the Money and the
BigMoney condition, as shown in Column (2). Using χ2-tests, we find that only 3.3% of all possible pairwise
country comparisons are significant at the 5% level after controlling for the false discovery rate (Benjamini and
Hochberg, 1995).
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Figure A2.2
Cumulative Distribution Function of Response Times
Notes. Cumulative distribution function for the time elapsed between the drop-off of the wallets
and the email responses from the recipients by country. The three main countries, and the countries
with the highest and lowest response rate in the NoMoney condition are highlighted (ranking in
parentheses).
The following reply message was sent three hours and fifteen minutes after receiving an email
from the recipients: “Hello, thank you very much for your email. I really appreciate your help.
Unfortunately, I have already left town. The content of the business card holder and the key are
not important to me. You can keep all of it or donate it to charity. Best regards, [firstname]
[lastname].” If present, we specifically mentioned the key because recipients would frequently
inquire about the key in follow-up emails. If multiple emails were sent to the same email address
then we flagged them for review by a research assistant. The majority of these emails did not
necessitate further action.
Besides automating part of the data collection, the use of a private email server allowed us
to register attempts to return a wallet even if the email address was spelled incorrectly. As long
as the domain name was spelled correctly, a research assistant could manually reassign the email
to the correct drop-off location. Common errors involve forgetting the dot in the email address
or using a similar name, such as“lars-andersen” or “lars.andresen” instead of “lars.andersen.”
We recorded emails that were sent within 100 days after the drop-offs. The median response
time was roughly 26 minutes across all countries, and about 88% of emails arrived within 24
hours (see Figure A2.2). Table A2.7 shows that response times did not significantly differ across
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treatments. Moreover, we find little variation in response times between countries. Using two-
sample t-tests, we find that only 1.5% of all possible pairwise country comparisons are significant
at the 5% level (FDR-adjusted P -values). Average response times and response rates by country
were not significantly correlated (Spearman’s ρ = 0.162, P = 0.319).
I. Measuring Recipient Characteristics and Situational Factors
Upon leaving the locations, our research assistants filled out a short survey to collect
additional information about the drop-offs. This data allowed to account for incidental factors
that varied across locations. Research assistants recorded the following information:
• Recipient gender. Research assistants took note of the recipient’s gender, which was coded
as 0 for female and 1 for male.
• Recipient age. Research assistants estimated the recipient’s approximate age on a 6-point
scale: < 20, 20-30, 30-40, 40-50, 50-60, > 60. For all analyses using age we use a median
split dummy variable in which we coded as 1 if the recipient was estimated to be 40 years
or older and 0 otherwise. We used a median split for purposes of simplicity; using a set of
indicator variables for each age category does not meaningfully affect any of the treatment
effects we report.
• Busyness. Research assistants estimated how busy the recipient was on a 7-point scale
from “not at all” (0) to “very busy” (6).
• Local recipient. Research assistants assessed whether the recipient was a foreigner on a
7-point scale from “local” (0) to “unclear” (3) to “foreigner” (6). We coded this variable as
1 if the recipient was rated below the midpoint of the scale and 0 otherwise. We used this
indicator variable for purposes of simplicity; treating this local residency as a continuous
variable does not meaningfully affect any of the treatment effects we report.
• No English. Whether the research assistant had to use a different language than English
to communicate with the recipient (using a mobile phone app). We coded this as 0 if
the recipient understood English, and 1 if the recipient did not. This variable was always
coded as 0 if a region is English speaking.
• Recipient understood situation. Research assistants assessed the extent the recipient un-
derstood the situation on a 7-point scale from “not at all” (0) to “fully understood” (6).
We only collected this information after finishing data collection in Poland and the UK.
• Friendliness. Research assistants assessed the friendliness of the recipient on a 7-point
scale from “very unfriendly” (0) to “very friendly” (6). We only collected this information
after finishing data collection in Croatia, Greece, Poland, Romania, Serbia, and the UK.
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• Computer. Research assistants noted if there was a computer at the recipient’s desk (0 =
computer absent, 1 = computer present).
• Coworkers. Research assistants took note of how many employees participated in or closely
witnessed the exchange. They had the following response options: one, two, three, or
more than three. For all analyses using this variable we coded this variable as 1 if multiple
coworkers participated or closely witnessed the exchange and 0 otherwise. We used this
indicator variable for purposes of simplicity; using a set of indicator variables for each
response option does not meaningfully affect any of the treatment effects we report.
• Other bystanders. Research assistants took note of how many other people could witness
the drop-off. They had the following response options: none, fewer than five, five or more.
For all analyses using presence of bystanders we coded this variable as 1 if any bystanders
were present and 0 otherwise. We used this indicator variable for purposes of simplicity;
using a set of indicator variables for each response option does not meaningfully affect any
of the treatment effects we report.
• Security camera. Research assistants took note of whether a security camera was visible in
the room (0 = no camera visible, 1 = camera visible). We only collected this information
after finishing data collection in Poland and the UK.
• Security guard. Research assistants took note of whether a security was present (0 =
guard present, 1 = guard absent). We only collected this information after finishing data
collection in Croatia, Greece, Poland, Romania, Serbia, and the UK.
J. Country-Level Correlates of Civic Honesty
As a supplement to our experimental study, we also examined country-level predictors of
civic honesty. We examined how rates of civic honesty vary according to the following set of
country-level characteristics:
• Country GDP. Logarithm of country gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-
parity per capita in 2010 from the IMF World Economic Outlook (Fund, 2015).
• Log. soil fertility. Logarithm of soil suitability, obtained from Ashraf and Galor (2013).
The data is originally from Ramankutty et al. (2002) who estimated soil suitability at half-
degree resolution based on soil pH and soil carbon density. The data was then aggregated
at the country-level by Michalopoulos (2012). Missing data on Serbia has been replaced
with data from Yugoslavia.
• Log. abs. latitude. Logarithm of the absolute latitude of a country’s approximate geodesic
centroid, obtained from Ashraf and Galor (2013). The data is originally from the CIA’s
World Factbook. Missing data on Serbia has been replaced with data from Yugoslavia.
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• Distance to waterway. Distance (in 100 km) to the nearest ice-free coastline or sea-
navigable river, obtained from Ashraf and Galor (2013). The data is originally from
Gallup et al. (1999). Missing data on Serbia has been replaced with data from Yugoslavia.
• Temperature. Average monthly temperature (in Celsius degrees) of a country between
1961 and 1990, obtained from Ashraf and Galor (2013). The data is originally from the
G-ECON project (Nordhaus, 2006). Missing data on Serbia has been replaced with data
from Yugoslavia.
• Precipitation. Average monthly precipitation (in mm per month) of a country between
1961 and 1990, obtained from Ashraf and Galor (2013). The data is originally from the
G-ECON project (Nordhaus, 2006). Missing data on Serbia has been replaced with data
from Yugoslavia.
• Mean elevation. Mean elevation of a country (in km) above sea level, obtained from
Ashraf and Galor (2013). The data is originally from the G-ECON project (Nordhaus,
2006). Missing data on Serbia has been replaced with data from Yugoslavia.
• Terrain roughness. Degree of terrain roughness, obtained from Ashraf and Galor (2013).
The data is originally from the G-ECON project (Nordhaus, 2006). Missing data on Serbia
has been replaced with data from Yugoslavia.
• Temperature (Volatility). Ancestry adjusted volatility of temperature between 1900 and
2000. Based on the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) database, and constructed using the
method outlined in Durante (2010). The variable is obtained from Galor and Özak (2016).
Missing data on Serbia has been replaced with data from Yugoslavia.
• Precipitation (Volatility). Ancestry adjusted volatility of precipitation between 1900 and
2000. Based on the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) database, and constructed using the
method outlined in Durante (2010). The variable is obtained from Galor and Özak (2016).
Missing data on Serbia has been replaced with data from Yugoslavia.
• Pathogen prevalence. Historic prevalence of nine infectious diseases (leishmanias, schisto-
somes, trypanosomes, leprosy, malaria, typhus, filariae, dengue, and tuberculosis) based
on epidemiological atlases from the first half of the 20th century, as constructed by Mur-
ray and Schaller (2010). The variable is obtained from Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017).
Data on Kazakhstan (and several other countries not covered by our study) has been fitted
based on an index of seven pathogens (excluding leprosy and tuberculosis) (Gorodnichenko
and Roland, 2017).
• Pronoun drop not allowed. Share of individuals that speak a language that does not
allow dropping the first-person pronoun (i.e., "I"), thereby putting more emphasis on the
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individual (Tabellini, 2008a). The variable was obtained from Tabellini (2008a). The data
is originally from Kashima and Kashima (1998). Data on Croatia, Kazakhstan, Morocco,
and Serbia has been manually completed based on the major languages using data from
the World Atlas of Language Structures (WALS).
• Politeness distinction. Share of individuals that speak a language that prescribes the use of
different pronouns (e.g., “tu" and “vous" in French) depending on the relationship between
the speakers. This is a trait that has been linked to hierarchy and power distance (Tabellini,
2008a). The variable was obtained from Tabellini (2008a). The data is originally from
Kashima and Kashima (1998). Data on Croatia, Kazakhstan, Morocco, and Serbia has
been manually completed based on the major languages using data from the World Atlas
of Language Structures (WALS).
• Weak future time reference. Share of individuals that speak a language with a weak future
time reference, obtained from Chen (2013). Languages with a weak future time reference
allow the speaker to use the same grammatical tense to speak about present and future
events instead of having a grammatically distinct future tense. Data on Brazil, Morocco,
Peru, Serbia, South Africa, Indonesia, Ghana, Kenya, Kazakhstan, India, and the United
Arab Emirates have been manually completed based on the major languages using data
from the World Atlas of Language Structures (WALS).
• Share of protestants. Percentage of a country’s population that is protestant, obtained
from Ashraf and Galor (2013). The data is originally from La Porta et al. (1999). Missing
data on Serbia has been manually completed using data from the Serbian census in 2002.
• Family ties. Strength of family ties calculated following Alesina and Giuliano (2010). The
variable is the first principal component of three family-related questions in the World
Value Survey (WVS): (i) “For each of the following, indicate how important it is in your
life. - Family:”, on a 4-point scale from 1 (not important at all) to 4 (very important), (ii)
“With which of these two statements do you tend to agree? A: One does not have the duty
to respect and love parents who have not earned it; B: Regardless of what the qualities
and faults of one’s parents are, one must always love and respect them.” (iii) “Which of
the following statements best describes your views about parents’ responsibilities to their
children? A: Parents have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their
own well-being for the sake of their children; B: It is the parents’ duty to do their best for
their children even at the expense of their own well being.”
• State history. State history index (Bockstette et al., 2002). For each period of 50 years
from year 1 C.E. to 1950, a country’s experience with supra-tribal government is coded for
(i) the existence of a government above the tribal level, (ii) whether said government was
foreign or locally based, and (iii) how much of the current country it ruled. A discount
120 APPENDIX A2
factor of 5% for each 50 years is applied so that more recent experience with statehood are
weighted more heavily in the index. The variable is obtained from Spolaore and Wacziarg
(2013).
• Years of democracy. Years since the polity score in the Polity IV data set is strictly above
zero, starting from 1800 or the year of independence for countries that became independent
later. The polity score is defined by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy
score and ranges from “strongly democratic" (10) to “strongly autocratic" (–10).
• Executive constraints. Constraints on executive scale from the Polity IV data set. The
scale takes values from “unlimited authority” (1) to “executive parity or subordination"
(7), the later being defined as a situation in which “accountability groups have effective
authority equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity.”
• Judicial independence. Judicial independence as of 1995, obtained from Glaeser et al.
(2004). The data is originally from La Porta et al. (2004) who defined the variable as the
sum of three sub-scales measuring (i) tenure of supreme court judges, (ii) tenure of the
highest ranked judges ruling on administrative cases, and (iii) the existence of case law.
The variable is normalized to range from zero to one.
• Constitutional review. Constitutional review as of 1995, obtained from Glaeser et al.
(2004). The data is originally from La Porta et al. (2004) who defined the variable as
the sum of two sub-scales measuring (i) the extent to which judges of the supreme or
constitutional court can review the constitutionality of laws and (ii) how difficult it is to
change the constitution. The variable is normalized to range from zero to one.
• Electoral rule: Plurality. Percentage of years between 1975 and 2000 in which a first-past-
the-post or winner-takes-all system was used to elect legislators, obtained from Glaeser
et al. (2004). The data is originally from Beck et al. (2001).
• Electoral rule: Proportionality. Percentage of years between 1975 and 2000 in which a
proportional system was used to elect legislators, i.e., legislators were elected based on
the share of votes that their party received in an election. The variables is obtained from
Glaeser et al. (2004). The data is originally from Beck et al. (2001).
• Primary education 1920. Primary school enrollment in 1920, obtained from Benavot and
Riddle (1988).
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Table A2.6
Analysis of Rejections











Institution FE yes yes
City FE yes yes
Money = BigMoney 0.077
Money = Money-NoKey 0.117
BigMoney = Money-NoKey 0.878
Wald test 0.184
Observations 16204 2959
Adjusted R2 0.009 0.006
Notes. OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. Column (1) shows the results for treatment Money
and NoMoney in all 40 countries. Column (2) shows the results for all four treatments in the United Kingdom, Poland, and
the United States. The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the recipient refused to take the wallet.
“Money,” “BigMoney,” and “Money-NoKey” are treatment indicators. The omitted category is the treatment “NoMoney.”
All models include city and institution fixed effects. The bottom of the table reports P -values from t-tests for equality of
the treatment coefficients and a Wald test of the joint significance of all treatments. Significance levels: ∗ P < 0.05, ∗∗ P
< 0.01, ∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
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Table A2.7
Analysis of Response Times











Institution FE Yes Yes
City FE Yes Yes
Money = BigMoney 0.840
Money = Money-NoKey 0.666
BigMoney = Money-NoKey 0.838
Wald test 0.964
Observations 7340 1711
Adjusted R2 0.015 −0.004
Notes. OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the response time in
days. Column (1) shows the results for treatment Money and NoMoney in all 40 countries. Column (2) shows the results
for all four treatments in the United Kingdom, Poland, and the United States. The dependent variable is the response
time in days. “Money,” “BigMoney,” and “Money-NoKey” are treatment indicators. The omitted category is the treatment
“NoMoney.” All models include city and institution fixed effects. The bottom of the table reports P -values from t-tests for
equality of the treatment coefficients and a Wald test of the joint significance of all treatments. Significance levels: ∗ P <
0.05, ∗∗ P < 0.01, ∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
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K. Survey Experiments
We conducted nationally representative online survey experiments in the United Kingdom,
Poland, and the United States to investigate self-reported motives for deciding to return or keep
a lost wallet. We conducted surveys in the UK and US in English. For Poland, we hired two
professional translators—one for the Polish translation and the other to translate it back to
English. We did this to ensure that the meaning of the questions were not lost in translation.
We sampled a total of 2,525 respondents through a Qualtrics online sample (n = 829 in
the UK, n = 809 in Poland, and n = 887 in the US). To qualify for participation, individuals
had to pass a simple attention check and meet the demographic quotas (based on age, gender,
and residence) set by Qualtrics to construct the representative samples. Participants received a
flat payment of US $4.00 for their participation.
We randomly assigned participants to one of our four treatments corresponding to the
NoMoney, Money, BigMoney, and Money-NoKey condition. Participants were told the study
was about lost and found property, and then asked to rate their knowledge of lost property laws.
They then read a brief description of a typical drop-off scenario and viewed a picture of the
wallet and its contents. The particular description and picture of the wallet varied according to
the condition. We also randomized the owner’s name and the type of institution. Figure A2.3
provides an example of how this information was presented to participants.
After reading the scenario, participants completed several blocks of questions. In the first
block, participants were asked how likely was it they would receive a financial reward from
the owner if they were to contact him about the wallet, and responded on an 11-point scale
from 0% to 100% in 10% increments. They were then asked, assuming the owner offered a
financial reward, how much money they thought the owner would give. Participants provided
their response in an open-text field.
In the second block, participants were asked the following questions on 11-point scales (0
= not at all, 10 = very much): “How concerned would you be with other people’s impression
of you if you do not contact the owner?”, “How important do you think is the lost item for its





Notes. Scenarios and pictures were adjusted according to experimental condition and
country. We also randomly varied the owner’s name and type of institution in the scenario.
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concerned would you be that you get punished if you do not contact the owner?” The order of
questions in this block were randomized for each participant.
In the third block, participants were asked to guess the annual income of the owner com-
pared to the average person in their country on a seven-point scale (−3 = much lower than the
average person, +3 = much higher than the average person). In the fourth block, participants
were asked how likely they would be to contact the owner to return the lost item, and also how
likely that someone else would contact the owner to return the lost item in such a situation. For
both questions participants responded on an 11-point scale from 0% to 100% in 10% increments.
We then included a number of exploratory questions. Participants were asked if they
personally have ever lost a wallet, a mobile phone, or a key, as well as if they have ever found a lost
wallet, mobile phone, or key. For each item they responded either yes (coded as 1) or no (coded as
0). In another block participants completed seven items from the Empathic Concern subscale of
the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983). Participants also completed six items from the
Impression Management subscale of the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (Paulhus,
1984), and a four-item measure of general attitudes about honesty. Lastly, participants were
presented with several misbehaviors (e.g., cheating on one’s taxes) and asked to assess the degree
that most other people would consider the behavior appropriate or inappropriate on a four-point
scale (−2 = very inappropriate, +2 = very appropriate).
As an additional attention check, we asked participants to recall key details from the study.
We first asked them to list the contents of the wallet in a series of open-text boxes. We then
asked them to identify the name of the owner from a list of 6 options. Finally, we asked them
to recall the amount of money in the wallet in an open-text box.
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L. Prediction Study: Non-Expert Sample
We conducted an online survey in the United States to investigate lay beliefs about the rela-
tionship between civic honesty and monetary incentives. Our sample consisted of 299 U.S. adults
from Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk labor market (58% male, 42% female; M age = 35.49, SD
= 10.66). To qualify for participation, individuals had to take the survey using a non-mobile
device (such as a desktop or laptop computer) and pass a simple attention check. Participants
received a flat payment of US $0.50 for their participation, along with the opportunity to win a
$5.00 bonus.
Participants were told that we had recently conducted a study in 25 US cities, and their
job was to predict the outcomes of the study. We first described the general design of our
lost wallet experiments, then provided participants with details about the exact procedure, the
wallets we turned in, and details about three of our experimental conditions (NoMoney, Money,
and BigMoney). Participants were also provided with an image of the wallets similar to that
in Figure A2.3. We then asked participants to predict reporting rates (from 0-100%) for each
condition. We informed participants that they should try their best to be accurate, as the most
accurate 5% of participants in the study would receive a bonus payment of $5.00. All responses
were made on the same page using slider scales from 0 to 100.
On the next page we probed participants’ beliefs about the relevant motivations operating
in each of our experimental conditions. We first asked participants to consider the following
three issues that our recipients may have been considering when deciding to return or not return
a wallet: (i) how tempted would the recipient be to keep the money in the wallet, (ii) how
concerned would the recipient be for the owner, and (iii) how much would the recipient feel
like they were a thief if they did not return the wallet. Participants estimated the relative
importance of these three concerns for each condition on 100-point slider scales, with higher
numbers indicated greater importance. For each condition, responses for the three concerns
were required to sum to 100.
Afterwards, participants provided basic demographic information including their age, gen-
der, ethnicity, educational level, employment status, and household income.
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M. Prediction Study: Expert Sample
We conducted a follow-up online survey to investigate expert predictions about the re-
lationship between civic honesty and monetary incentives. To do so, we surveyed a group of
academic economists whose email addresses were publicly available on the Research Papers in
Economics repository website (http://repec.org).
We culled email addresses for economists who have published in the last five years, and
who ranked in the top 5% in at least one of the following dimensions on the website: “average
rank,” “citations,” “citations, discounted by age,” “h-index,” “abstract views,” and “downloads.”
To exclude economists who were likely to be familiar with our project, we excluded anyone from
our email list who was affiliated with a research institute in Zurich or on the website’s expert
lists for experimental economics, cognitive and behavioral economics, norms and social capital,
or prospect theory. This procedure yielded 2,283 email addresses. We sent out an invitation to
participate in the study, and received 294 completed responses. For our analysis we excluded 15
respondents who reported familiarity with our lost wallet experiments, yielding a final sample
of 279 participants (88% male, 12% female; M age = 54.60, SD = 11.64). The overwhelming
majority of respondents were university professors (95%), with 71% at the rank of full professor.
Participants were given the same instructions and were asked to make the same predictions
as in our previous prediction study, but were not asked to complete the motivation items on self-
interest, altruism, and theft aversion. Participants were informed up front that the three most
accurate respondents would receive a US $100 bonus which they could keep or donate to charity.
At the end of the survey we asked respondents to report their gender, age, current academic
status/ranking, and whether they were previously familiar with our lost wallet experiments.
144 APPENDIX A2
II. A Conceptual Framework for Civic Honesty
We model a recipient’s decision to return a lost wallet as follows. A recipient chooses an
action a ∈ {0, 1} to either keep the wallet (a = 0) or return the wallet along with its content
(a = 1). The recipient’s decision is determined by four factors. The first factor reflects the
effort necessary to return the wallet. The recipient incurs an effort cost c when returning the
wallet, such as the time required to contact the owner. The second factor reflects the potential
material benefits to the recipient. If the recipient decides to keep the wallet, then her material
payoff increases by the amount of money m in the wallet. The third factor reflects potential
altruistic concerns from the recipient towards the owner, captured by the weight α that the
recipient places on the potential externality. If the recipient fails to return the wallet then she
can internalize the costs to the owner, which includes the money inside the wallet (m) along
with anything else inside the wallet thought to be valuable to the owner (v). Based on prior
empirical work (Engel, 2011; Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Charness and Rabin, 2002), we assume
that the recipient cannot value the wallet more than its owner (0 ≤ α < 1). The fourth factor
reflects self-image concerns, captured by the weight γ (hereafter what we call “theft aversion”).
If the recipient fails to return the wallet then she may consume a negative self-image resulting
from thinking of herself as a dishonest person. The weight placed on theft aversion is assumed
to be non-negative, γ ≥ 0. Based on these four factors, an individual chooses action a in order
to maximize the following objective function:
max
a∈{0,1}
{(1− a)m+ aα(m+ v)− (1− a)γm− ac}. (A2.2)
As is clear from equation (A2.2), we assume the non-pecuniary costs of failing to return the
wallet (captured by α and γ) increase linearly with the amount of money inside the wallet.6 It
6. This is a reduced form representation consistent with signaling models such as Bénabou and Tirole (2006),
where recipients are concerned about their social or self-image. Returning a wallet with greater amounts of money
is a costlier signal about the recipient’s honesty and therefore yields a higher reputational benefit than a wallet
with smaller amounts of cash. Psychological costs could also be represented in other forms, such as negative
emotional costs (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007) or a desire to adhere to
social norms (Krupka and Weber, 2013; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009).
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follows from equation (A2.2) that a recipient will return a wallet if and only if
αv +m(α+ γ − 1) ≥ c. (A2.3)
Note that in our framework theft aversion depends on the amount of money in the wallet,
whereas altruistic concerns for the owner depend on the amount of money as well other contents
in the wallet thought to be valuable to the owner. Accordingly, recipients sufficiently high in
altruism (i.e., a high α) would be compelled to return the wallet even when it contains little
or no money. By contrast, recipients who are theft averse (i.e., high γ) would be compelled to
return a wallet only when it contains sufficiently large amounts of money.
When we apply the framework to our current experiments, we obtain four potential types
of recipients. The first type involves recipients primarily motivated by material self-interest (i.e.,
low α and low γ), who will never return a wallet regardless of its contents. Our second type
involves recipients who are sufficiently altruistic and theft averse (i.e., high α and high γ) who
will always return the wallet regardless of its contents (so long as such concerns outweigh the
effort costs of returning the wallet).
The third and fourth types are unique in that their behavior will depend on the wallet’s
contents. Our third type involves recipients high in altruism but low in theft aversion (i.e., high
α and low γ), who will return a wallet with little to no money but will keep a wallet when
it contains sufficiently large amounts of cash. These individuals are primarily motivated by
altruistic concerns for low amounts of money, but self-interest dominates for larger amounts of







Our fourth type involves recipients low in altruism but high in theft aversion (i.e., low α and
high γ), who will fail to return a wallet with little to no money but return a wallet when it
contains larger amounts of cash. These individuals will not be sufficiently motivated by concern
for the owner’s welfare to return wallets with relatively small amounts of money, but theft
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Figure A2.4
Response Patterns as a Function of Altruism (α) and Theft Aversion (γ)
Notes. This figure illustrates response patterns for each of four behavioral types as a function of
altruism (α) and theft aversion (γ). Recipients in region A will not report a wallet in either treatment.
In contrast, recipients in region B will always report a wallet, regardless of whether it contains money or
not. Recipients in region C are sufficiently altruistic to return a wallet in the NoMoney condition, but
their degree of theft aversion is not large enough to compensate the temptation to pocket the money in
Money condition. Finally, region D comprises recipients who are not sufficiently altruistic to report a
wallet with no money, but their degree of theft aversion is strong enough to induce them to return the
wallet in the Money condition.








The distribution of types in the population determines the nature of the relationship be-
tween the reporting rate and the amount of money in the wallet. Figure A2.4 illustrates this
dynamic along a α/γ-plane for the NoMoney and Money conditions. In the NoMoney condition,
recipients with sufficiently high altruistic concerns (α > α∗) will return the wallet, while all other
recipients will not; the separation between these two response types is denoted by the vertical
line in Figure A2.4. In the Money condition, recipient types are distinguished by the line with
slope −(v + m)/m which intersects the α-axis to the right of α∗ at α∗∗ = (c + m)/(v + m).
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The two lines divide the plane into four regions. Recipients in region A fail to return the wallet
in both conditions because they are self-regarding, reflecting our first type (low α and low γ).
Recipients in region B will return the wallet in both treatments because they are sufficiently
altruistic and theft averse, reflecting our second type (high α and high γ). Region C consists of
recipients who are altruistic enough to return the wallet in the NoMoney condition but fail to
return the wallet in the Money condition due to self-interest, reflecting our third type (i.e., high
α and low γ). Finally, region D consists of recipients who do not reach the threshold of altruism
α∗ in the NoMoney condition and therefore do not return the wallet, but who are sufficiently
motivated by theft aversion to return the wallet in the Money condition.
Based on our framework, treatment differences in reporting rates reflect the distribution
of types in the population. The fact that reporting rates are relatively higher in the Money
condition suggest that recipient types in region D are more prevalent than those in region C.
An analogous line of reasoning can be applied to explain the increase in civic honesty in the
BigMoney condition relative to the NoMoney and Money conditions.
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III. Results
A. Civic Honesty across Countries
We first examine reporting rates in the NoMoney and Money conditions for all 40 countries.
Overall, 51% of recipients in the Money condition reported the wallet compared to 40% of
recipients in the NoMoney condition (Z = 14.18, P < 0.0001). We observe an increase in
reporting rates for the Money condition relative to the NoMoney condition in 38 out of 40
countries, and this effect is statistically significant at the 5% level for 19 countries after adjusting
for the pairwise comparison false discovery rate (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995). Furthermore,
in neither of the two countries that displayed a reduction in reporting rates in the Money
condition was the decline statistically significant (Z = 1.47, P = 0.141 for Mexico; Z = 0.19,
P = 0.853 for Peru).
Table A2.8 displays the results when aggregated across all 40 countries. For the table as well
as all subsequent analyses, we use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with robust standard
errors. Responses are coded as 100 if the wallet was reported and 0 otherwise. We use OLS for
purposes of simplicity and clarity because coefficients can be directly interpreted as percentage
point changes; using nonlinear models such as logistic regression return virtually identical results.
Column (1) of Table A2.8 indicates that reporting rates increase by 10.8 percentage points in
the Money relative to the NoMoney condition when including city, institution, and treatment
fixed effects7 (t16941 = 15.16, P < 0.001).
Column (2) of Table A2.8 indicates that our treatment effect holds when also controlling
for additional recipient and situational characteristics. This specification also finds that these
additional characteristics also influenced reporting rates independent of our experimental condi-
tions. On average men were roughly 2 percentage points less likely than women to report a wallet
(t16928 = 2.78, P = 0.005), and older recipients (i.e., those judged to 40 years or older) were 2
percentage points less likely to report a wallet (t16928 = 2.75, P = 0.006). The presence of a com-
puter at the recipient’s workstation increased the likelihood of reporting a wallet (t16928 = 7.10,
7. Controlling for the other two experimental conditions does not affect estimates of the Money coefficient,
but provides added precision when estimating our other control variables.
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Table A2.8

















Institution FE yes yes
City FE yes yes
Treatments yes yes
Observations 17303 17295
Adjusted R2 0.178 0.185
Notes. OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable in all models takes on
the value 100 if a wallet was reported and 0 otherwise. “Money” is a dummy for treatment Money (we also include an
indicator for treatments “BigMoney” and “Money-NoKey”). The omitted category in this table is the treatment “NoMoney.”
All models further include city and institution fixed effects. In Column (2), we also include binary control variables for
individual and situational factors, including a recipient’s age (above 40 years) and gender (male), as well as the presence
of a computer, coworkers, and other bystanders. Significance levels: ∗ P < 0.05, ∗∗ P < 0.01, ∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
P < 0.001), as did the presence of other coworkers (t16928 = 6.11, P < 0.001). The latter of the
two findings is unsurprising given that, in addition to the possibility of increased social monitor-
ing, the presence of other coworkers may have also reduced recipients’ workload. By contrast,
the presence of other bystanders (excluding coworkers) decreased reporting rates (t16928 = 4.90,
P < 0.001). One possibility for this result is that the increase in workload by having bystanders
present exerted a larger influence on recipients’ behavior than did the additional social pressure
brought about by the bystander’s presence.
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Table A2.9
Reporting Rates in NoMoney, Money, and BigMoney Condition
UK, Poland, and US United Kingdom Poland United States
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Money 15.940∗∗∗ 23.106∗∗∗ 3.310 18.301∗∗∗
(2.370) (3.851) (4.690) (3.934)
BigMoney 25.235∗∗∗ 35.941∗∗∗ 11.761∗∗ 27.832∗∗∗
(2.558) (4.567) (4.410) (4.260)
Constant 35.506∗∗∗ 25.763∗∗ 59.380∗∗∗ 34.445∗∗
(8.517) (9.345) (11.216) (11.291)
Controls:
Recipient yes yes yes yes
Situation yes yes yes yes
Institution FE yes yes yes yes
City FE yes yes yes yes
Other treatments yes yes yes yes
Money = BigMoney 0.000 0.001 0.058 0.027
Observations 2926 1132 794 1000
Adjusted R2 0.091 0.122 0.050 0.100
Notes. OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. Column (1) presents the results for all three countries,
Column (2) for the United Kingdom, Column (3) for Poland, and Column (4) for the United States. The dependent variable
in all models takes on the value 100 if a wallet is reported and 0 otherwise. “Money” and “BigMoney” are treatment indicators
(we also include an indicator for our “Money-NoKey” treatment but report those estimates in Table A2.10). The omitted
category in this table is the treatment “NoMoney.” All models include binary control variables for recipient and situational
characteristics, including a recipient’s age (above 40 years) and gender (male), as well as the presence of a computer, other
people, and coworkers. All models include city and institution fixed effects. The “Money = BigMoney” row reports P -values
from t-tests for equality of the treatment coefficients. Significance levels: ∗ P < 0.05, ∗∗ P < 0.01, ∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
B. Civic Honesty under High Stakes
We next examine reporting rates for the three countries in which we conducted the Big-
Money condition alongside our Money and NoMoney conditions (N = 2,932). Despite the higher
incentive to steal, recipients were more likely to report a lost wallet when it contained greater
amounts of money. Across the three countries, 46% of the recipients reported the wallet in the
NoMoney condition, which increased to 61% in the Money condition and increased even further
to 72% in the BigMoney condition (Z > 4.40 for all pairwise comparisons, P < 0.001). Column
(1) in Table A2.9 shows that, when controlling for situational and recipient characteristics, the
average share of recipients who reports a wallet increases by almost 16 percentage points in the
Money relative to the NoMoney condition (t2846 = 6.73, P < 0.001). The BigMoney condition
increases the reporting rate by 25 percentage points, on average, relative to the NoMoney condi-
tion (t2846 = 9.86, P < 0.001), and the difference between the BigMoney and Money conditions
is also significant (t2846 = 3.92, P < 0.001). Columns (2) to (4) show that the increasing trend
III. RESULTS 151
Table A2.10
Reporting Rates in Money-NoKey Condition
UK, Poland, and US United Kingdom Poland United States
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Money-NoKey −9.185∗∗∗ −11.750∗∗ −9.820∗ −2.927
(2.482) (3.832) (4.743) (4.433)
Constant 51.446∗∗∗ 48.869∗∗∗ 62.690∗∗∗ 52.746∗∗∗
(8.393) (8.971) (11.068) (11.373)
Controls:
Recipient yes yes yes yes
Situation yes yes yes yes
Institution FE yes yes yes yes
City FE yes yes yes yes
Other treatments yes yes yes yes
Observations 2926 1132 794 1000
Adjusted R2 0.091 0.122 0.050 0.100
Notes. OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. Column (1) presents the results for all three countries,
Column (2) for the United Kingdom, Column (3) for Poland, and Column (4) for the United States. The dependent variable
in all models takes on the value 100 if a wallet is reported and 0 otherwise. “Money-NoKey” is a treatment indicator (we
also include indicators for treatments “NoMoney” and “BigMoney” but do not report their estimates for ease of exposition).
The omitted category in this table is the treatment “Money.” All models include binary control variables for individual
characteristics and situational factors, including a recipient’s age (above 40 years) and gender (male), as well as the presence
of a computer, other people, and coworkers. All models include city and institution fixed effects. Significance levels: ∗ P
< 0.05, ∗∗ P < 0.01, ∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
in civic honesty for larger monetary stakes holds for all three countries.
C. Testing for Altruism
To examine the role of altruism, we compare the Money condition to the Money-NoKey
condition for the three countries where we conducted both treatments (N = 2, 932). Wallets
from these two conditions contain the same contents with the exception of the key, which is
valuable to the owner of the wallet but not to the recipient.8 As a result, altruistic concerns
should be responsible for any differences in reporting rates between the Money and Money-
NoKey conditions. Shown in Table A2.10, we do find relatively fewer wallets were reported
when they did not contain a key. Column (1) indicates that the average reporting rate across
countries decreased by more than 9 percentage points in the Money-NoKey condition relative
8. In the representative survey experiments, we asked participants to evaluate the importance of the wallet
to the owner on a 11-point scale from not at all (0) to very much (10). Consequently, respondents tended to
recognize the value of the key to the owner. On average, respondents considered the wallet in the Money-NoKey
condition to be 2.32 points (or 0.86 standard deviations) less important to the owner compared than the wallet
in the Money condition (t1120 = 14.33, P < 0.001). This comparison is in the same direction and statistically
significant when examining each country separately (all P -values < 0.001).
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to the Money condition (t2846 = 3.70, P < 0.001). Columns (2) to (4) show that this pattern
holds for all three countries, though the difference was statistically significant only for the UK
and Poland (12 and 10 percentage points, respectively).
D. Evidence for Theft Aversion
Since we collected survey data to measure how possible psychological motives to report a
lost wallet differ according to wallet content, we restrict our analysis to participants who were
able to correctly recall the amount of money inside the wallet described to them (rounded to
the nearest integer). This leaves us with a sample of 2,160 participants from our original sample
of 2,525. When we do not exclude any participants we find largely similar results (displayed in
Table A2.12) to those reported below.
In our survey experiments, we asked participants to rate the extent to which failing to report
a wallet felt like stealing. Column (1) in Table A2.11 shows that across the three countries,
respondents reported that failing to return a wallet would feel more like stealing when the
wallet contained greater amounts of money. Relative to the NoMoney condition, the average
score increased by 1.57 points (or 0.47 standard deviations) in the Money condition, and by
2.08 points (or 0.64 standard deviations) in the BigMoney condition (t2150 = 7.72, P < 0.001
for Money; t2150 = 10.41, P < 0.001 for BigMoney). The difference between the Money and
BigMoney condition was also significant (t2150 = 2.71, P = 0.007). In contrast, we failed
to observe a reliable difference in responses between the Money and Money-NoKey conditions
(t2150 = 1.13, P = 0.259). This suggests that anticipated costs due to theft aversion depend on
the amount of money in the wallet, but do not meaningfully depend on other contents that are
only valuable to the owner.
In the survey we also asked respondents to report the likelihood they would contact the
owner to return the wallet (from 0-100%). Naturally such self-reports should be interpreted with
caution, and indeed we find responses were overly optimistic when compared with the behavioral
data (average estimates ranged between 88% and 93% across countries). Nevertheless, the
pattern of treatment differences in self-reported likelihood of returning wallet follow the same
rank-ordering as those from our lost wallet experiments (see Column 2 in Table A2.11), and so
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Table A2.11
Survey Responses across Experimental Conditions
Theft aversion Stated likelihood of reporting
concerns (in %)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Money 1.570∗∗∗ 2.400∗ −0.748 −0.368
(0.203) (0.985) (0.966) (0.941)
BigMoney 2.076∗∗∗ 3.847∗∗∗ −0.315 −0.928
(0.200) (0.975) (0.989) (0.979)
Money-NoKey 1.358∗∗∗ −2.454∗ −5.177∗∗∗ −1.843
(0.201) (1.171) (1.131) (1.163)
Theft aversion concerns 2.005∗∗∗ 1.690∗∗∗
(0.161) (0.152)
Perceived importance to owner 1.283∗∗∗
(0.180)
Fear of punishment 0.133
(0.106)
Constant 6.512∗∗∗ 86.414∗∗∗ 73.357∗∗∗ 65.609∗∗∗
(0.224) (1.217) (1.675) (2.126)
Controls:
Institution FE yes yes yes yes
Country FE yes yes yes yes
Money = BigMoney 0.007 0.120 0.623 0.516
Money = Money-NoKey 0.259 0.000 0.000 0.165
Observations 2160 2160 2160 2160
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.029 0.159 0.188
Notes. OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. In Column (1) the dependent variable is our proxy
for theft aversion concerns which is measured by the question “To what extent would it feel like stealing if you do not
contact the owner?” with possible answers ranging from “not at all” (0) to “very much” (10). The dependent variable in
Columns (2) to (4) is the likelihood that participants would report the wallet (as a percentage). “Money,” “BigMoney,”
and “Money-NoKey” are treatment indicators. All models include country and institution fixed effects. The bottom of the
table reports P -values from t-tests for equality of the treatment coefficients. Significance levels: ∗ P < 0.05, ∗∗ P < 0.01,
∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
we use our self-report data as a proxy for exploring possible motives for returning a lost wallet.
Column (3) in Table A2.11 shows that theft aversion concerns were positively related to
one’s stated likelihood of reporting a wallet (t2149 = 12.44, P < 0.001). Furthermore, compared
to the model displayed in Column (2) that does not control for theft aversion, the model in
Column (3) provides a substantially better fit to the data (adjusted R2 increases from 0.029 to
0.159) and the coefficients for the Money and BigMoney conditions shrink and are no longer
statistically significant. To the extent such self-reports extend to real behavior, theft aversion
may partly explain why people are more likely to return a lost wallet with greater amounts of
money inside. Finally, Column (4) also includes a measure of perceived importance of the wallet
to the owner, which serves as a proxy for altruistic concerns, and a measure for the subjective fear
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Table A2.12
Survey Responses across Experimental Conditions, Full Sample
Theft aversion Stated likelihood of reporting
concerns (in %)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Money 1.501∗∗∗ 2.919∗∗ −0.121 0.219
(0.189) (0.958) (0.939) (0.916)
BigMoney 1.742∗∗∗ 3.708∗∗∗ 0.181 −0.423
(0.190) (0.968) (0.975) (0.960)
Money-NoKey 1.225∗∗∗ −1.736 −4.217∗∗∗ −0.786
(0.189) (1.124) (1.082) (1.112)
Theft aversion concerns 2.025∗∗∗ 1.699∗∗∗
(0.151) (0.140)
Perceived importance to owner 1.436∗∗∗
(0.172)
Fear of punishment 0.059
(0.099)
Constant 6.653∗∗∗ 85.616∗∗∗ 72.143∗∗∗ 63.917∗∗∗
(0.208) (1.158) (1.573) (2.003)
Controls:
Institution FE yes yes yes yes
Country FE yes yes yes yes
Money = BigMoney 0.167 0.371 0.716 0.427
Money = Money-NoKey 0.110 0.000 0.000 0.312
Observations 2525 2525 2525 2525
Adjusted R2 0.039 0.023 0.152 0.185
Notes. OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. Full sample, including participants that failed our
recall attention check. In Column (1) the dependent variable is our proxy for theft aversion concerns measured by the
question “To what extent would it feel like stealing if you do not contact the owner?” with possible answers ranging from
“not at all” (0) to “very much” (10). The dependent variable in Columns (2) to (4) is the likelihood that participants
would report the wallet (as a percentage). “Money,” “BigMoney,” and “Money-NoKey” are treatment indicators. All models
include country and institution fixed effects. The bottom of the table reports P -values from t-tests for equality of the
treatment coefficients. Significance levels: ∗ P < 0.05, ∗∗ P < 0.01, ∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
of punishment if the wallet is not reported. We find that both the perceived importance of the
wallet and the aversion to viewing oneself as a thief are positively related to the stated likelihood
of reporting the wallet (t2147 = 7.14, P < 0.001 and t2147 = 11.11, P < 0.001, respectively).
This suggests that both altruism and theft aversion concerns are relevant to reporting a lost
wallet, and that the two operate independently of each other. In contrast, self-reported fear
of punishment is not significantly correlated with the stated likelihood of reporting the wallet
(t2147 = 1.26, P = 0.208). Thus, if anything, threat of punishment plays only a minor role in
reporting a lost wallet.
The pattern of results displayed in Table A2.11 suggests that theft aversion explains why
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the reporting rate increases with the amount of money in the wallet, but not with the presence
or absence of the key. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a series of mediation analyses.
For the first mediation test, we restricted observations to the three conditions that only varied
the amount of money in the wallet (NoMoney, Money, and BigMoney conditions). Using the
NoMoney condition as our reference variable, we calculated indirect paths {Money → theft
aversion → Likelihood of reporting} and {BigMoney → theft aversion → Likelihood of reporting}
using bootstrapped standard errors with 10,000 resamples (Shrout and Bolger, 2002). Consistent
with our hypothesis, theft aversion mediated the relationship between the amount of money
inside the wallet and the likelihood of reporting a lost wallet (indirect bMoney = 2.47, SE = 0.42,
P < 0.001; indirect bBigMoney = 3.26, SE = 0.48, P < 0.001). Furthermore, the direct effect
in both conditions was nonsignificant after accounting for the indirect effect of theft aversion
(direct bMoney = 0.003, SE = 0.97, P = 0.997; direct bBigMoney = 0.43, SE = 0.99, P = 0.666).
We then conducted a second mediation test based on our framework’s assumption that
altruism, rather than theft aversion, should explain the difference in reporting rates between the
Money and Money-NoKey conditions. Restricting observations to only those two conditions,
we conducted a similar path analysis as before except this time for the indirect paths {Money-
NoKey → Perceived harm to owner → Likelihood of reporting} and {Money-NoKey → Theft
aversion → Likelihood of reporting}. Consistent with our conceptual framework, we find that
our proxy for altruistic concerns (perceived harm to the owner) reliably mediates the difference
between the two conditions (indirect b = −3.58, SE = 0.57, P < 0.001) while theft aversion does
not (indirect b = −0.45, SE = 0.41, P = 0.274). Furthermore, the direct effect of experimental
condition was nonsignificant after accounting for our indirect effects (direct b = −0.96, SE =
1.10, P = 0.381). Taken together these results are consistent with the hypothesis that theft
aversion explain why the reporting rate increases with the amount of money in the wallet, but
does not explain why the reporting rate decreases with the absence the key.
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E. Prediction Data: Non-Expert Sample
We examined whether people anticipate our behavioral results by asking online participants
to predict reporting rates in the US for wallets that contained $0, $13.45, and $94.15. Contrary
to the behavioral data, respondents predicted that reporting would be highest when the wallet
contained no money (M = 72.71, SD = 29.47), lower when the wallet contained a modest
amount of money (M = 65.04, SD = 24.01), and lower still when the wallet contained a
substantial amount of money (M = 54.55, SD = 28.88). All three predictions were reliably
different from one another (Table A2.13, Column 1; t298 ≥ 6.40, P < 0.001 for all pairwise
comparisons). For each condition we also compared the average predicted change to the actual
change in reporting rates. The predicted change in reporting rates was always lower (i.e., more
cynical) than the actual change in reporting rates (t298 ≥ 12.16, P < 0.001 for all pairwise
comparisons).
We next examined response profiles within participants.9 As the amount of money inside
the wallet increased, 64% predicted a monotonic decrease in civic honesty, 18% predicted a
monotonic increase in civic honesty, 3% predicted no change, and 15% displayed non-monotonic
predictions. Using a sign test (coded as –1 = predicted a decrease in civic honesty, +1 =
predicted an increase in civic honesty, 0 = all remaining responses), we find that reliably more
participants expected rates of civic honesty to decrease than increase as wallet amounts became
larger (P < 0.001).
Participants also reported their beliefs about the relative share of different motivations
operating in each condition. On average participants expected self-interest to grow and altruistic
concerns to shrink for wallets containing relatively more money. Compared to the NoMoney
condition, participants expected the temptation of recipients to pocket the money to increase by
18.95 points (or 0.93 standard deviations) in the Money condition, and by 36.98 points (or 1.26
standard deviations) in the BigMoney condition (t298 > 16.00, P < 0.001 for both comparisons).
The difference between the Money and BigMoney conditions was also significant (t298 = 14.15,
P < 0.001). We see the reverse pattern for beliefs about altruistic concerns by recipients towards
9. We assume weak monotonicity when calculating percentages for response profiles. Results from our sign-
tests do not meaningfully change when response profiles are instead calculated assuming strong monotonicity.
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the owner of the wallet. Relative to the NoMoney condition, participants expected altruistic
concerns to decrease by 23.95 points (or 0.92 standard deviations) in the Money condition, and
by 42.15 points (or 1.31 standard deviations) in the BigMoney condition (t298 > 15.80, P < 0.001
for both comparisons). The difference between the Money and BigMoney conditions was also
significant (t298 = 14.96, P < 0.001).
Recall that in the behavioral and self-report data, theft aversion appeared to play an
important role in explaining variation across conditions appears. Respondents in our prediction
study, on the other hand, afforded considerably less importance to concerns of theft aversion.
Relative to the NoMoney condition, participants did expect concerns about viewing oneself as a
thief to increase by 5 points (or 0.26 standard deviations) in the Money condition, and by 5.17
points (or 0.21 standard deviations) in the BigMoney condition (t298 > 3.60, P < 0.001 for both
comparisons). The difference between the Money and BigMoney conditions was not statistically
reliable (t298 = 0.16, P = 0.875). We also note differences in predicted theft aversion concerns
across conditions were considerably smaller than those observed for predicted self-interest or
altruism.
Lastly, we examined how inferences about motivations related to predictions of rates of civic
honesty (Columns 2 to 4, Table A2.13). Self-interest scores were inversely related to predicted
reporting rates (Column 2; t298 = 9.54, P < 0.001), and altruism scores were positively related
to predicted reporting rates (Column 3; t298 = 6.53, P < 0.001). In both cases, the adjusted
R2 increases by more than a factor of two relative to our baseline model in Column (1), and
the coefficients for our treatment coefficients shrink and are no longer statistically significant.
However, as displayed in Column (4), theft aversion concerns were not reliably associated with
predicted reporting rates (t298 = 1.36, P = 0.174). When compared to our baseline model,
including theft aversion concerns in the model does not meaningfully increase explained variance
and our treatment coefficients do not decrease in size.
The pattern of results displayed in Table A2.13 suggest that respondents’ inferences about
self-interest and altruism, but not concerns of theft aversion, underly their beliefs that response
rates will decline for wallets with relatively more money. To test this hypothesis, we conducted
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Table A2.13
Predictions of Reporting Rates across Experimental Conditions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Money −7.672∗∗∗ 1.613 0.198 −8.120∗∗∗
(1.199) (1.634) (1.729) (1.272)
BigMoney −18.164∗∗∗ −0.041 −4.313 −18.627∗∗∗





Theft aversion concerns 0.090
(0.066)
Constant 72.709∗∗∗ 77.533∗∗∗ 49.534∗∗∗ 70.950∗∗∗
(1.706) (1.716) (3.820) (2.180)
Money = BigMoney 0.000 0.327 0.007 0.000
Observations 299 299 299 299
Adjusted R2 0.066 0.191 0.138 0.068
Notes. OLS estimates with participant-clustered standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is predicted
reporting rates by recipients (from 0-100%). “Money” and “BigMoney” are treatment indicators. The omitted category is
“NoMoney.” The bottom of the table reports P -values from t-tests for equality of the treatment coefficients. Significance
levels: ∗ P < 0.05, ∗∗ P < 0.01, ∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
a series of mediation analyses. For each our three motivation items,10 we calculated the indirect
pathway {Experimental conditions → Inferred motivation → Predicted reporting rate} using
bootstrapped participant-clustered standard errors with 10,000 resamples (Shrout and Bolger,
2002). Consistent with the pattern suggested in Table A2.13, inferences of increasing self-
interest and declining altruism each statistically mediate the relationship between experimental
conditions and predicted reporting rates (self-interest results: indirect bMoney = −9.29, SE
= 1.18, P < 0.001; indirect bBigMoney = −18.12, SE = 2.18, P < 0.001; altruism results:
indirect bMoney = −7.87, SE = 1.29, P < 0.001; indirect bBigMoney = −13.85, SE = 2.20,
P < 0.001). However, we fail to observe a reliable indirect effect of inferred theft aversion
concerns on predicted reporting rates (indirect bMoney = 0.45, SE = 0.36, P = 0.209; indirect
bBigMoney = 0.46, SE = 0.37, P = 0.216). Thus, participants appeared to weight the role of
self-interest and declining altruism, but not inferences of theft aversion, in predicting rates of
civic honesty.
10. We conducted separate mediation analyses for each motivation item rather than conduct a simultaneous
mediation test for all three items, as the latter analysis would require us to remove at least one item due to
collinearity (since inferences for the three items were required to sum to 100).
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F. Prediction Data: Expert Sample
The results we observe from our expert sample were qualitatively similar to those from our
MTurk sample, but considerably weaker in magnitude. On average, respondents predicted that
reporting rates would be highest in the NoMoney condition (M = 69.38, SD = 25.43), followed
by the Money condition (M = 68.98, SD = 21.36), and lowest in the BigMoney condition
(M = 65.70, SD = 23.15). We compared conditions using an OLS regression with participant-
clustered standard errors. Predicted reporting rates in the BigMoney condition were reliably
lower than those in the NoMoney condition (t278 = 2.05, P = 0.042) and Money condition
(t278 = 2.50, P = 0.013), but predicted reporting rates in the NoMoney and Money conditions
did not reliably differ from one another (t278 = 0.44, P = 0.660). For each condition we also
compared the average predicted change to the actual change in reporting rates. The predicted
change in reporting rates was always lower (i.e., more cynical) than the actual change in reporting
rates (t278 ≥ 8.70, P < 0.001 for all pairwise comparisons).
We next examined response profiles within participants. As the amount of money inside
the wallet increased, 49% predicted a monotonic decrease in civic honesty, 29% predicted a
monotonic increase in civic honesty, 6% predicted no change, and 16% displayed non-monotonic
predictions. Using a sign test (coded as –1 = predicted a decrease in civic honesty, +1 =
predicted an increase in civic honesty, 0 = all remaining responses), we find that reliably more
participants expected rates of civic honesty to decrease than increase as wallet amounts became
larger (P < 0.001). In summary, experts in our sample held inaccurate beliefs, but to a lesser
degree than our sample of MTurkers.
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G. Cross-Country Correlates of Civic Honesty
In this section, we explore possible explanations for cross-country differences in civic hon-
esty. To address potential issues related to reverse causality, we primarily consider “deep” and
historical explanatory variables which are plausibly exogenous to honest behavior and are con-
sidered formative to the development of society (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2013). To illustrate
the value of this approach, consider that reporting rates in our study are positively correlated
with contemporaneous measures of wealth (such as per capita income). From this correlation it
is unclear whether country wealth leads to greater civic honesty or vice versa (or alternatively,
some unobserved third variable influences both wealth and civic honesty). Now consider that,
instead of wealth, we observed a correlation between a country’s geographic terrain and civic
honesty. Country terrain can be considered a deep variable because civic honesty is unlikely to
influence geography, but geography could potentially influence civic honesty (by shaping citi-
zen’s interactions in ways that benefit or hinder cooperation). For this reason, using deep and
historical variables is potentially more informative in explaining cross-country differences in civic
honesty. We then extend our analysis to explore the role of culture and institutions, with the
caveat that those factors may be endogenous11 (Greif, 2006; Bisin and Verdier, 2011; Alesina
and Giuliano, 2015; Enke, forthcoming).
We conducted a series of OLS regressions in which we regressed a given country-level
variable onto individual decisions to report a wallet (for a full list of variables, see the “Country-
level Correlates of Civic Honesty” subsection of Materials and Methods). As the rank-ordering
of countries is almost identical for the NoMoney and the Money condition (Spearman’s ρ =
0.939, P < 0.001), we pooled data between the two conditions. All regressions control for
treatment condition, recipient and situational characteristics, as well as institution fixed effects.
Figure A2.5 presents the corresponding coefficients and standard errors (adjusted for clustering
at the country-level). We standardized the explanatory variables to have a mean of zero and a
11. Some of the variables were not available for all countries in our dataset. Where possible, we updated
the data to obtain better geographic coverage. For example, measures of historic institutions were substituted
from predecessor countries and we manually coded linguistic traits for several countries using the World Atlas
of Language Structures (WALS). Figure A2.7 shows that the results are qualitatively similar if we only use data
from the original sources.
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standard deviation of one, so the coefficients can be interpreted as the difference in reporting
rates associated with a one standard deviation change in the explanatory variable. To account for
multiple hypothesis testing, we report P -values adjusted for the false discovery rate (Benjamini
and Hochberg, 1995). Figs. A2.8 and A2.9 show that our results are robust when we conduct
our regression analysis separately for the Money and NoMoney conditions.
We first examined whether rates of civic honesty are correlated with commonly-discussed
geographic conditions: soil fertility, absolute latitude, distance to waterways, temperature, pre-
cipitation, elevation, and terrain ruggedness. These geographic conditions have been found to
foster economic development (Ashraf and Galor, 2011b; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2013), and we
find that such variables are also significantly associated with civic honesty. Country-level re-
porting rates for lost wallets were associated with absolute latitude (t39 = 5.26, P < 0.001),
lower temperature (t39 = 4.40, P < 0.001), and lower elevation (t39 = 2.77, P = 0.020). These
findings suggest that civic honesty may be a channel through which geography affects economic
development, in that geographic conditions and climate could have influenced the scope of social
interactions and cooperation in pre-industrial societies. Norms of trust and cooperation may
have in turn facilitated the transition from agricultural societies to market economies, which
are based on interactions with out-group members and strangers (Ostrom, 1990; Greif, 1994;
Woolcock, 1998; Henrich et al., 2001, 2010; Mokyr, 2008; Litina, 2016). Another possibility is
that geography indirectly influences civic honesty by promoting favorable economic conditions,
which in turn increases rates of honesty (Sharma et al., 2014; Fisman et al., 2015; Ananyev and
Guriev, forthcomming).
We next examined the role of historical weather variability. Buggle and Durante (2017)
advanced the hypothesis that subsistence farmers developed persistent norms of cooperation
and trust in strangers to cope with climate risk, which in turn facilitated exchanges between
communities or helped to establish geographically-diversified insurance agreements (Dean et al.,
1985; Cashdan, 1985; Nettle, 1998). Using regional survey data from Europe, they found that
historical weather variability is positively correlated with trust. Corroborating Buggle and Du-
rante’s survey results, we find that historical seasonal variability in temperature is also positively
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Figure A2.5
Correlates of Civic Honesty
Notes. OLS coefficient estimates with standard errors clustered at the country-level.
The dependent variable takes on the value 100 when an individual reported a wallet
and 0 otherwise. Each coefficient has been estimated separately using standardized
explanatory variables. They can therefore be interpreted as the difference in reporting
rates associated with a one standard deviation change in the explanatory variable. We
control for treatment status, institution fixed effects, and our standard set of control
variables for recipient and situational characteristics: dummies for age above 40 years
and gender, as well as the presence of a computer, coworkers, and other bystanders. To
correct for multiple hypothesis testing, P -values are adjusted for false discovery rate
(Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995). The number of countries included in the regressions
is indicated in parentheses.
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correlated with reporting rates in our study (t39 = 2.82, P = 0.019).12
We conclude our analysis of geographic factors by examining the relationship between his-
torical prevalence of infectious diseases and civic honesty. According to the prominent pathogen-
stress theory of sociality, communities that lived in regions with high exposure to infectious dis-
eases were less likely to interact with strangers to prevent potential infection of novel pathogens,
and as a result adopted collectivistic norms limited to one’s immediate in-group (Fincher et al.,
2008; Fincher and Thornhill, 2012). Given that the lost wallets in our study always belonged to
a stranger, recipients in locations with historically high pathogen prevalence may have felt less
compunction to return a lost wallet to an out-group member. Consistent with this hypothesis,
we find a sizable negative association between historical pathogen prevalence and civic honesty
(t39 = 7.20, P < 0.001).
We next explored the relationship between civic honesty and cultural proxies for a general-
ized sense of morality—that is, moral norms and obligations that extend beyond one’s in-group to
anonymous strangers (Tabellini, 2010). To do so we first examined the role of different language
structures, as language is thought to directly shape norms and expectations about behavior.
For instance, Kashima and Kashima (1998) proposed that languages which do not permit the
dropping of first person pronouns (e.g., “I” in English or “ich” in German) serve to demarcate
an individual from his or her social context, in turn reinforcing values around individual au-
tonomy and responsibility. We found a strong positive correlation between reporting rates and
countries with languages which do not permit the dropping first personal pronouns (t39 = 4.00,
P < 0.001). This finding is consistent with prior work demonstrating that individualistic values
are positively related to behaviors in line with generalized morality norms (Tabellini, 2008a;
Licht et al., 2007). By contrast, we failed to find a reliable correlation between reporting rates
and the use of multiple second person pronouns (t39 = 0.19, P = 0.851) or weak future time
reference (t39 = 0.92, P = 0.492), two linguistic features that have received attention in the
literature.13
12. We also do not observe a significant correlation between precipitation and reporting rates (t39 = 0.36,
P = 0.750). According to Galor and Savitskiy (2018), temperature shocks were more decisive for productivity in
the pre-industrial era than precipitation.
13. Usage of multiple second person pronouns (e.g., “tu” and “vous” in French) as politeness distinction has
been postulated to make status hierarchy and social distance more salient between speakers (Brown and Gilman,
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Moving away from language to other cultural proxies of generalized morality, we next
explored Protestantism. A long-standing literature in sociology and political science (Weber,
1930; Putnam et al., 1993) argues that Protestantism is conducive to social capital, and we find
that countries with a higher share of Protestants also exhibit significantly more honest behavior
(t39 = 4.82, P < 0.001). This is in line with prior work finding that Protestantism encourages
applying the same behavioral standards to in-group and out-group members, leading to higher
trust in strangers (Arruñada, 2010; La Porta et al., 1997; Glaeser et al., 2000; Uslaner, 2002;
Guiso et al., 2011). Indeed, we also found that stronger family ties are negatively correlated with
reporting rates (t32 = 7.42, P < 0.001), as stronger family ties imply norms of cooperation that
are often limited to one’s narrow in-group (Alesina and Giuliano, 2010; Banfield, 1958; Coleman,
1990; Alesina and Giuliano, 2014).
For the final part of our analysis, we explored some of the institutional determinants of
civic honesty. The theoretical and empirical literature has examined both the complementar-
ity between state formation and civic behavior (through the internalization of formal rules and
increased trust in institutions), and their substitutability (as formal institutions may also crowd-
out civic behavior)(Aghion et al., 2010; Bénabou and Tirole, 2011; Tabellini, 2008b; Cassar et al.,
2014; Guiso et al., 2016; Lowes et al., 2017). We failed to find a significant association between
state history—a commonly-used index of experience with formal government institutions (Bock-
stette et al., 2002)—and civic honesty (t38 = 0.77, P = 0.572). However, we found that both
historical experience with democratic institutions and political constraints on executive power
are positively correlated with reporting rates (t39 = 2.55, P = 0.029 for democratic history;
t39 = 6.54, P < 0.001 for political constraints). This is consistent with the hypothesis that in-
clusive political institutions and the prevention of abuses of power are essential for civic behavior
(Banfield, 1958; Putnam et al., 1993).
Some researchers have argued, however, that commonly-used measures of societal institu-
tions are potentially problematic because they measure time-varying political outcomes rather
than permanent constraints (Glaeser et al., 2004). To address this concern we also analyzed
1960; Kashima and Kashima, 1998). The weak future time reference feature allows the speaker to use the same
grammatical tense to talk about future and present events and has been linked to greater patience and less
impulsive behaviors (Chen, 2013; Falk et al., 2018).
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a country’s electoral rules (i.e., plurality and proportionality) and judicial checks and balances
(i.e., judicial independence and constitutional review), which tend to be relatively time-invariant.
Electoral systems based on plurality rule are thought to promote accountability due to the
winner-take-all character of electoral competition,14 but at the cost of targeting benefits to
narrow constituencies and less overall representativeness (Persson and Tabellini, 2004). Propor-
tional representation, on the other hand, is thought to be more inclusive and promotes broader
democratic consensus.15 Using data from Beck et al. (2001), we found that countries with pro-
portional representation exhibit significantly higher reporting rates (t36 = 2.71, P = 0.022),
while plurality representation is not reliably related to civic honesty (t36 = 0.40, P = 0.750).
These results suggest that broad political representation could be a key factor underlying the
correlation between democratic institutions and civic honesty. We also used judicial indepen-
dence and constitutional review as constitutional measures of the judiciary’s power to constrain
the executive. While these measures have been associated with political and economic free-
dom in previous studies (La Porta et al., 1997), we failed to observe a significant correlation
with reporting rates16 (t30 = 0.72, P = 0.579 for judicial independence; t30 = 0.58, 0.655 for
constitutional review).
Our last institutional variable involves national education. The history of national educa-
tion is closely intertwined with the formation of the modern state (Green, 1990; Uslaner and
Rothstein, 2016), so we examined the relationship between historical primary school enrollment
rates and civic honesty. It has been argued that socialization is crucial to most primary educa-
tion curricula and serves to ease interactions with strangers (Glaeser et al., 2007). We observed
a significant and sizable positive correlation between historical rates of primary education and
civic honesty (t38 = 5.95, P < 0.001), consistent with the hypothesis that education contributes
to the formation of social capital (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Milligan et al., 2004; Helliwell and
14. The US and the UK are prime examples of countries with a plurality system where geographically defined
constituencies elect one representative each.
15. Examples of proportional representation include Scandinavian countries where each constituency elects
several representatives. In these countries additional mechanisms are in place to ensure that the allocation of seats
closely mirrors the overall popular vote. However, plurality and proportional representation are not mutually
exclusive. Elements of both systems can coexist if a country’s constitution stipulates different rules for electing
representatives in a two-chamber legislature (e.g., Switzerland) or if proportional representation is combined with
some sort of bonus for the winning party, as is the case in Italy (Nannicini et al., 2013).




Notes. Explanatory power (adjusted R2) of the first principal components of the geographic,
cultural, and institutional variables. We regress country averages of regression-adjusted reporting
rates (corrected for treatment indicators, institution fixed effects, and our standard set of control
variables for individual characteristics and situational factors) on the first principal components of
geography, geography and culture, geography and institutions, and all three categories together, re-
spectively. To compute the first principal components of the variables in each category, we exclude
variables with less than 37 observations (i.e., family ties, judicial independence, and constitutional
review).
Putnam, 2007; Tabellini, 2010; Guiso et al., 2011; Algan and Cahuc, 2013).
Given that geography has been linked to culture and institutions (Engerman and Sokoloff,
1997; Acemoglu et al., 2002; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Ashraf and Galor, 2011a; Alesina
et al., 2013), it is possible that the correlations we observe between civic honesty and institu-
tional variables may be spurious when not controlling for geographic conditions. We examined
the robustness of our results to this concern by controlling for the first principal component of all
geographic variables, and found qualitatively similar results17 (see Figure A2.10). The first prin-
cipal component of our set of geographic variables accounts for roughly 32% of the variance in
17. Our results are similar if we control for the first three principal components or if the principal components
are constructed using only the basic geographic factors, including soil fertility, absolute latitude, distance to
waterway, temperature, precipitation elevation, and terrain ruggedness. As an alternative to controlling for the
first principal component of geography, we also conducted the same regressions using the contemporary per capita
income as our control variable. As shown in Figure A2.11, the results are largely unchanged.
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civic honesty, and the first principal component of our set of cultural and institutional variables
explains an additional 34% of the variation18 (Figure A2.6). Taken together, our analysis sug-
gests that economically favorable geographic conditions, inclusive political institutions, national
education, and cultural values that emphasize moral norms extending beyond one’s in-group are
positively associated with higher levels of civic honesty.
18. To compute the first principal components for each category, we exclude variables with less than 37
observations (i.e., family ties, judicial independence, and constitutional review). The results are similar if we
restrict the analysis to the 25 countries where all measures are available: Geography explains 40% of the variation
in civic honesty and culture and institutions together explain an additional 25%.
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Figure A2.7
Correlates of Civic Honesty: Original Data Only
Notes. OLS coefficient estimates with standard errors clustered at the country-level.
The dependent variable takes on the value 100 when an individual reported a wallet
and 0 otherwise. Each coefficient has been estimated separately using standardized
explanatory variables. They can therefore be interpreted as the difference in reporting
rates associated with a one standard deviation change in the explanatory variable. We
control for treatment status, institution fixed effects, and our standard set of control
variables for recipient and situational characteristics: dummies for age above 40 years
and gender, as well as the presence of a computer, coworkers, and other bystanders. To
correct for multiple hypothesis testing, P -values are adjusted for false discovery rate
(Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995). The number of countries included in the regressions
is indicated in parentheses.
III. RESULTS 169
Figure A2.8
Correlates of Civic Honesty: NoMoney
Notes. OLS coefficient estimates with standard errors clustered at the country-level.
The sample is restricted to drop-offs in treatment NoMoney. The dependent variable
takes on the value 100 when an individual reported a wallet and 0 otherwise. Each
coefficient has been estimated separately using standardized explanatory variables.
They can therefore be interpreted as the difference in reporting rates associated with
a one standard deviation change in the explanatory variable. We control for treatment
status, institution fixed effects, and our standard set of control variables for recipient
and situational characteristics: dummies for age above 40 years and gender, as well
as the presence of a computer, coworkers, and other bystanders. To correct for multi-
ple hypothesis testing, P -values are adjusted for false discovery rate (Benjamini and




Correlates of Civic Honesty: Money
Notes. OLS coefficient estimates with standard errors clustered at the country-level.
The sample is restricted to drop-offs in treatment Money. The dependent variable takes
on the value 100 when an individual reported a wallet and 0 otherwise. Each coeffi-
cient has been estimated separately using standardized explanatory variables. They
can therefore be interpreted as the difference in reporting rates associated with a one
standard deviation change in the explanatory variable. We control for treatment sta-
tus, institution fixed effects, and our standard set of control variables for recipient
and situational characteristics: dummies for age above 40 years and gender, as well
as the presence of a computer, coworkers, and other bystanders. To correct for multi-
ple hypothesis testing, P -values are adjusted for false discovery rate (Benjamini and




Correlates of Civic Honesty: Controlling for Geography
Notes. OLS coefficient estimates with standard errors clustered at the country-level.
The dependent variable takes on the value 100 when an individual reported a wallet
and 0 otherwise. Each coefficient has been estimated separately using standardized
explanatory variables. They can therefore be interpreted as the difference in reporting
rates associated with a one standard deviation change in the explanatory variable.
We control for the first principal component of all geographical measures, treatment
status, institution fixed effects, and our standard set of control variables for recipient
and situational characteristics: dummies for age above 40 years and gender, as well
as the presence of a computer, coworkers, and other bystanders. To correct for multi-
ple hypothesis testing, P -values are adjusted for false discovery rate (Benjamini and




Correlates of Civic Honesty: Controlling for Country GDP
Notes. OLS coefficient estimates with standard errors clustered at the country-level.
The dependent variable takes on the value 100 when an individual reported a wallet
and 0 otherwise. Each coefficient has been estimated separately using standardized
explanatory variables. They can therefore be interpreted as the difference in reporting
rates associated with a one standard deviation change in the explanatory variable. We
control for the logarithm of a countries GDP per capita in 2010 (IMF World Economic
Outlook; based on purchasing-power-parity), treatment status, institution fixed effects,
and our standard set of control variables for recipient and situational characteristics:
dummies for age above 40 years and gender, as well as the presence of a computer,
coworkers, and other bystanders. To correct for multiple hypothesis testing, P -values
are adjusted for false discovery rate (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995). The number of
countries included in the regressions is indicated in parentheses.
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IV. Alternative Explanations
We explored several alternative explanations for why rates of civic honesty tend to increase
with greater amounts of money left in a wallet.
A. Fear of Punishment
One possibility is that wallet recipients were concerned about possible punishment for not
reporting the wallet, especially when a wallet contained relatively more money. We purposefully
designed our experiment to minimize such concerns by telling recipients that the wallet was
found on a different street and having our research assistants immediately leave upon handing
over the wallet (thereby never receiving written confirmation for the lost item). We also note
that lost property laws tend to be uncommon and even when in place are rarely enforced (West,
2003).19
We first address the issue of punishment concerns by exploiting regional variation in lost
property laws within the US. The US legal system is based on common law, under which a person
who finds lost property can keep the item until the original owner comes forward.20 However,
some states have enacted statutes that modify the common law’s treatment of lost property. For
instance, the state of New York imposes a fine of up to one hundred dollars if a finder willfully
fails to report lost property.21
About half of our lost wallet observations in the US originate from states that have adopted
statutes explicitly requiring finders to return lost property to the rightful owner or to a relevant
agency, such as the police. We therefore divided our sample according to whether legal conse-
quences could ensue for failing to return a lost wallet. If fear of legal punishment drives the
19. In our representative survey we find a small but significant increase in self-reported fear of punishment
with greater amounts of money in the wallet (t2150 = 3.19, P = 0.001, for the difference between the NoMoney
and the Money condition; t2150 = 2.45, P = 0.014, for the difference between the Money and BigMoney condi-
tion). However, Column (4) in Table A2.11 shows that while theft aversion concerns and altruism are positively
correlated with the intention to report the wallet, self-reported fear of punishment does not predict the stated
likelihood of reporting the wallet.
20. Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/lost_property, accessed on September
18, 2016. Common law distinguishes between lost and mislaid property. Lost property is property that was
unintentionally left behind by its owner. Mislaid property, on the other hand, is property that was intentionally
set down in a location by its owner and then forgotten.
21. See N.Y. Personal Property Law § 252 (3).
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Table A2.14













Institution FE yes yes
City FE yes yes
Other treatments yes yes
Money = BigMoney 0.026 0.404
Observations 496 504
Adjusted R2 0.152 0.055
Notes. OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. Column (1) focuses on US states without a lost
property law, whereas Column (2) contains data from states with such a law. The dependent variable in both columns
takes on the value 100 if a wallet was reported and 0 otherwise. “Money” and “BigMoney” are treatment indicators (we also
include an indicator for treatment “Money-NoKey” but do not report its estimates for ease of exposition). Both models
include binary control variables for individual and situational factors, including a recipient’s age (above 40 years) and
gender (male), as well as the presence of a computer, coworkers, and other bystanders. The models also include city and
institution fixed effects. The bottom of the table reports P -values from t-tests for equality of the treatment coefficients.
Significance levels: ∗ P < 0.05, ∗∗ P < 0.01, ∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
increase in reporting rates, then this relationship should be especially pronounced for states with
lost property regulations. As shown in Table A2.14 however, we find similar treatment effects
regardless of whether a state has a lost property law. Using seemingly unrelated regressions
for states with and without property laws (Zellner, 1962), we fail to find a reliable difference in
the size of the coefficients between the two groups for either the Money treatment (χ21 = 0.21,
P = 0.646) or the BigMoney treatment (χ21 = 0.27, P = 0.607). Thus, recipients in states
with legal sanctions surrounding lost property did not act in a meaningfully different way from
recipients in states without such laws.
A second way we address possible punishment concerns is by examining whether the pres-
ence of a security camera moderates our results. Security cameras could serve as proof that the
wallet was turned in to the recipient and therefore amplify concerns about punishment if the
wallet was not returned. After each drop-off, except in Poland and the United Kingdom, our
research assistants took note of whether they observed a security camera. Column (1) in Ta-
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Table A2.15
Civic Honesty and Presence of Security Cameras
Full sample Security camera?
No Yes
(1) (2) (3)




Constant 40.096∗∗∗ 27.774∗ 38.699∗∗∗
(5.143) (11.485) (5.691)
Recipient Yes Yes Yes
Situation Yes Yes Yes
Institution FE Yes Yes Yes
City FE Yes Yes Yes
Other treatments Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15369 5806 9563
Adjusted R2 0.189 0.224 0.170
Notes. OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. Column (1) shows the estimates for the full sample
as a benchmark, Column (2) contains observations where no security camera was sighted, and Column (3) includes only
observations where a camera was sighted. The dependent variable in all models takes on the value 100 if a wallet was
reported and 0 otherwise. “Money” is a dummy for treatment Money (we also include indicators for treatments “Money-
NoKey” and “BigMoney” but do not report their estimates for ease of exposition). All models include binary control
variables for recipient and situational characteristics, including a recipient’s age (above 40 years), gender (male), and the
presence of a computer, coworkers and other bystanders. The models also include city and institution fixed effects. Note
that the sample does not include data from the United Kingdom and Poland because we did not collect data on security
cameras. Significance levels: ∗ P < 0.05, ∗∗ P < 0.01, ∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
ble A2.15 shows that if anything, the presence of a security camera during the drop-off lowered
the likelihood of reporting a wallet by 2.7 percentage points (t15044 = −2.78, P = 0.005). While
the treatment effect in the Money condition, relative to the NoMoney condition, is slightly larger
for drop-off locations with cameras than those without (χ21 = 3.20, P = 0.074 when comparing
the Money coefficient in Columns 2 and 3), the treatment effect is large and significant for both
subsamples (t5485 = 7.68, P < 0.001 for Column 2; t9241 = 12.20, P < 0.001 for Column 3).
A third approach we use to address punishment concerns involves the presence of other
individuals when performing a wallet drop-off. Recipients may have been worried about neg-
ative reactions from bystanders—an informal punishment—for not reporting a wallet. After
performing the wallet drop-offs, our research assistants also noted whether coworkers and other
individuals were present during the exchange. If worries about informal sanctions influenced




Civic Honesty and Social Monitoring
Full No No bystanders Alone
sample coworkers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Money 10.792∗∗∗ 9.944∗∗∗ 10.083∗∗∗ 8.824∗∗∗
(0.712) (0.884) (1.216) (1.506)
Constant 33.302∗∗ 28.147∗ 64.166∗∗ 67.158∗∗
(11.112) (11.407) (24.972) (24.791)
Controls:
Recipient yes yes yes yes
Situation yes yes yes yes
Institution FE yes yes yes yes
City FE yes yes yes yes
Other treatments yes yes yes yes
Observations 17295 11528 5939 4079
Adjusted R2 0.185 0.178 0.205 0.196
Notes. OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. Column (1) shows the estimates for the full sample as
a benchmark, Column (2) includes observations without coworkers present, Column (3) includes observations without other
bystanders present, and Column (4) includes observations where neither coworkers nor other bystanders were present. The
dependent variable in all models takes on the value 100 if a wallet was reported and 0 otherwise. “Money” is a dummy for
treatment Money (we also include an indicators for treatments “Money-NoKey” and “BigMoney” but do not report their
estimates for ease of exposition). All models include binary control variables for recipient and situational characteristics,
including a recipient’s age (above 40 years), gender (male), and the presence of a computer. The models also include city
and institution fixed effects. Significance levels: ∗ P < 0.05, ∗∗ P ≤ 0.01, ∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
Table A2.16 displays the results for the full sample compared to instances when no coworkers
were present, no bystanders were present, and when the recipient and research assistant were
completely alone during the exchange. Relative to the full sample, we fail to find a reliable
difference in treatment effects when co-workers are not present (χ21 = 0.56, P = 0.455 when
comparing the coefficient of Money in Columns 1 and 2), when other individuals are not present
(χ21 = 0.25, P = 0.615 comparing Columns 1 and 3), and when recipients were alone (χ
2
1 = 1.40,
P = 0.238 comparing Columns 1 and 4). We observe roughly similarly-sized treatment effects
between the full sample and all subsamples, suggesting that the presence of others did not qualify
our results.
B. Returning the Wallet but Pocketing the Money
Another explanation for our main result is that recipients in the Money and BigMoney
conditions may have been more likely to return the wallet after first pocketing the money. We
decided not to collect reported wallets to minimize the inconvenience to the recipients. It is
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possible that some recipients contacted the owner to return the wallet without the money.
To examine this possibility we picked up all reported wallets in seven cities across the Czech
Republic (82 wallets) and Switzerland (90 wallets). We selected these two countries because they
differ markedly in their level of corruption and presumably also in dishonest behavior.22 If some
recipients reported the wallet after first pocketing the money, then we should observe wallets
that are returned without any money (especially in the Czech Republic where corruption is more
prevalent). However, we recovered 99% and 98% of the money from the wallets that we picked
up in Switzerland and the Czech Republic, respectively, and we observe no reliable difference
between the two countries (Z = 0.22, P = 0.823 by a rank-sum test). This suggests that
collecting emails was a valid method to measure whether people would return a wallet with all
of its contents.
C. Possible Finder’s Fee for Returning a Wallet
Another explanation for the increase in civic honesty for wallets with greater amounts
of money is that the recipients expected a larger monetary reward (i.e., “finder’s fee”) when
returning a wallet that contained relatively more money. To examine this possibility, we asked
respondents in our representative survey experiments about their beliefs regarding a finder’s fee
and find results that are inconsistent with the behavioral patterns from our field experiments.
In the representative survey experiments, we asked the participants to estimate the like-
lihood that they would receive a financial reward from the owner, and if they received such
a reward, how much money did they think they would get. We constructed a measure of ex-
pected reward by multiplying these two estimates together, and to facilitate comparability across
countries we converted amounts to US dollars using the same exchange rate as in our field ex-
periments. Overall, 42% of the participants stated that they would not expect a financial reward
at all. The median expected reward ranged between US $0.00 (Money-NoKey condition) and
$1.58 (High-Stakes condition)—cash amounts that were much lower than what the recipients
could have gained from keeping the wallet (except for the NoMoney condition). Finally, we do




Civic Honesty and Beliefs about Finder’s Fees













Institution FE yes yes
Country FE yes yes
Money = BigMoney 0.000 0.125
Money = Money-NoKey 0.008 0.000
Observations 2160 2160
Adjusted R2 0.028 0.029
F 13.320 6.619
Notes. OLS estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. In Column (1), the dependent variable is participants’
expected financial reward for reporting the wallet (in US dollars). The dependent variable in Column (2) is the likelihood
that participants would report the wallet (as a percentage). “Money,” “BigMoney,” and “Money-NoKey,” are treatment
indicators. All models include country and institution fixed effects. The bottom of the table reports P -values from t-tests
for equality of the treatment coefficients. Significance levels: ∗ P < 0.05, ∗∗ P < 0.01, ∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
not observe that the expected reward increased monotonically with the amount of money in the
wallet, as shown in Column (1) of Table A2.17. In fact, on average participants expected the
highest reward in the NoMoney condition.23 We also do not find that a higher expected reward
is associated with a higher stated likelihood of reporting the wallet, as shown in Column (2) of
Table A2.17. Moreover, controlling for a respondent’s expected reward does not meaningfully
change our observed treatment effects (see Column 2 of Table A2.11 for comparison). Overall,
the prospect of a financial reward is unlikely to explain the monotonic increase in reporting
rates.
23. One potential explanation for this seemingly counterintuitive result is that the amount of cash in the
Money condition serves as an upper bound on the amount people expect to receive as a finder’s fee. Consistent
with this interpretation, when examining conditional expectations about the reward (i.e., how much money a
respondent expects to receive, conditional upon receiving a reward for returning the wallet) we find that only 12%
of responses exceeded $13.45 in the Money condition, compared to 35% of responses in the NoMoney condition
(Z = 9.13, P < 0.001). This difference is significant when examining each country (US, UK, and Poland)
separately (Z > 4.00 in all conditions, P < 0.001). Furthermore, and also consistent with a censoring effect,
we observed greater variability in conditional expected finder fees in the NoMoney condition than in any other
condition (P < 0.001 by a variance-ratio test for every pairwise comparison between the NoMoney condition and
all other conditions).
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V. Robustness Checks
A. Individual and Situational Factors
To what extent do individual and situational factors drive cross-country differences in civic
honesty? For instance, drop-off locations may have been more crowded in some countries with
the possible consequence that recipients felt more observed and obliged to return the wallet. Or
perhaps recipients were busier when there were more customers present during the drop-off and
as a result less likely to report a wallet.
To examine the robustness of cross-country differences in civic honesty, we estimated the
residuals from a regression that accounted for recipient and situational characteristics between
locations as well as institution fixed effects. We conducted this analysis separately for the Money
and NoMoney conditions, and then aggregated the residuals by country. For ease of exposition,
we add the average reporting rate across all countries. The resulting regression-adjusted ranking
and the original country ranking were virtually the same for both the NoMoney and Money
conditions (Spearman’s ρ = 0.976 and 0.990, respectively; both P -values < 0.001). Moreover,
the range of reporting rates across countries remained large and almost identical when using
the regression-adjusted data instead of the original data (Figure A2.12). This suggests that
differences in recipient and situational characteristics between locations did not account for
large differences in civic honesty across countries.
B. Experimenter Effects
We also examined the role of our research assistants in influencing recipient decisions to
report the wallets. We used a total of 13 research assistants (all recruited from two German
speaking universities), and purposely created overlaps for some of the countries they traveled to.
We had two research assistants with overlapping presences in France, Germany, Italy, Malaysia,
Poland, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey and the UK, and seven research assistants in the US. Ta-
ble A2.18 presents an overview of the number of wallets each research assistant turned in by




Notes. Regression-adjusted share of wallets reported in the NoMoney (US $0) and Money
(US $13.45) condition by country. We regress individual decisions to report a wallet on
recipient (age and gender of the recipient) and situational control variables (presence of a
computer, number of coworkers and other bystanders) as well as institution fixed effects, and
subsequently computed residuals for treatment Money and NoMoney. Finally, we aggregated
residuals for each country and added the overall average reporting rate. The original and
the regression-adjusted ranking are highly correlated for both the NoMoney and Money
conditions (Spearman’s ρ = 0.976, P < 0.001 and ρ = 0.990, P < 0.001, respectively).
least one other research assistant performing drop-offs in the same city. These overlaps help us
to distinguish between experimenter and city fixed effects.
We first explored the influence of research assistants by introducing experimenter fixed
effects in our benchmark regression model. Tables A2.19 and A2.20 present the estimates of the
treatment effects with and without experimenter fixed effects for each country where we had an
overlap. We ran several tests to assess the influence of the research assistants. First, we found
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that the treatment effects in each country remained basically the same, regardless of whether
we control for experimenter fixed effects.24 Second, in the US we performed all 21 pairwise
comparisons of the seven experimenter fixed effects and found that none of the comparisons are
statistically significant at the 5% level (note that this is a conservative test since we do not adjust
the P -values for multiple hypothesis testing). Third, we conducted joint significance tests of the
experimenter fixed effects and found null results in all countries (F -tests in Tables A2.19 and
A2.20). Finally, we computed the change in the variance explained (measured by the adjusted
R2) when we augment our benchmark specification with experimenter fixed effects and found
virtually no change in the variance explained (as shown at the bottom of Tables A2.19 and
A2.20). Overall, we find little evidence that differences between research assistants are driving
our results.
24. We also estimated the same regression model as in Column 2 of Table A2.8 and added the experimenters’
age and gender as explanatory variables. Both coefficients failed to reach statistical significance, suggesting that
experimenter age and gender did not reliably influence reporting rates among recipients (t16924 = 1.17, P = 0.243
for age; t16924 = 1.18, P = 0.237 for gender). We also failed to find a significant interaction effect between the
gender of the experimenter and gender of the recipient (t16923 = 0.90, P = 0.368). However, these null results
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C. Differences in Email Usage
Since our measure of civic honesty relied on recipients contacting the owner by email,
one concern is that differences in exposure to email communication could be responsible for
cross-country differences in reporting rates. Yet, we focused on drop-off locations in urban
places and included institutions where email communication is common. In particular, hotel
staff should be able to communicate via email in all parts of the world. Consequently, if email
experience is a key driver of differences in reporting rates, we should see substantially less
heterogeneity when we restrict our sample to hotels. However, Figure A2.13 shows that this is
not the case. We still observe large differences in reporting rates across countries when focusing
on hotels only. As a further robustness check, we included the share of firms that use email to
interact with their customers and suppliers in a country (from the World Bank Global Enterprise
Survey) as an additional control variable to construct the regression-adjusted measure of civic
honesty.25 Figure A2.14 shows that the differences between countries remain large, and the
regression-adjusted ranking is almost identical to the unconditional ranking (Spearman’s ρ =
0.950, P < 0.001 for the NoMoney condition, and ρ = 0.932, P < 0.001 for the Money condition).
This suggests that experience with email communication was not a major driver of cross-country
differences in reporting rates.
D. Differences in Economic Development
We also assessed the extent that cross-country variation in civic honesty was robust when
controlling for differences in economic development. For this purpose, we included contempo-
rary per capita income as an additional control variable for the estimation of regression-adjusted
reporting rates. The results in Figure A2.15 demonstrate that cross-country differences remain
substantial, even when controlling for economic development. The regression-adjusted rankings
from Figure A2.15 are also positively correlated with the unconditional rankings from 2.1 (Spear-
man’s ρ = 0.705, P < 0.001 for the NoMoney condition; Spearman’s ρ = 0.753, P < 0.001 for
the Money condition).
25. The Global Enterprise Survey does not cover most Western European countries and North America, so
we limit our analysis of email usage to 27 countries.
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Figure A2.13
Country Ranking for Hotels
Notes. Share of wallets reported by hotel employees in treatments NoMoney (US $0) and
Money (US $13.45) by country. The amount of money in the wallet is adjusted to purchasing
power parity for each country. ‘AVERAGE’ shows the averages across all 40 countries.
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Figure A2.14
Regression-Adjusted Ranking: Email Usage
Notes. Regression-adjusted share of wallets reported in treatment decisions to report a
wallet on the share of firms that use email to interact with their customers and suppliers in a
country (from the World Bank Global Enterprise Survey), individual (age and gender of the
recipient) and situational control variables (presence of a computer, number of coworkers and
other bystanders) as well as institution fixed effects, and subsequently computed residuals
for treatments Money and NoMoney. Finally, we aggregated residuals for each country and
added the overall average reporting rate. The regression-adjusted ranking is almost identical
to the unconditional ranking (Spearman’s ρ = 0.950, P < 0.001 for treatment NoMoney, and
ρ = 0.932, P < 0.001 for treatment Money). Due to missing data, the estimates are based
on a sample of 27 countries.
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Figure A2.15
Regression-Adjusted Ranking: Country GDP
Notes. Regression-adjusted share of wallets reported in the NoMoney (US $0) and Money
(US $13.45) condition by country. We regress individual decisions to report a wallet on the
logarithm of a countries GDP per capita in 2010 (IMF World Economic Outlook; based on
purchasing-power-parity), in addition to recipient (age and gender of the recipient) and situ-
ational control variables (presence of a computer, number of coworkers and other bystanders)
as well as institution fixed effects. We subsequently computed residuals for treatment Money
and NoMoney. Finally, we aggregated residuals for each country and added the overall aver-
age reporting rate. The original and the GDP-adjusted ranking are significantly correlated
for both the NoMoney and Money conditions (Spearman’s ρ = 0.705, P < 0.001 and ρ =
0.753, P < 0.001, respectively).
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I. Derivation of the Registration Model
A. Properties of the Cumulative Binomial Distribution
Let B(m;n, p) denote the cumulative binomial distribution that a binary event with prob-








Lemma 1 For m < n and p ∈ (0, 1), B(m;n, p) is strictly increasing in m.
Proof. Trivial.
Lemma 2 For m < n and p ∈ (0, 1), B(m;n, p) is strictly decreasing in n.
Proof. Let B(a, b) denote the beta function and Ix(a, b) the regularized incomplete beta func-
tion.













(1− p)npm+1 < 0 
(A3.1)








































m(1− p)n−m−1 < 0 
(A3.2)
B. Deriving the Reporting Function




U(yi|xi) = Prob(receiving BF|yi) (b− c · (xi − yi)) (A3.3)
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where b > 0 is the benefit a family receives from being part of the Bolsa Família program and
c · (xi−yi) are the expected costs if it is later detected that the family underreported its income.
Claim 1 If x̄ > ȳ + b
c
= xr, families with an income xi ∈ (xr, x̄] will never report an income
yi ≤ ȳ. Thus, they will never be included in Bolsa Família.
Proof. The expected utility from reporting yi given a true income xi is Prob(receiving BF|yi)
(b− c · (xi − yi)). For xi > ȳ + bc , the expected costs of detection exceed the gains from being
included in Bolsa Família. As Prob(receiving BF|yi) > 0 for yi ≤ ȳ, a family with xi > ȳ + bc
has strictly negative expected utility from reporting an eligible income. 
For convenience, these families are assumed to report their income truthfully. However,
none of the results are affected by this assumption.
Claim 2 Suppose that families are not constraint to reporting positive incomes. Then, families
with an income of xi ≤ xr = ȳ+ bc report according to the unconstrained reporting function ŷ(xi):








B(M−1;N−1, F (α)) dα (A3.4)
where B(m;n, p) denotes the cumulative binomial distribution that a binary event with probability
p occurs at most m out of n times.
Proof. The expected utility from reporting yi given a true income xi is:



















(b− c · (xi − yi))
(A3.5)













































By integrating from xi to xr and using the boundary condition ŷ (xr) = ȳ, the optimal reporting
function is recovered:








B(M−1;N−1, F (α)) dα (A3.8)
Next it is verified that no family can increase its expected utility by deviating from the reporting
function. Consider the expected utility of a family with a true income xi that reports as if its
income were x′, and suppose all other families report according to ŷ(x):
U(ŷ(x′)|xi) = B(M−1;N−1, F (x′)) (b− c · (xi − ŷ(x′)))
= B(M−1;N−1, F (x′)) (b− c · (x′ − ŷ(x′)))




B(M−1;N−1, F (α)) dα− c ·
∫ xi
x′









B(M−1;N−1, F (α))−B(M−1;N−1, F (x′))
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dα









Because the cumulative binomial distribution function is strictly decreasing in the probability
(Lemma 3), and F (x) is strictly increasing, B(M−1;N−1, F (x′)) is decreasing in x. As a
result, the final integral is positive for both x′ < xi and x′ > xi and the expected utility is lower
than the expected utility from reporting y(xi). 
Claim 3 If ŷ(0) < 0 and b
c
< ȳ, there exists a critical value x∗ ∈ (0, b
c
] such that a family with
xi = x
∗ is indifferent between reporting ŷ(x∗) and reporting y = 0.
Proof. If all families report according to the constraint reporting function y(xi), the probability
of being included in Bolsa Família with a reported income of y = 0 depends on the number of
other families that also report y = 0. If at most M − 1 other families report y = 0, reporting
y = 0 guarantees a place in Bolsa Família. If k ≥ M other families report y = 0, a family is
included with probability M
k+1 < 1 if it reports y = 0. For x
∗ = 0, Prob(receiving BF|0) = 1.
For x∗ > 0, the probability of inclusion if a family reports y = 0 is:









F (x∗)k(1− F (x∗))N−k−1 M
k + 1
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A family with income x∗ is indifferent between reporting ŷ(x∗) and y = 0 if and only if:
B(M−1;N−1, F (x∗)) (b− c · (x∗ − ŷ(x∗)))
=
(






(b− c · x∗)
(A3.11)
For x∗ arbitrarily close to 0, the expected utility from reporting ŷ(x∗) is strictly smaller than the
expected utility from reporting y = 0, because ŷ(x∗) < 0 and the probability of receiving Bolsa
Família from reporting ŷ(x∗) is smaller than the probability from reporting y = 0. At x∗ = b
c
,
the expected utility from reporting ŷ(x∗) exceeds the expected utility from reporting y = 0:




B(M−1;N−1, F (α)) dα
≥
(






· 0 = 0
(A3.12)
By the intermediate value theorem, there exists x∗ ∈ (0, b
c
] such that a family with income x∗ is
indifferent between reporting ŷ(x∗) and reporting 0. 
C. Optimality of the Reporting Function
To show that the constrained reporting function y(x) is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, it is
shown that if all other families report according to y(x), a family with an income of xi < x∗ has
a higher expected utility from reporting 0 than from reporting any y > 0 (Claims 4 and 5), and
a family with an income of x∗ ≤ xi < xr has a higher utility from reporting according to ŷ(xi)
than from reporting any other y ≥ 0 (Claim 6).
Claim 4 Suppose all other families report according to y(x). Reporting y = 0 yields a higher
expected utility than reporting ŷ(x∗) if and only if xi < x∗.
Proof. The expected utility from reporting ŷ(x∗) is linearly decreasing in xi at a rate of
−B(M−1;N−1, F (x∗))·c, while the expected utility from reporting y = 0 is linearly decreasing
in xi at the steeper rate of −(B(M−1;N−1, F (x∗)) + MNF (x∗)(1 −B(M ;N,F (x∗)))) · c. By
definition, the expected utilities are equal at xi = x∗. Thus, for all xi < x∗, reporting y = 0
leads to a strictly higher expected utility. 
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Claim 5 Suppose all other families report according to y(x). For xi < x∗, reporting y = 0 is
better than reporting y > 0.















(c · (x∗ − xi))
≤B(M−1;N−1, F (x∗)) (b− c · (x∗ − y(x∗)))
+ B(M−1;N−1, F (x∗)) (c · (x∗ − xi))
= B(M−1;N−1, F (x∗)) (b− c · (xi − y(x∗)))
(A3.13)
The inequality holds because ŷ(x∗) is the best response for x∗ and the cumulative binomial
distribution is decreasing in the probability (Lemma 3). As shown earlier, reporting y = 0 gives
higher expected utility than reporting ŷ(x∗) for xi < x∗, thus reporting y = 0 is better than
reporting any y > 0 for xi < x∗. 
Claim 6 Suppose all other families report according to y(x). For x∗ < xi < xr, reporting ŷ(xi)
is better than reporting any other y ≥ 0.
Proof. Consider the following cases:
1. If ŷ(0) ≥ 0, the reporting function is unconstrained and the claim follows from the opti-
mality of ŷ(x).
2. If ŷ(0) < 0 and y = 0, the claim follows from Claim 4.
3. If ŷ(0) < 0 and 0 < y < ŷ(x∗), the probability of being included is the same whether
the family reports y or ŷ(x∗), but the expected utility is strictly smaller if it reports y:
B(M−1;N−1, F (x∗)) (b−c · (xi−y)) < B(M−1;N−1, F (x∗)) (b−c · (xi−y(x∗)))
4. If ŷ(0) < 0 and ŷ(x∗) ≤ y, the claim follows directly from the optimality of ŷ(x).
This concludes the proof. 
D. Implications of the Reporting Function
Claim 7 For b
c
< min(ȳ, x̄), at least some families report a strictly positive income 0 < y ≤ ȳ.
Proof. The claim follows immediately from Claim 3 because the critical value x∗ ∈ [0, b
c
].





0 B(M−1;N−1, F (x∗)) dα, y(x) is discontinuous at x∗.
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0 B(M−1;N−1, F (x∗)) dα then ŷ(0) <
0. If the reporting function was continuous at x∗ it would need to be the case that ŷ(x∗) = 0.
From Equation (A3.11) it is immediately clear that this also requires that the probabilities of
inclusion are the same in the constrained and the unconstrained model. This is only true for
x∗ = 0, contradicting the initial assumption. 
Claim 9 If the benefit b increases, more families will report y = 0.
Proof. Consider a family with income x∗. If b increases, the expected utility from reporting
y = 0 increases more than the expected utility from reporting ŷ(x∗). The family now strictly
prefers to report y = 0. As only families with an income below the critical value report y = 0
(Claim 4), the new solution to Equation (A3.11) must be higher than the initial x∗. 
Claim 10 If the expected cost c increases, fewer families will report y = 0.
Proof. Consider a family with income x∗. If c increases, the expected utility from reporting
y = 0 decreases more than the expected utility from reporting ŷ(x∗). The family now strictly
prefers to report ŷ(x∗). As only families with an income above the critical value report according
to ŷ(x) (Claim 6), the new solution to Equation (A3.11) must be lower than the initial x∗. 
Claim 11 For x̄ > xr, more families will report y ≤ ȳ if the expected benefit b increases.
Proof. The claim follows immediately from the fact that families report an income below the
eligibility threshold whenever xi < xr. 
Claim 12 For x̄ > xr, fewer families will report y ≤ ȳ if the expected cost c increases.
Proof. The claim follows immediately from the fact that families report an income below the
eligibility threshold whenever xi < xr. 
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II. Robustness
The first main result of the paper—that Bolsa Família is more effective after a municipality
has been audited at random—is robust for a large number of alternative specifications.
A. Following Children for More Than Two Years
The standard estimation follows each child for just two years to mitigate the problem of
included families dropping out of Bolsa Família or unincluded families gaining access to the
program. This might overestimate the impact of the random audits if the beneficial effect
decreases once families have been included for some time.
Table A3.1 displays the estimates of an intent-to-treat approach where families are followed
for an additional year and (potentially non-random) dropout and inclusions are ignored. As
expected, this leads to lower estimates of Bolsa Família’s effectiveness. However, the gains after
a municipality has been audited are similar, if anything, the interaction effects are slightly larger.
Table A3.1
Bolsa Família Is More Effective after a Random Audit







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BF 0.583∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗ 0.784∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗ 0.239∗
(0.045) (0.084) (0.115) (0.174) (0.060) (0.101)
Past audit -0.588∗ -0.913∗∗ -0.284
(0.245) (0.340) (0.422)
BF × Past audit 0.366∗ 0.692∗ 0.355+
(0.182) (0.332) (0.203)
Control mean 87.920 87.920 87.539 87.539 87.631 87.631
Child FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year × strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.858 0.858 0.861 0.861 0.863 0.863
N(municipalities) 5,401 5,401 5,071 5,071 4,860 4,860
N(priority strata) 12,752 12,752 8,803 8,803 6,055 6,055
N(children) 2,585,404 2,585,404 594,973 594,973 751,123 751,123
N 7,171,463 7,171,463 1,657,313 1,657,313 2,095,969 2,095,969
Years 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017
Notes. This table reports the effect of inclusion into the Bolsa Família program and random audits on children’s
school enrollment if children are followed for up to three years. The dependent variable in all models takes on
value 100 if a child is enrolled in school and 0 otherwise. “BF” indicates if a child’s family is included in the Bolsa
Família program, “Past audit” indicates that a municipality has been audited at random, and “BF × Past audit” is
the interaction of the two treatments. Columns (1) and (2) present the results for the most representative sample.
Columns (3) and (4) consider only newly registered families. Columns (5) and (6) require families to have last updated
their data in the same month. All models include individual-level child fixed effects, municipality fixed effects and
“Year × Priority strata” fixed effects. For the fixed effects, families in each priority stratum have the exact same
income, the same number of children, belong to the same vulnerability category, and have last updated their data
in the same month. Standard errors are clustered at both the family and the municipality level. Significance levels:
+P < 0.1,∗ P < 0.05,∗∗ P < 0.01,∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
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B. Non-Parametric Controls for Age and Gender
Educational participation varies by age and gender. Table A3.2 shows that the result is
robust if, in addition to the individual fixed effects, non-parametric controls for age and gender
are included and Equation (3.4) is appended as follows:
Yi,f,θ,m,t = β Bolsa Famíliaf,t + γ Past auditm,t + δ (BF × Past audit)f,m,t
+ αi + agei,t × sexi + νm + µθ,t + εi,f,θ,m,t
(A3.14)
Table A3.2
Bolsa Família Is More Effective after a Random Audit







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BF 1.090∗∗∗ 0.992∗∗∗ 1.524∗∗∗ 1.353∗∗∗ 1.120∗∗∗ 1.024∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.071) (0.119) (0.143) (0.068) (0.092)
Past audit -0.114 -0.375 0.375
(0.265) (0.366) (0.541)
BF × Past audit 0.258∗ 0.454∗ 0.251+
(0.128) (0.229) (0.148)
Control mean 87.283 87.283 86.442 86.442 86.809 86.809
Child FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age × Sex FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year × strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.928 0.928 0.934 0.934 0.934 0.934
N(municipalities) 5,401 5,401 5,068 5,068 4,858 4,858
N(priority strata) 12,559 12,559 8,641 8,641 6,008 6,008
N(children) 2,573,117 2,573,117 590,630 590,630 747,786 747,786
N 5,146,234 5,146,234 1,181,260 1,181,260 1,495,572 1,495,572
Years 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017
Notes. This table reports the effect of inclusion into the Bolsa Família program and random audits on children’s
school enrollment if non-parametric controls for age and gender are included. The dependent variable in all models
takes on value 100 if a child is enrolled in school and 0 otherwise. “BF” indicates if a child’s family is included in
the Bolsa Família program, “Past audit” indicates that a municipality has been audited at random, and “BF × Past
audit” is the interaction of the two treatments. Columns (1) and (2) present the results for the most representative
sample. Columns (3) and (4) consider only newly registered families. Columns (5) and (6) require families to have
last updated their data in the same month. All models include individual-level child fixed effects, “Age × Sex” fixed
effects, and “Year × Priority strata” fixed effects. For the fixed effects, families in each priority stratum have the exact
same income, the same number of children, belong to the same vulnerability category, and have last updated their data
in the same month. Standard errors are clustered at both the family and the municipality level. Significance levels:
+P < 0.1,∗ P < 0.05,∗∗ P < 0.01,∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
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C. Including Teenagers
Youths above the age of 15 were not originally covered by Bolsa Família. While there have
been benefits for those aged 16 and 17 during all the years of the analysis, they are subject
to different conditionalities, including lower attendance requirements (75% instead of the usual
85%). Moreover, while regular employment is only legal from age 17, apprenticeship contracts
are possible from age 15, after the end of compulsory education.
Table A3.3 shows that although the effect of Bolsa Família is somewhat smaller (Columns
1, 3, and 5), the program is still estimated to be significantly more effective after a municipality
has been audited at random in the first two samples (Columns 2 and 4), but not in the third
one (P = 0.103).
Table A3.3








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BF 0.839∗∗∗ 0.750∗∗∗ 1.325∗∗∗ 1.152∗∗∗ 0.765∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.063) (0.109) (0.133) (0.059) (0.079)
Past audit -0.095 -0.364 0.324
(0.255) (0.341) (0.540)
BF × Past audit 0.231∗ 0.458∗ 0.213
(0.113) (0.214) (0.131)
Control mean 87.214 87.214 84.884 84.884 86.519 86.519
Child FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year × strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.929 0.929 0.941 0.941 0.936 0.936
N(municipalities) 5,416 5,416 5,146 5,146 4,944 4,944
N(priority strata) 15,250 15,250 9,944 9,944 7,205 7,205
N(children) 3,058,499 3,058,499 682,427 682,427 900,544 900,544
N 6,116,998 6,116,998 1,364,854 1,364,854 1,801,088 1,801,088
Years 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017
Notes. This table reports the effect of inclusion into the Bolsa Família program and random audits on children’s
school enrollment if teenagers up to the age of 17 are included. The dependent variable in all models takes on value 100 if
a child is enrolled in school and 0 otherwise. “BF” indicates if a child’s family is included in the Bolsa Família program,
“Past audit” indicates that a municipality has been audited at random, and “BF × Past audit” is the interaction of
the two treatments. Columns (1) and (2) present the results for the most representative sample. Columns (3) and (4)
consider only newly registered families. Columns (5) and (6) require families to have last updated their data in the same
month. All models include individual-level child fixed effects and “Year × Priority strata” fixed effects. For the fixed
effects, families in each priority stratum have the exact same income, the same number of children, belong to the same
vulnerability category, and have last updated their data in the same month. Standard errors are clustered at both the
family and the municipality level. Significance levels: +P < 0.1,∗ P < 0.05,∗∗ P < 0.01,∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
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D. Only Original Random Audit Program
In 2016, the CGU was formally reconstituted as the Ministério da Transparência, Fiscaliza-
ção e Controladoria-Geral da União and the original random audit program, the Programa de
Fiscalização por Sorteios Públicos, was superseded by the Programa de Fiscalização em Entes
Federativos, that includes both random and non-random audits.
Table A3.4 shows that the results are robust to if only the 40 rounds of the Programa de
Fiscalização por Sorteios Públicos are considered, and the random third cycle of the Programa de
Fiscalização em Entes Federativos is excluded. This is unsurprising given that only one round
of random audits is excluded, affecting the classification of only 35 municipalities in 2017 in
the most representative sample, and only 34 and 32 municipalities, respectively, in the smaller
samples.
Table A3.4
Bolsa Família Is More Effective after a Random Audit







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BF 1.006∗∗∗ 0.897∗∗∗ 1.498∗∗∗ 1.304∗∗∗ 0.919∗∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.072) (0.122) (0.148) (0.067) (0.091)
Past audit -0.043 -0.343 0.468
(0.352) (0.544) (0.698)
BF × Past audit 0.287∗ 0.517∗ 0.279+
(0.131) (0.239) (0.152)
Control mean 87.283 87.283 86.441 86.441 86.810 86.810
Child FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year × strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.925 0.925 0.932 0.932 0.931 0.931
N(municipalities) 5,401 5,401 5,068 5,068 4,858 4,858
N(priority strata) 12,559 12,559 8,641 8,641 6,008 6,008
N(children) 2,573,117 2,573,117 590,630 590,630 747,786 747,786
N 5,146,234 5,146,234 1,181,260 1,181,260 1,495,572 1,495,572
Years 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017
Notes. This table reports the effect of inclusion into the Bolsa Família program and random audits on children’s
school enrollment if only audits under the original Programa de Fiscalização por Sorteios Públicos are considered. The
dependent variable in all models takes on value 100 if a child is enrolled in school and 0 otherwise. “BF” indicates if
a child’s family is included in the Bolsa Família program, “Past audit” indicates that a municipality has been audited
at random, and “BF × Past audit” is the interaction of the two treatments. Columns (1) and (2) present the results
for the most representative sample. Columns (3) and (4) consider only newly registered families. Columns (5) and
(6) require families to have last updated their data in the same month. All models include individual-level child fixed
effects, municipality fixed effects and “Year × Priority strata” fixed effects. For the fixed effects, families in each priority
stratum have the exact same income, the same number of children, belong to the same vulnerability category, and have
last updated their data in the same month. Standard errors are clustered at both the family and the municipality level.
Significance levels: +P < 0.1,∗ P < 0.05,∗∗ P < 0.01,∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
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E. Including Audits in the Same Year
Because the results of the random audits are often only published at the end of the calendar
year or even at the beginning of the next year, the Past audit indicator has been defined to take
value 1 if a municipality has been audited at random in a previous year. Moreover, if the
audits increase the effectiveness of Bolsa Família because they make it harder for families to
misrepresent their income, including audits that occurred later in the year of registration might
underestimate their effectiveness.
If municipalities are considered as having been audited in the past even if the audit takes
place in the current year, 198 municipalities are reclassified as having been audited at random
earlier than in the original sample. For the smaller samples, 182 and 172 municipalities are
affected, respectively. However, Table A3.5 shows that the results don’t change. This is also true
if only audits from the original Programa de Fiscalização por Sorteios Públicos are considered.
Table A3.5
Bolsa Família Is More Effective after a Random Audit







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BF 1.006∗∗∗ 0.900∗∗∗ 1.498∗∗∗ 1.318∗∗∗ 0.919∗∗∗ 0.807∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.073) (0.122) (0.150) (0.067) (0.092)
Past audit -0.648∗∗ -1.088∗∗ -0.469
(0.240) (0.347) (0.298)
BF × Past audit 0.275∗ 0.480∗ 0.285+
(0.130) (0.237) (0.151)
Control mean 87.277 87.277 86.426 86.426 86.795 86.795
Child FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year × strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.925 0.925 0.932 0.932 0.931 0.931
N(municipalities) 5,401 5,401 5,068 5,068 4,858 4,858
N(priority strata) 12,559 12,559 8,641 8,641 6,008 6,008
N(children) 2,573,117 2,573,117 590,630 590,630 747,786 747,786
N 5,146,234 5,146,234 1,181,260 1,181,260 1,495,572 1,495,572
Years 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017
Notes. This table reports the effect of inclusion into the Bolsa Família program and random audits on children’s
school enrollment if audits that happen in the same year are considered. The dependent variable in all models takes
on value 100 if a child is enrolled in school and 0 otherwise. “BF” indicates if a child’s family is included in the Bolsa
Família program, “Past audit” indicates that a municipality has been audited at random in a previous year or is being
audited at random in the same year, and “BF × Past audit” is the interaction of the two treatments. Columns (1)
and (2) present the results for the most representative sample. Columns (3) and (4) consider only newly registered
families. Columns (5) and (6) require families to have last updated their data in the same month. All models include
individual-level child fixed effects, municipality fixed effects and “Year × Priority strata” fixed effects. For the fixed
effects, families in each priority stratum have the exact same income, the same number of children, belong to the same
vulnerability category, and have last updated their data in the same month. Standard errors are clustered at both the
family and the municipality level. Significance levels: +P < 0.1,∗ P < 0.05,∗∗ P < 0.01,∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
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F. Updating the Cadastro Único
Once a family is included in the Cadastro Único, it is required to update its data at least
every other year. Thus, in a given year the data of some families actually reflects information
from previous years. The identification strategy addressed this challenge by constructing priority
strata so that these families would only be matched with other families who also have potentially
outdated information. Table A3.6 shows that the results are robust if families in these priority
strata are excluded.
Table A3.6
Bolsa Família Is More Effective after a Random Audit







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BF 0.605∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗∗ 0.908∗∗∗ 0.738∗∗∗ 0.588∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.062) (0.118) (0.135) (0.060) (0.077)
Past audit -0.119 -0.229 0.401
(0.293) (0.378) (0.600)
BF × Past audit 0.252∗ 0.456∗ 0.247+
(0.119) (0.208) (0.138)
Control mean 88.747 88.747 88.188 88.188 87.627 87.627
Child FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year × strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.925 0.925 0.939 0.939 0.933 0.933
N(municipalities) 5,395 5,395 5,045 5,045 4,829 4,829
N(priority strata) 7,233 7,233 5,649 5,649 4,244 4,244
N(children) 2,266,681 2,266,681 496,929 496,929 688,148 688,148
N 4,533,362 4,533,362 993,858 993,858 1,376,296 1,376,296
Years 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017
Notes. This table reports the effect of inclusion into the Bolsa Família program and random audits on children’s
school enrollment if families that didn’t update their data in the year of the matching are excluded. The dependent
variable in all models takes on value 100 if a child is enrolled in school and 0 otherwise. “BF” indicates if a child’s
family is included in the Bolsa Família program, “Past audit” indicates that a municipality has been audited at random,
and “BF × Past audit” is the interaction of the two treatments. Columns (1) and (2) present the results for the most
representative sample. Columns (3) and (4) consider only newly registered families. Columns (5) and (6) require
families to have last updated their data in the same month. All models include individual-level child fixed effects
and “Year × Priority strata” fixed effects. For the fixed effects, families in each priority stratum have the exact same
income, the same number of children, belong to the same vulnerability category, and have last updated their data
in the same month. Standard errors are clustered at both the family and the municipality level. Significance levels:
+P < 0.1,∗ P < 0.05,∗∗ P < 0.01,∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
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G. Including Only Complete Years
The data for this paper was obtained in late 2017, so the last year of the Cadastro Único
data represents the state in June 2017. As a result, families who registered towards the end
of the sample had less time to realize their gains, although the year fixed effects mitigate this
problem to some degree. Table A3.7 shows that the results are robust if data from 2017 is
excluded and only data from complete years are used to estimate the treatment effects.
Table A3.7








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BF 1.026∗∗∗ 0.915∗∗∗ 1.556∗∗∗ 1.349∗∗∗ 0.954∗∗∗ 0.847∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.076) (0.127) (0.160) (0.069) (0.095)
Past audit -0.044 -0.347 0.468
(0.352) (0.546) (0.698)
BF × Past audit 0.292∗ 0.551∗ 0.279+
(0.140) (0.280) (0.160)
Control mean 87.152 87.152 86.325 86.325 86.740 86.740
Child FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year × strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.923 0.923 0.928 0.928 0.929 0.929
N(municipalities) 5,381 5,381 5,013 5,013 4,821 4,821
N(priority strata) 11,696 11,696 8,171 8,171 5,734 5,734
N(children) 2,384,393 2,384,393 532,812 532,812 706,958 706,958
N 4,768,786 4,768,786 1,065,624 1,065,624 1,413,916 1,413,916
Years 2012-2016 2012-2016 2012-2016 2012-2016 2012-2016 2012-2016
Notes. This table reports the effect of inclusion into the Bolsa Família program and random audits on children’s
school enrollment excluding data from 2017 where the data is observed in June instead of December. The dependent
variable in all models takes on value 100 if a child is enrolled in school and 0 otherwise. “BF” indicates if a child’s
family is included in the Bolsa Família program, “Past audit” indicates that a municipality has been audited at random,
and “BF × Past audit” is the interaction of the two treatments. Columns (1) and (2) present the results for the most
representative sample. Columns (3) and (4) consider only newly registered families. Columns (5) and (6) require
families to have last updated their data in the same month. All models include individual-level child fixed effects
and “Year × Priority strata” fixed effects. For the fixed effects, families in each priority stratum have the exact same
income, the same number of children, belong to the same vulnerability category, and have last updated their data
in the same month. Standard errors are clustered at both the family and the municipality level. Significance levels:
+P < 0.1,∗ P < 0.05,∗∗ P < 0.01,∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
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H. Treatment Propensity
The left panel of Figure A3.1 makes clear that although the overlap assumption is satis-
fied, families in some priority strata have considerably higher probabilities of being included.
Two additional robustness tests suggest themselves from the graph: testing whether treatment
effects are robust when inverse probability weights are applied to correct for the higher treat-
ment propensity of some families and when the families with the lowest and highest treatment
propensity are excluded.
Figure A3.1
Overlap of Treatment Propensities
Notes. This figure displays the density functions for the treatment propensities of newly registered families in marginal
priority strata. The left panel shows the unweighted density function for Bolsa Família beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.
The right panel shows the density functions after stabilized inverse-probability weights are applied.
The right panel of Figure A3.1 shows that the use of stabilized inverse probability weights
does indeed improve the overlap. The weights take the form w1,f =
Prob(BF)
Prob(BF|θ,m) for fami-
lies that get included and w0,f =
1−Prob(BF)
1−Prob(BF|θ,m) for families that don’t get included, where
Prob(BF | θ,m) denotes the conditional probability of being included in Bolsa Família for a
family in priority stratum θ and municipality m. Table A3.8 shows that the results are robust:
the beneficial effect of Bolsa Família on school enrollment persists if stabilized inverse probabil-
ity weights are applied (Columns 1, 3, and 5) and, for the most part, continues to be stronger
after a municipality has been audited at random (Columns 2 and 4). Only in the sample where
families are also required to have registered in the same month is the interaction effect no longer
significant (P = 0.187).
Table A3.9 shows that the results are relatively robust if only marginal priority strata with
a treatment probability of more than 10% and less than 90% are included, although this reduces
the sample size considerably. The interaction remains significant in the most representative
sample (P = 0.046) and the sample of newly registered families (P = 0.047), but not in the
sample of families who registered in the same month (P = 0.143).
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Table A3.8








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BF 1.026∗∗∗ 0.922∗∗∗ 1.270∗∗∗ 1.083∗∗∗ 0.928∗∗∗ 0.851∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.067) (0.120) (0.147) (0.070) (0.094)
Past audit -0.104 -0.277 0.418
(0.292) (0.396) (0.661)
BF × Past audit 0.274∗ 0.494∗ 0.200
(0.128) (0.241) (0.151)
Control mean 87.283 87.283 86.442 86.442 86.809 86.809
Child FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year × strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.931 0.931 0.937 0.937 0.935 0.935
N(municipalities) 5,401 5,401 5,068 5,068 4,858 4,858
N(priority strata) 12,559 12,559 8,641 8,641 6,008 6,008
N(children) 2,573,117 2,573,117 590,630 590,630 747,786 747,786
N 5,146,234 5,146,234 1,181,260 1,181,260 1,495,572 1,495,572
Years 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017
Notes. This table reports the effect of inclusion into the Bolsa Família program and random audits on children’s
school enrollment if stabilized inverse probability weights are applied to correct for differences in the treatment propensity
across priority strata. The dependent variable in all models takes on value 100 if a child is enrolled in school and 0
otherwise. “BF” indicates if a child’s family is included in the Bolsa Família program, “Past audit” indicates that a
municipality has been audited at random, and “BF × Past audit” is the interaction of the two treatments. Columns
(1) and (2) present the results for the most representative sample. Columns (3) and (4) consider only newly registered
families. Columns (5) and (6) require families to have last updated their data in the same month. All models include
individual-level child fixed effects, municipality fixed effects and “Year × Priority strata” fixed effects. For the fixed
effects, families in each priority stratum have the exact same income, the same number of children, belong to the same
vulnerability category, and have last updated their data in the same month. Standard errors are clustered at both the
family and the municipality level. Significance levels: +P < 0.1,∗ P < 0.05,∗∗ P < 0.01,∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
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Table A3.9
Bolsa Família Is More Effective after a Random Audit







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BF 0.975∗∗∗ 0.876∗∗∗ 1.483∗∗∗ 1.288∗∗∗ 0.866∗∗∗ 0.781∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.072) (0.112) (0.149) (0.068) (0.092)
Past audit -0.096 -0.223 0.216
(0.291) (0.509) (0.434)
BF × Past audit 0.263∗ 0.526∗ 0.223
(0.132) (0.264) (0.152)
Control mean 87.211 87.211 86.494 86.494 86.852 86.852
Child FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year × strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.926 0.926 0.933 0.933 0.932 0.932
N(municipalities) 5,401 5,401 5,060 5,060 4,858 4,858
N(priority strata) 12,547 12,547 8,601 8,601 6,005 6,005
N(children) 2,127,141 2,127,141 470,867 470,867 691,381 691,381
N 4,254,282 4,254,282 941,734 941,734 1,382,762 1,382,762
Years 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017
Notes. This table reports the effect of inclusion into the Bolsa Família program and random audits on children’s
school enrollment if families in priority strata with less than 10% of more than 90% treatment propensity are excluded.
The dependent variable in all models takes on value 100 if a child is enrolled in school and 0 otherwise. “BF” indicates
if a child’s family is included in the Bolsa Família program, “Past audit” indicates that a municipality has been audited
at random, and “BF × Past audit” is the interaction of the two treatments. Columns (1) and (2) present the results
for the most representative sample. Columns (3) and (4) consider only newly registered families. Columns (5) and
(6) require families to have last updated their data in the same month. All models include individual-level child fixed
effects, municipality fixed effects and “Year × Priority strata” fixed effects. For the fixed effects, families in each priority
stratum have the exact same income, the same number of children, belong to the same vulnerability category, and have
last updated their data in the same month. Standard errors are clustered at both the family and the municipality level.
Significance levels: +P < 0.1,∗ P < 0.05,∗∗ P < 0.01,∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
212 APPENDIX A3
III. Details and Results of the Field Experiment
To test if local administrators are indeed less likely to register ineligible families after a
random audit, I conducted a field experiment with 6,998 Bolsa Família registration centers
(CRAS).1 Registration centers were contacted asking about the possibility of receiving Bolsa
Família, and the information provided in the message was experimentally varied to make the
sender eligible or ineligible while holding other characteristics constant.
A. Sample
The sample consisted of 6,998 registration centers that could be contacted individually using
email.2 There are a total of 8,176 CRAS centers in Brazil, distributed across 5,526 municipali-
ties.3 While the largest municipality, São Paulo, has more than 50 centers, most municipalities
(82%) have just one center. The field experiment included only municipalities that were eligible
for the random audits. This excluded 557 registration centers located in the 31 most populous
municipalities. Of the remaining 7,619 registration centers, 74 were excluded because the official
contact list does not include an email address. An additional 547 centers were excluded because
they share an email address, making it impossible to contact them individually. This left a final
sample of 6,998 registration centers.
B. Treatments
Over several weeks, three emails were sent to registration centers. The emails asked about
registering for the Bolsa Família program and provided information that makes the sender either
eligible or ineligible (see Table 3.6 of Chapter 3 for the email texts). The "Ineligible" treatment
mentioned a monthly income of R$ 450 and for a mother with one child. The resulting per capita
income (R$ 225) exceeds the eligibility threshold of R$ 170. The "Eligible I" treatment held
the gross monthly income constant but mentioned two children, leading to a per capita income
of R$ 150, which makes the household eligible. Meanwhile, the "Eligible II" treatment held the
household composition constant, but reduced the monthly income to R$ 300, again leading to a
per capita income of R$ 150.
C. Sending the Emails
I set up a private email server to send the emails and collect responses. The use of a custom
email server allowed me to ensure that none of the incoming emails are filtered or blocked and
1. The experiment was approved by the Human Subjects Committee of the Faculty of Economics, Busi-
ness Administration, and Information Technology at the University of Zurich (OEC IRB # 2019-010 ) and was
preregistered at the AEA RCT registry under the number AEARCTR-0004151.
2. Email addresses are from the official contact details the centers listed on the MDS website: https:
//aplicacoes.mds.gov.br/sagi/mops/serv-cras.php (Accessed on March 21, 2019)
3. Some municipalities do not operate their own center but rely on a neighboring municipality or mobile
state-operated services.
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Figure A3.2
Email Delivery Rates by Wave and Previous Audit
Notes. This figure displays the delivery rate of the email requests,
split by the wave of the experiment and previous audits. Error bars
indicate standard errors and are clustered at the municipality level.
that even incorrectly addressed emails would be registered, provided that the domain name was
correct. Each outgoing email was sent from a unique email address mentioning only the first
name of the sender, Maria, and a random five-digit number.
Emails were sent in three waves at the beginning of May, June, and July 2019. Within
waves, emails were sent at a random time on a workday between 9:00 and 17:00 in the centers time
zone. The order of the emails was randomized at the municipality level and block-randomized
with respect to states and whether a municipality had been audited at random. Three different
subject lines were used and block-randomly assigned with respect to the treatment, the order
of emails, states, and past audit status. Finally, the day of the week and the time of day were
block-randomly assigned with respect to all the other design parameters.
Roughly a quarter of emails could not be delivered and returned an error message from the
host. Common error messages included not being able to find the user on the host, email memory
being full, and timeout errors. This failure rate is independent of the wave of the experiment
and whether a municipality had previously been audited or not (χ2(5) = 3.248, P = 0.662; see
Figure A3.2), as well as the treatment (χ2(2) = 0.228, P = 0.892).4
4. The timing of delivery error messages is also independent of both the treatment and the audit status;
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Figure A3.3
Response Times by Treatment and Previous Audit
Notes. This figure displays the cumulative distribution function for the time elapsed between
the sending of the request and the responses from the registration centers, split by experimental
condition and previous audits. The cumulative distribution functions for delivery errors are shown
in gray.
D. Response Times
Figure A3.3 displays the cumulative distribution function of the response times. The re-
sponse times to delivered emails are independent of the treatment and whether a municipality
has preciously been audited or not; a Kruskal-Wallis rank test does not reject the hypothesis
that the response times are drawn from the same distribution (χ2(5) = 1.504, P = 0.913).5 I
pre-registered that I would use a Heckman selection model to analyze whether the treatments or
the interactions of the treatments and the random audits significantly affect the response times.
Unsurprisingly, given the Kruskal-Wallis test, they do not.
E. Analysis of Email Content
Even if the response rates in different experimental conditions were the same, employees of
registration centers might still discern between eligible and ineligible families when they compose
a Kruskal-Wallis rank test does not reject the hypothesis that the response times are drawn from the same
distribution (χ2(5) = 8.148, P = 0.148), suggesting that these are indeed the same automatic server responses.
5. Delivery error messages arrive significantly faster than responses to delivered emails (χ2(1) = 3675.972,
P = 0.000).



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































their reply. Thus, in addition to testing for differences in the response rate, each response was
also coded to analyze the content of the message.
Table A3.10 test for differences in the content of the emails, using a two-step Heckman
selection model to control for the different response rates in the experimental conditions and in
previously audited municipalities. As shown in Column (1), responses in the Ineligible treat-
ment were 6.74 percentage points more likely to contain an incorrect assessment of the family’s
eligibility, i.e., to state that the family qualifies for Bolsa Família (P = 0.024). However, this
effect is driven exclusively by unaudited municipalities, and it is fully offset by the negative 7.41
percentage point interaction term (P = 0.027). Column (2) shows that there is no correspond-
ing effect for correct eligibility assessments. Messages also don’t significantly differ in how much
practical information they include; they are equally likely to provide directions to the CRAS,
to mention opening hours, or to list the documents required for registration. Registration cen-
ters in previously audited municipalities are 7.21 percentage points more likely to request that
ineligible families call them (P = 0.074). While this might open a back channel for colluding
with ineligible families, we would expect a negative interaction in this case, as rates of income
underreporting are higher in unaudited municipalities. There is also no difference in whether the
messages explain Bolsa Família’s eligibility criteria or whether they ask the sender to confirm
that she lives in the service area of the CRAS. Finally, emails were also screened for direct offers
of collusion and for less overt signals of corruption, such as suggesting that the rules are flexible.
However, none of the messages contained such a smoking gun.
F. Low Response Rate
The response rate was below 20% for all treatments in all waves of the experiment. There are
several possible explanations for this unexpectedly low response rate with different implications:
CRAS centers could not have received the emails, they could not be used to correspond via
email, or they might have been suspicious.
The relatively high number of emails that returned an error message casts doubt on the
reliability of the centers’ IT systems and it is conceivable that there are additional emails that
did not reach the centers. In the absence of an error message, it is unfortunately not possible
to know whether this is the case. However, given that audited and unaudited municipalities
were equally likely to return an error message and had similar response rates in the control
treatments, it is unlikely that these additional undelivered emails (should they exist) bias the
result about the treatment differences.
Not all CRAS centers list an email address as part of their contact details and it is possible
that even some that do check their email only infrequently. Especially in rural areas, potential
Bolsa Família recipients are arguably more likely to visit the center or to call rather than sending
an email.6 This factor is very likely to have depressed the response rate. Of the email addresses
6. The use of email was guided in equal parts by financial and practical considerations: telephone numbers
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listed, quite a few appear to be private email addresses of employees (some Gmail or Hotmail
address) and a small number of responses mentioned that the request had been forwarded to the
CRAS by an employee who no longer worked there. Apart from the shift in levels, unfamiliarity
with email per se is again unlikely to bias the results, for the same reason outlined above.
The most serious concern is that the low response rate is indicative of suspicion. Several
aspects of the design might have contributed to it: the emails stated the sender’s approximate
income, they provided relatively little other information and no full name, and the email ad-
dresses included only the first name. Mentioning the income was unavoidable to make sure that
the sender is objectively eligible or ineligible7 and providing as little demographic information
as possible was an ethical necessity to avoid confusion with real families that register during
the time of the study.8 It is possible that CRAS employees were more suspicious of emails in
the Ineligible treatment and even more so in audited municipalities. If this is the case, it might
explain the observed differences in the response rates. Note that it is entirely consistent with
the income underreporting mechanism if having previously been audited makes CRAS employees
more careful not to register ineligible families because they suspect some audit or test.
G. Robustness
The results of the field experiment are robust for different specifications of the regression,
if undelivered emails are coded as non-responses, if only the first wave of emails is considered,
and if the two control treatments—Eligible I and Eligible II—are treated separately.
Table A3.11 shows that treating delivery errors as non-responses does not affect the results.
As in Table 3.7 of Chapter 3, Column (1) shows the results if state fixed effects are included
to account for the stratification of the audit lottery, Columns (2) and (3) show the results if
only within CRAS center variance is exploited, and Columns (4) and (5) if the control variables
from Avis et al. (2018) are used. Columns (3) and (5) again add fixed effects for the different
subject lines, the order, and the timing of the emails. Although the coefficients are somewhat
smaller when undelivered emails are included, they remain statistically significant, as is the case
for the interaction terms (P = 0.001 for the coefficients and P ≤ 0.020 for the interactions in
all specifications).
in Brazil are geographically coded and might have revealed that the caller does not reside in the municipality.
7. Other approaches such as mentioning an occupation would have required CRAS employees to guess whether
the household may or may not be eligible and would have depended on local factors such as the median wage.
8. The household composition—a single mother with one or two children—is very common among registrants,
there is no information on the children’s names, age or gender, and Maria is by far the most common female
name in Brazil. Almost 15% of women in the Cadastro Único list Maria as one of their first names. Even if an




Response Rate to Requests from Eligible and Ineligible
Families
(Including Undelivered Emails)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ineligible -1.284∗∗ -1.284∗∗ -1.304∗∗ -1.284∗∗ -1.349∗∗
(0.450) (0.450) (0.452) (0.450) (0.450)
Past audit 0.392 0.168 0.171
(0.785) (0.747) (0.745)
Ineligible × Past audit -1.752∗ -1.752∗ -1.670∗ -1.752∗ -1.684∗
(0.709) (0.709) (0.709) (0.709) (0.714)
Population (Log.) 2.554∗∗∗ 2.576∗∗∗
(0.401) (0.401)
Income inequality (Gini) -8.170+ -8.179+
(4.941) (4.965)




Urban population -0.647 -0.574
(1.794) (1.800)
Control mean 10.864 10.864 10.864 10.864 10.864
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Center FE No Yes Yes No No
Order FE No No Yes No Yes
Subject line FE No No Yes No Yes
Day FE No No Yes No Yes
Time FE No No Yes No Yes
R2 0.037 0.600 0.606 0.058 0.067
N 20994 20994 20994 20994 20994
Notes. This table reports the difference in response rates to requests from eligible and
ineligible families in the field experiment if undelivered emails are coded as non-responses.
The dependent variable is an indicator that takes value 100 if the registration center replied
to a request and 0 otherwise. “Ineligible” indicates that the details in the request made
a family ineligible for Bolsa Família, “Past audit” indicates that a municipality has been
audited at random, and “Ineligible × Past audit” is the interaction of the two treatments.
“Population (Log.)”, “Income inequality (Gini)”, “Income per capita (Log.)”, and the rates of
“Illiteracy” and “Urban population” control for municipality characteristics in 2000, before
the inception of the audits program. Columns (2) and (3) include registration center fixed
effects. Columns (3) and (5) include fixed effects for the order of emails, the different subject
lines, the day of the week and the exact time of day the email was sent. All models include
state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Significance levels:
+P < 0.1,∗ P < 0.05,∗∗ P < 0.01,∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
As each center receives three similar emails, the response to emails in later waves might be
affected by the emails in earlier waves: the email might look familiar to social workers or be more
likely to end up in a spam filter.9 To address these concerns, I pre-registered a robustness check
to show that the effect persists if only the first wave of emails is used. Table A3.12 shows that
9. The response messages were screened for signs of suspicion. Overall, fewer than 1% of the responses showed
any sign of suspicion. However, this rate increases with each round from 0.27% in the first round to 1.52% in the
final round.
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Table A3.12




Ineligible -2.174+ -1.904 -1.802
(1.245) (1.232) (1.247)
Past audit 1.651 1.536 1.386
(1.402) (1.342) (1.371)
Ineligible × Past audit -4.422∗ -4.692∗ -4.743∗
(1.902) (1.890) (1.947)
Population (Log.) 2.868∗∗∗ 2.954∗∗∗
(0.608) (0.612)
Income inequality (Gini) -11.944 -13.252
(8.903) (8.987)




Urban population 1.060 1.183
(3.047) (3.093)
Control mean 15.064 15.064 15.064
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Subject line FE No No Yes
Day FE No No Yes
Time FE No No Yes
R2 0.043 0.066 0.098
N 5276 5276 5276
Notes. This table reports the difference in response rates to
requests from eligible and ineligible families in the first round of
the field experiment. The dependent variable is an indicator that
takes value 100 if the registration center replied to a request and
0 otherwise. “Ineligible” indicates that the details in the request
made a family ineligible for Bolsa Família, “Past audit” indicates
that a municipality has been audited at random, and “Ineligible ×
Past audit” is the interaction of the two treatments. “Population
(Log.)”, “Income inequality (Gini)”, “Income per capita (Log.)”, and
the rates of “Illiteracy” and “Urban population” control for munic-
ipality characteristics in 2000, before the inception of the audits
program. Column (3) includes fixed effects for the order of emails,
the different subject lines, the day of the week and the exact time
of day the email was sent. All models include state fixed effects.
Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Significance levels:
+P < 0.1,∗ P < 0.05,∗∗ P < 0.01,∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
the effect persists. Column (1) shows the model if only state fixed effects are included. Column
(2) adds the control variables from Avis et al. (2018). Column (3) further add fixed effects for the
different subject lines and the timing of the emails. In all three specifications, emails from the
Ineligible treatment were approximately two percentage points less likely to receive a response
in unaudited municipalities, and 6.5 percentage points less likely to receive a response in audited
municipalities. The treatment effects are significantly bigger in municipalities that have been
audited at random (P < 0.020 in all specifications).
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Table A3.13
Response Rate to Requests from Eligible and Ineligible
Families
(Separate Control Treatments)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Eligible II 0.042 -0.060 -0.234 0.051 -0.091
(0.645) (0.648) (0.651) (0.645) (0.649)
Ineligible -1.687∗ -1.556∗ -1.617∗ -1.646∗ -1.732∗∗
(0.672) (0.682) (0.686) (0.671) (0.672)
Past audit 0.513 0.307 0.363
(1.180) (1.111) (1.112)
Eligible II × Past audit -0.118 -0.029 -0.095 -0.113 -0.064
(1.126) (1.127) (1.123) (1.124) (1.126)
Ineligible × Past audit -2.455∗ -2.717∗ -2.740∗ -2.492∗ -2.545∗
(1.094) (1.105) (1.107) (1.093) (1.103)
Population (Log.) 3.510∗∗∗ 3.509∗∗∗
(0.488) (0.489)
Income inequality (Gini) -11.855+ -12.169∗
(6.140) (6.168)




Urban population -0.707 -0.533
(2.235) (2.244)
Eligible II - Ineligible 0.010 0.027 0.043 0.012 0.016
Diff. Interactions 0.031 0.013 0.015 0.028 0.023
Control mean 14.277 14.345 14.345 14.277 14.277
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Center FE No Yes Yes No No
Order FE No No Yes No Yes
Subject line FE No No Yes No Yes
Day FE No No Yes No Yes
Time FE No No Yes No Yes
R2 0.039 0.599 0.606 0.068 0.078
N 15891 15736 15736 15891 15891
Notes. This table reports the difference in response rates to requests from eligible
and ineligible families in the field experiment if the two control conditions are treated
separately. The dependent variable is an indicator that takes value 100 if the registration
center replied to a request and 0 otherwise. “Eligible II” indicates that the request is part
of the Eligible II condition, “Ineligible” indicates that the details in the request made a
family ineligible for Bolsa Família, “Past audit” indicates that a municipality has been
audited at random, and “Eligible II × Past audit” and “Ineligible × Past audit” are the
interactions of the two conditions with the random audits. “Population (Log.)”, “Income
inequality (Gini)”, “Income per capita (Log.)”, and the rates of “Illiteracy” and “Urban
population” control for municipality characteristics in 2000, before the inception of the
audits program. Columns (2) and (3) include registration center fixed effects. Columns
(3) and (5) include fixed effects for the order of emails, the different subject lines, the
day of the week and the exact time of day the email was sent. All models include state
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Significance levels:
+P < 0.1,∗ P < 0.05,∗∗ P < 0.01,∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
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Finally, while both control treatments imply the same per capita income and qualify the
household to receive Bolsa Família, they could nevertheless be perceived differently by admin-
istrators at the CRAS. I thus test whether the results persist if the Eligible I and Eligible II
treatments are included separately in the regression. Table A3.13 shows that this is indeed the
case. While there is no significant difference between either the two control treatments or their
interactions with previous audits (p > 0.700 for all comparisons), the coefficients for the Ineligi-
ble treatment and its interaction are quantitatively similar to the values in Table 3.7 of Chapter
3 where they are compared to both control treatments simultaneously. Both the coefficients and
the interaction terms differ significantly from those of the Eligible I treatment (P < 0.020 for
all comparisons) and the Eligible II treatment (P < 0.040 for all comparisons).
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IV. Details and Results of the Social Norms Experiment
To test whether changes in local norms can explain the lower rates of income underreporting
after a random audit, I elicited relevant social norms in an incentivized online experiment with
675 participants living in 424 municipalities, some of which had been randomly selected for
audits in the past.10 However, there is no evidence that social norms change as a result of a
random audit.
A. Recruitment and Sample
Participants were recruited through Facebook to achieve maximum geographic coverage
and, at the same time, relatively precise targeting. The target audience was restricted to resemble
the typical Bolsa Família beneficiary—women aged 18 to 50, who have an interest in Bolsa
Família and are accessing Facebook on their mobile device. The 31 municipalities that are too
populous for the random audits were excluded. The recruitment advert (Figure A3.4) only
mentioned the possibility of winning mobile phone credit and made no mention of Brazil’s audit
program.
Figure A3.4
Facebook Recruitment Advert (English Translation)
Notes. This figure displays the English translation of the advert
used to recruit participants on Facebook.
While Facebook allows advertisers to target relatively homogenous audiences, it does not
guarantee that participation is evenly distributed across municipalities. Nor is it guaranteed
10. The experiment was approved by the Human Subjects Committee of the Faculty of Economics, Business
Administration, and Information Technology at the University of Zurich (OEC IRB # 2019-008 ).
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Table A3.14
Balancedness of Individual Characteristics in Online Sample
No past audit Past audit LHS-test
(1) (2) (3)
Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation Coeff.
Population (Log.) 10.464 1.239 10.531 1.231 -0.011
Urban population 0.770 0.212 0.745 0.197 -0.001
Income inequality (Gini) 0.545 0.055 0.561 0.050 0.009+
Income per capita (Log.) 5.998 0.512 5.874 0.513 0.015
Illiteracy 16.801 11.191 20.017 12.089 0.124
F-test: χ2(5) 3.344
F-test: P-value 0.647
Observations 271 153 424
Age 30.727 7.891 30.796 7.796 0.176
Education (7-point scale) 3.064 1.355 2.941 1.398 -0.195
Household size 3.778 1.683 3.452 1.441 -0.328∗
In Cadastro Único 0.800 0.401 0.860 0.348 0.058
Ever a beneficiary 0.833 0.374 0.887 0.317 0.055
F-test: χ2(5) 11.604
F-test: P-value 0.041
Observations 454 221 675
Notes. This table reports on the balancedness of municipal (top panel) and individual (bottom panel)
characteristics in the online sample. Columns (1) and (2) present the summary statistics for municipalities
that have not previously been subject to a random audit and for those that have been, respectively.
Column (3) uses a left-hand-side test (Pei et al., 2019) to check whether these characteristics are predictive
of whether a municipality has been audited in regressions of the form Xi,m,s = α + βPast Auditm,s +
νs + εi,m,s. The F-test tests whether these coefficients are jointly different from zero. Significance levels:
+P < 0.1,∗ P < 0.05,∗∗ P < 0.01,∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
that participants from municipalities that have previously been audited at random are similar
to those from unaudited municipalities along dimensions that cannot directly be targeted.
The top panel of Table A3.14 shows that audited and unaudited municipalities in the online
sample do not differ significantly with regard to the socioeconomic factors used elsewhere in this
paper. Columns (1) and (2) show that these characteristics are relatively well-balanced between
municipalities that have not previously been subject to a random audit and those that have been.
As a more stringent test of balancedness (Pei et al., 2019), Column (3) reports the coefficient
when the variable of interest is regressed on the audit indicator and state fixed effects, and tests
whether these coefficients are jointly significant from zero. A significant test statistic suggests
that these variables together can predict which municipalities in the online sample have been
audited. This is not the case (χ2(5) = 3.344, P = 0.647).
Turning to individual characteristics, the bottom panel shows that there are some dif-
ferences between respondents from audited and unaudited municipalities. The households of
participants from audited municipalities are significantly smaller (−0.328, P = 0.032), and the
LHS-test cannot reject the hypothesis that there are some differences in participant character-




While society at large condemns welfare fraud, some parts of the population may nonethe-
less consider it an acceptable practice. However, as welfare fraud is illegal, few participants
would admit to supporting it if asked directly. This non-negligible social desirability problem
is mitigated using the method developed by Krupka and Weber (2013): Instead of asking par-
ticipants for their opinion, they are incentivized to try and give the same response as another
randomly matched participant. This transforms the question into a coordination game in which
the social norm serves as a focal point.
I presented participants with three short vignettes (see Table 3.8 in Chapter 3): First, a
family that underreports its income to qualify for the program. Second, a local administrator who
suspects that the family underreports their income but turns a blind eye. Finally, a neighbor
who places an anonymous call with the local registration office that leads to an audit of the
family. Participants are then asked to rate the behavior in the scenario, given four choices: very
wrong, somewhat wrong, somewhat right, very right. In each case, participants are asked to try
to give the same answer as another participant: "Please indicate how right or wrong [...]’s action
is. Both you and the other participant should try to mark the same response."11
Participants were informed that one of the three vignettes will be randomly selected for
payment at the end of the experiment and that they receive R$ 10 in mobile phone credits if the
answers match. Given the strong focal point for each of the vignettes, a participant who always
gave the most common response had an expected payout of R$ 7.00. The average participant
received just over R$ 6.06. On top of this, participants had the chance to win an additional R$ 10
in a Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) honesty task (see below). The median participant took
7 minutes and 15 seconds to complete the experiment, leading to a fairly generous reimbursement
on a per hour basis, despite the absence of a participation fee.
In addition to the vignettes, participants were asked to indicate how prevalent behavior
similar to the scenarios is in their municipality. Finally, participants also provided basic demo-
graphic information.
C. Social Norms
Table A3.15 displays the results of an ordered logistic regression to test whether partici-
pants from municipalities that were randomly audited in the past are more likely to reply that
the behavior described in the vignettes is wrong. Columns (1), (2), and (3) report the norm
on income underreporting, Columns (4), (5), and (6) on helping families to underreport their
11. Anecdotal evidence from participants’ interactions with the Facebook advert suggests that participants
understand the incentives and find them hilarious:
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Table A3.15
Social Norms Don’t Change after a Random Audit
(Ordered Logistic Regression)
Income underreporting Turning a blind eye Blowing the whistle
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Past audit -0.078 -0.124 -0.125 0.074 0.083 0.055 -0.113 -0.132 -0.067
(0.235) (0.240) (0.246) (0.247) (0.249) (0.255) (0.213) (0.216) (0.218)
Age 0.030∗ 0.030∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.044∗∗ -0.005 -0.006
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012)
Education (7-point scale) 0.032 0.040 0.166+ 0.173+ 0.027 0.016
(0.082) (0.084) (0.087) (0.090) (0.078) (0.080)
Household size -0.080 -0.082 0.028 0.025 -0.072 -0.066
(0.066) (0.067) (0.063) (0.064) (0.061) (0.063)
In Cadastro Único 0.214 0.224 -0.117 -0.107 0.133 0.108
(0.396) (0.397) (0.442) (0.448) (0.300) (0.301)
Ever a beneficiary -0.111 -0.077 0.059 0.088 -0.051 -0.092
(0.436) (0.441) (0.452) (0.455) (0.351) (0.357)
Population (Log.) -0.065 -0.096 0.129
(0.115) (0.117) (0.115)
Income inequality (Gini) -2.361 1.165 3.147
(2.977) (3.523) (2.275)
Income per capita (Log.) 0.710 0.137 -1.237+
(0.743) (0.830) (0.683)
Illiteracy 0.009 -0.012 0.003
(0.030) (0.038) (0.026)
Urban population 0.067 0.190 0.678
(0.845) (0.913) (0.866)
Control mean 3.544 3.544 3.544 3.540 3.540 3.540 1.526 1.526 1.526
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N(municipalities) 424 424 424 424 424 424 424 424 424
N 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675
Notes. This table reports the difference in elicited social norms in the online experiment. Columns (1), (2), and (3) report the norm on
income underreporting, Columns (4), (5), and (6) on helping families to underreport their income, and Columns (7), (8), and (9) on blowing the
whistle on families who underreport. The dependent variable is an ordinal scale whether the behavior described in the vignette is: very wrong,
somewhat wrong, somewhat right, very right. “Past audit” indicates that a municipality has been audited at random. “Age”, “Education (7-point
scale)”, “Household size”, “In Cadastro Único”, and “Ever a beneficiary” control for individual-level characteristics. “Population (Log.)”, “Income
inequality (Gini)”, “Income per capita (Log.)”, and the rates of “Illiteracy” and “Urban population” control for municipality characteristics in
2000, before the inception of the audits program. All models include state fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the municipality
level. Significance levels: +P < 0.1,∗ P < 0.05,∗∗ P < 0.01,∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
income, and Columns (7), (8), and (9) on denouncing families who underreport. For each vi-
gnette, the first specification includes only the audit indicator and state fixed effects to account
for the stratification of the audit lottery. The second specification includes participant charac-
teristics and the third both participant and municipality level controls. The coefficient of the
audit indicator does not reach statistical significance in any of the models (P > 0.500 for all
specifications).12
12. The result is not specific to the ordered logistic model. The same is true in a linear model where the
responses are coded from (1) very right to (4) very wrong.
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Table A3.16
Beliefs Don’t Change after a Random Audit
(Ordered Logistic Regression)
Income underreporting Turning a blind eye Blowing the whistle
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Past audit -0.034 -0.041 -0.106 -0.197 -0.201 -0.184 -0.086 -0.123 -0.121
(0.184) (0.183) (0.187) (0.181) (0.182) (0.176) (0.187) (0.192) (0.189)
Age 0.007 0.005 -0.008 -0.008 -0.005 -0.003
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Education (7-point scale) 0.085 0.068 0.026 0.017 -0.099 -0.093
(0.054) (0.056) (0.056) (0.058) (0.061) (0.062)
Household size -0.039 -0.043 0.031 0.042 -0.063 -0.059
(0.052) (0.052) (0.049) (0.048) (0.053) (0.053)
In Cadastro Único 0.155 0.106 -0.114 -0.140 -0.251 -0.240
(0.246) (0.254) (0.248) (0.262) (0.273) (0.272)
Ever a beneficiary 0.078 0.071 0.520+ 0.478+ 0.222 0.191
(0.271) (0.274) (0.278) (0.283) (0.320) (0.321)
Population (Log.) 0.223∗ 0.182+ -0.037
(0.087) (0.098) (0.096)
Income inequality (Gini) -0.549 -3.630+ -2.172
(2.010) (2.177) (2.282)
Income per capita (Log.) 0.271 -0.447 0.073
(0.524) (0.582) (0.570)
Illiteracy -0.010 -0.008 -0.005
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
Urban population -1.960∗ -0.856 -0.611
(0.776) (0.760) (0.723)
Control mean 2.976 2.976 2.976 2.159 2.159 2.159 2.075 2.075 2.075
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N(municipalities) 424 424 424 424 424 424 424 424 424
N 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675 675
Notes. This table reports the difference in beliefs in audited and unaudited municipalities. Columns (1), (2), and (3) report the beliefs
about the frequency of income underreporting, Columns (4), (5), and (6) of helping families to underreport their income, and Columns (7),
(8), and (9) of blowing the whistle on families who underreport. The dependent variable is an ordinal scale whether the behavior described
in the vignette is: very rarely, rarely, often, very often. “Past audit” indicates that a municipality has been audited at random. “Age”,
“Education (7-point scale)”, “Household size”, “In Cadastro Único”, and “Ever a beneficiary” control for individual-level characteristics.
“Population (Log.)”, “Income inequality (Gini)”, “Income per capita (Log.)”, and the rates of “Illiteracy” and “Urban population” control for
municipality characteristics in 2000, before the inception of the audits program. All models include state fixed effects. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the municipality level. Significance levels: +P < 0.1,∗ P < 0.05,∗∗ P < 0.01,∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
D. Beliefs
Even if the random audits do not change participants’ moral assessment of income un-
derreporting, they might change the perceived frequency of these behaviors. To address this,
the online experiment asked participants how commonly actions similar to that in the scenarios
occur in their municipality. Table A3.16 displays the results of an ordered logistic regression,
this time with the perceived frequency on an ordinal scale: very rarely, rarely, often, very often.
Again, the coefficient of the audit indicator is not statistically significant in any of the models
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(P > 0.250 for all specifications).13
E. Rule-Following
To test whether the random audits affect general rule-following, I used a version of the
honesty game developed by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013). In the task, a participant
flips a coin in private and reports the outcome to the experimenter. Without any verification,
the participant is then paid when she reports heads as the outcome. Since it is impossible to
know whether any particular participant reports the true outcome—or, indeed, whether she
even flipped a coin—, each participant has an incentive to maximize the payoff by just reporting
heads. On aggregate, however, it is easy to determine the share of participants that misreport
the outcome of the coin flip because roughly half of the reported coins should come up tails.14
Participants flipped a R$1 coin ten times and reported the outcome of each round. One
coin flip was selected at random at the end of the experiment, and participants won an additional
R$ 10 if they had reported that it came up heads.15 Thus, if the random audits change norms
about rule-following behavior in general, we would expect participants in previously audited
municipalities to report fewer instances of heads.
Figure A3.5
Distribution of Reported Winning Coin Flips in the Honesty Game
Notes. This figure displays the reported number of winning coin flips in the Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi
(2013) honesty game. The red outlines indicate the expected distribution of winning coin flips if participants
play honestly. Error bars indicate standard errors and are clustered at the municipality level.
13. The same is true in a linear model where the responses are coded from (1) very rarely to (4) very often.
14. Versions of this task have been successfully used to study honesty in the banking sector (Cohn et al., 2014),
to investigate the development of honesty in children (Bucciol and Piovesan, 2011), to demonstrate the effect of
experienced unfairness on behavior (Houser et al., 2012), and to predict rule violations in a maximum-security
prison (Cohn et al., 2015).
15. This payment scheme was necessary because some mobile phone operators required a minimum of R$ 10
for credit top-up.
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Figure A3.5 shows that this is not the case. While participants from audited municipalities
are slightly less likely to report zero (−1.35 percentage points, P = 0.090) and somewhat more
likely to report six successful coin flips (+5.67 percentage points, P = 0.048), none of the
differences is significant if we correct for multiple hypothesis testing (Benjamini and Hochberg,
1995). In particular, residents in audited municipalities are not significantly less likely to report
all coin flips as successful, even without correcting for multiple hypothesis testing (P = 0.184).
Overall, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the distribution of supposedly winning coin flips
is the same for participants from audited and unaudited municipalities (χ2(10) = 10.8348,
P = 0.371, χ2-test; Z = 0.675, P = 0.500, rank-sum test).
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V. Additional Figures
Figure A3.6
Cadastro Único Registration Rate
Notes. This figure displays the average Cadastro Único registration rate across time. The index of municipal management
quality (IGD-M) defines the registration rate as the number of registered families divided by the number of eligible families
in the municipality, estimated based on the last census. The indicator was dropped from the IGD-M in July 2015.
Figure A3.7
Geographic Coverage of Marginal Priority Strata
Notes. This figure displays the geographic coverage of marginal priority strata in the most representative sample (left),
the sample of newly registered families (middle), and the sample of families that registered in the same month (right).
Gray municipalities are not included because they are not eligible for the random audits.
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Figure A3.8
Distribution of Bolsa Família’s Effectiveness in Different Municipalities
Notes. This figure displays the distribution of estimated treatment effects for different
municipalities in the most representative sample (top), the sample of newly registered families
(middle), and the sample of families that registered in the same month (bottom). Each dot
represents the effect size and p-value for a municipality and is estimated based on at least 50
children. The density is weighted by the number of observations in each group. The dashed
vertical gray line represents significance at the 5% level.
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Figure A3.9
Distribution of Random Audits
Notes. This figure displays the geographic distribution of the random audits in each year under the Programa
de Fiscalização em Entes Federativos (2003-2015) and the random third cycle of its successor, the Programa
de Fiscalização em Entes Federativos (2016).
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Figure A3.10
Distribution of the “Past Audit” Indicator
Notes. This figure displays the geographic distribution of the Past audit indicator for each year. The
indicator takes value 1 if a municipality has been audited at random in a previous year and 0 otherwise.
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Figure A3.11
Financial Loss Uncovered by the Random Audits
Notes. This figure displays the considerable overlap between the financial losses judged as falha média or falha grave.
Figure A3.12
Rates of Illegitimate Payments for Citizens and Public Servants
Notes. This figure displays the distribution of the rate of illegitimate payments in municipalities uncovered by the random
audits. The rate for citizens is estimated based on families that were randomly sampled (N = 30). The rate for public
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Figure A3.15
CRAS Infrastructure Doesn’t Change after a Random Audit
Notes. This figure displays the change in the available infrastructure at Bolsa Família registration centers after
a municipality has been audited at random. The white diamonds show the estimated treatment effect from 37
regressions where infrastructure variables in the Censo SUAS are regressed on the “Past audit” indicator, registration
center and year fixed effects. Colors indicate false coverage rate adjusted 90%, 95%, 99%, and 99.9% confidence
intervals (Benjamini and Yekutieli, 2005).
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Figure A3.16
Complementary Actions Don’t Change after a Random Audit
Notes. This figure displays the change in activities and programs aimed at vulnerable families through the Serviço
de Proteção e Atendimento Integral à Família (PAIF) after a municipality has been audited at random. The white
diamonds show the estimated treatment effect from 23 regressions where variables related to complementary programs
in the Censo SUAS are regressed on the “Past audit” indicator, registration center and year fixed effects. Colors
indicate false coverage rate adjusted 90%, 95%, 99%, and 99.9% confidence intervals (Benjamini and Yekutieli, 2005).
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Figure A3.17
Governance of Social Programs Doesn’t Change after a Random Audit
Notes. This figure displays the change in the governance of social programs after a municipality has been audited
at random. The white diamonds show the estimated treatment effect from 53 regressions where variables related to
municipalities’ Councils for Social Assistance (CMAS) in the Censo SUAS are regressed on a “Past audit” indicator,
municipality and year fixed effects. Colors indicate false coverage rate adjusted 90%, 95%, 99%, and 99.9% confidence




Bolsa Família Increases School Enrollment








BF 4.432∗∗∗ 3.104∗∗∗ 5.163∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.145) (0.125)
Control mean 87.283 86.442 86.809
Child FE No No No
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Year × strata FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.075 0.107 0.082
N(municipalities) 5,401 5,068 4,858
N(priority strata) 12,559 8,641 6,008
N(children) 2,573,117 590,630 747,786
N 5,146,234 1,181,260 1,495,572
Years 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017
Notes. This table reports the effect of inclusion into the Bolsa Família program and random audits on
children’s school enrollment in a model without child fixed effects. The dependent variable in all models
takes on value 100 if a child is enrolled in school and 0 otherwise. “BF” indicates if a child’s family is included
in the Bolsa Família program, “Past audit” indicates that a municipality has been audited at random, and
“BF × Past audit” is the interaction of the two treatments. Columns (1) and (2) present the results for the
most representative sample. Columns (3) and (4) consider only newly registered families. Columns (5) and
(6) require families to have last updated their data in the same month. All models include municipality
and “Year × Priority strata” fixed effects, but no individual-level child fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at both the family and the municipality level. Significance levels: +P < 0.1,∗ P < 0.05,∗∗ P <
0.01,∗∗∗ P < 0.001.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Home CRAS Home CRAS Home CRAS
BF 0.679∗∗∗ 0.900∗∗∗ 0.065 1.389∗∗∗ 0.834∗∗∗ 0.816∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.072) (0.342) (0.154) (0.192) (0.092)
Past audit 2.482+ -0.315+ 3.555+ -0.482+ 5.348∗∗∗ -0.237
(1.488) (0.178) (1.937) (0.292) (1.118) (0.322)
BF × Past audit -0.078 0.302∗ 0.278 0.518∗ -0.118 0.283+
(0.275) (0.135) (0.421) (0.248) (0.367) (0.153)
Control mean 88.213 87.163 86.727 86.388 86.877 86.748
Child FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year × strata FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.936 0.927 0.952 0.933 0.946 0.933
N(municipalities) 3,601 5,382 2,194 4,979 2,284 4,802
N(priority strata) 5,157 12,350 3,066 8,376 1,967 5,881
N(children) 174,384 2,350,705 48,316 531,521 49,350 684,731
N 348,768 4,701,410 96,632 1,063,042 98,700 1,369,462
Years 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017 2012-2017
Notes. This table reports the effect of inclusion into the Bolsa Família program and random audits on children’s
school enrollment separately for families that registered during a home visit (Columns 1, 3, and 5) and those that
registered at the CRAS (Columns 2, 4, and 6). The dependent variable in all models takes on value 100 if a child is
enrolled in school and 0 otherwise. “BF” indicates if a child’s family is included in the Bolsa Família program, “Past
audit” indicates that a municipality has been audited at random, and “BF × Past audit” is the interaction of the
two treatments. Columns (1) and (2) present the results for the most representative sample. Columns (3) and (4)
consider only newly registered families. Columns (5) and (6) require families to have last updated their data in the
same month. All models include individual-level child fixed effects, municipality fixed effects and “Year × Priority
strata” fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at both the family and the municipality level. Significance levels:
+P < 0.1,∗ P < 0.05,∗∗ P < 0.01,∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
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Table A3.20
Change in Sanctions after a Random Audit
Log. excluded families Log. withheld benefits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Past audit -0.017 0.021
(0.042) (0.021)
Immediately after 0.080 0.049∗
(0.049) (0.023)
Long run -0.089∗ 0.005
(0.045) (0.023)
Control mean 3.311 3.311 5.085 5.085
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.855 0.855 0.933 0.933
N(municipalities) 5539 5539 5539 5539
N 33226 33226 38760 38760
Years 2012-2017 2012-2017 2011-2017 2011-2017
Notes. This table reports the effect of a random audit on the number of
beneficiary families that are sanctioned. The dependent variable in Columns
(1) and (2) is the logarithm of the number of families that are excluded from
Bolsa Família. The dependent variable in Columns (3) and (4) is the log-
arithm of the number of families whose benefits are withheld for at least a
month. “Past audit” indicates that a municipality has been audited at ran-
dom. “Immediately after” takes value 1 if the municipality has been randomly
audited in the previous year. “Long run” takes value 1 if the municipality has
been randomly audited in an earlier year. All models include municipality
and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
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Appendices to:
Genes, Pubs, and Drinks:
Gene-Environment Interplay and




Geographic Distribution of UK Biobank Participants
Notes. This figure displays the geographic distribution of participants in the UK
Biobank. Participants were recruited by one of the UKB’s 23 assessment centers.
The location of assessment centers was chosen such that at least 150,000 potential
participants in this age group live within less than 10 miles of each center (UKB,
2006, p.49). As a result, the vast majority of participants live in urban areas.
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Figure A4.2
Geographic Distribution of Pubs in the United Kingdom
Notes. This figure displays the geographic distribution of pubs in the United King-
dom from The Good Pub Guide.
254 APPENDIX A4
Figure A4.3
Predictive Power of the Polygenic Score
Notes. This figure shows the predictive power of the polygenic score for different drinking-related outcomes
in the UKB. Yellow bars indicate the adjusted R2 from 38 regressions where drinking-related outcomes in the
UKB are regressed on the first 40 principal components of the genetic data, “Age × Sex” fixed effects, and
local authority fixed effects. Orange bars indicate the increase in adjusted R2 when the polygenic score for the
number of drinks per week is included in the regression.
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Figure A4.4
Local Licensing Policy Is Uncorrelated with the Average Genetic Predisposition
Notes. This figure shows the relationship between local licensing policy and the average genetic predisposition. The
left panel shows the correlation with the number of premises per capita allowed to sell alcohol on-premise (including
premises permitted to sell alcohol both on- and off-premise). The middle panel shows the correlation with the number
of premises per capita allowed to provide licensable entertainment but not permitted to sell alcohol. The right panel
shows the correlation with the number of supermarkets per capita licensed to sell alcohol 24h a day. The average genetic
predisposition is measured as the mean polygenic score for the number of drinks per week for UKB participants living in
the local authority. Orange points represent the values of different local authorities, with labeled outliers (values more than




Participants with a High PGS Have Less Elastic Demand (Retailers)
Notes. This figure displays the relationship between drinking behavior and the number of retailers within 1000m of UKB
participants with a polygenic score above and below the median. The orange and yellow lines and the shaded gray areas
show the polynomial fit and the associated 95% confidence interval for UKB participants with high and low polygenic
scores, respectively. The figure was constructed using kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing. All models control
for genetic stratification using the first 40 principal components of the genetic data, “Age × Sex” fixed effects, and local
authority fixed effects.
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Figure A4.6
High PGS Participants React Less to Policy (Licensed Premises)
Notes. This figure displays the relationship between drinking behavior and the number of premises per capita allowed to
sell alcohol on-premise (including premises permitted to sell alcohol both on- and off-premise) for UKB participants with a
polygenic score above and below the median. The orange and yellow lines and the shaded gray areas show the polynomial
fit and the associated 95% confidence interval for UKB participants with high and low polygenic scores, respectively. All
models control for genetic stratification using the first 40 principal components of the genetic data, “Age × Sex” fixed
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Figure A4.7
High PGS Participants React Less to Policy (No-Sale Licenses)
Notes. This figure displays the relationship between drinking behavior and the number of premises per capita allowed to
provide licensable entertainment but not permitted to sell alcohol for UKB participants with a polygenic score above and
below the median. The orange and yellow lines and the shaded gray areas show the polynomial fit and the associated 95%
confidence interval for UKB participants with high and low polygenic scores, respectively. All models control for genetic
stratification using the first 40 principal components of the genetic data, “Age × Sex” fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the local authority level.
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Figure A4.8
High PGS Participants React Less to Policy (24h Supermarkets)
Notes. This figure displays the relationship between drinking behavior and the number of supermarkets per capita
licensed to sell alcohol 24h a day for UKB participants with a polygenic score above and below the median. The orange
and yellow lines and the shaded gray areas show the polynomial fit and the associated 95% confidence interval for UKB
participants with high and low polygenic scores, respectively. All models control for genetic stratification using the first 40





Summary Statistics of Drinking Outcomes in the UKB
count mean sd min max
Initial Assessment (Mar 2006-Mar 2010)
Alcohol drinking frequency (6-point scale) 501088 3.050 1.531 0 5
Drinks daily 501693 0.204 0.403 0 1
Drinks at least weekly 501693 0.692 0.462 0 1
Used to alcohol drink 40503 0.447 0.497 0 1
Usually drinks alcohol with meals 251535 0.675 0.468 0 1
Drinks more than 10 years ago 274194 0.317 0.560 0 5
Drinks per week 385790 10.409 10.340 0 483
Log. drinks per week 385790 2.046 0.969 0 6
Drank yesterday 70716 0.477 0.499 0 1
Goes to the pub at least weekly 501708 0.263 0.440 0 1
Repeat Visit (Aug 2012-Jun 2013)
Alcohol drinking frequency (6-point scale) 20333 3.115 1.461 0 5
Drinks daily 20337 0.187 0.390 0 1
Drinks at least weekly 20337 0.714 0.452 0 1
Used to alcohol drink 1363 0.479 0.500 0 1
Usually drinks alcohol with meals 12963 0.729 0.444 0 1
Drinks more than 10 years ago 10789 0.232 0.482 0 5
Drinks per week 15861 9.531 8.898 0 136
Log. drinks per week 15861 2.014 0.896 0 5
Goes to the pub at least weekly 20337 0.245 0.430 0 1
Imaging Visit (May 2014-ongoing)
Alcohol drinking frequency (6-point scale) 23451 3.098 1.432 0 5
Drinks daily 23455 0.167 0.373 0 1
Drinks at least weekly 23455 0.716 0.451 0 1
Used to alcohol drink 1518 0.483 0.500 0 1
Usually drinks alcohol with meals 14432 0.718 0.450 0 1
Drinks more than 10 years ago 12093 0.246 0.493 0 5
Drinks per week 18278 9.532 8.668 0 106
Log. drinks per week 18278 2.028 0.881 0 5
Goes to the pub at least weekly 23455 0.264 0.441 0 1
24 hrs dietary recall (Feb 11, Jun 11, Oct 11, Apr 12)
Drank yesterday 100604 0.505 0.500 0 1
Drank yesterday 83269 0.531 0.499 0 1
Drank yesterday 103797 0.506 0.500 0 1
Drank yesterday 100254 0.507 0.500 0 1
Mental Health Module (Jul 2016-Jul 2017)
Alcohol drinking frequency (5-point scale) 157167 2.590 1.276 0 4
Ever had any addiction 155604 0.060 0.238 0 1
Ever addicted to alcohol 154927 0.023 0.151 0 1
Currently addicted to alcohol 149757 0.010 0.101 0 1
Typical amount of drinking 156846 1.658 1.130 0 5
Binge drinking frequency 157149 1.323 0.903 0 4
Notes. This table reports summary statistics for alcohol-related outcomes in the
UK Biobank. Several measures were collected in multiple rounds of the assessment.
Summary statistics are reported separately for each round.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































Local Licensing Policy Is Uncorrelated with the Average Genetic Predisposition
Local authorities with
avg. PGS below median
Local authorities with
avg. PGS above median
LHS-test
Pei et al. 2019
Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation Coeff.
On-premise licenses (per 1,000) 1.921 0.655 1.848 1.361 0.010
No-sales premise licenses (per 1,000) 0.637 0.304 0.592 0.301 -0.001
24h supermarket licenses (per 1,000) 0.021 0.013 0.027 0.038 0.000
F-test: χ2(3) 3.500
F-test: P-value 0.321
Notes. This table reports on the balancedness of local licensing policy. Columns (1) to (4) present the summary statistics for local
authorities with an average polygenic score below and above the median of all areas. Column (5) uses a left-hand-side test (Pei et al.,
2019) to check whether licensing policy is predictive of the local genetic predisposition in regressions of the form Xi,s = α + βPGSi +
PCi + f(agei, sexi) + εi,s. The F-test tests whether these coefficients are jointly different from zero. Significance levels: +P < 0.1,∗ P <
0.05,∗∗ P < 0.01,∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Probability of Moving as a Function
of the PGS and the Number of Pubs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pubs within 1km 0.042∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
PGS-DPW -0.210∗ -0.225∗ -0.199∗ -0.224∗
(0.093) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090)
Pubs within 1km × PGS-DPW -0.003+ -0.004+ -0.003+ -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 9.286∗∗∗ 9.280∗∗∗ 9.274∗∗∗ 9.318∗∗∗
(0.208) (0.201) (0.203) (0.091)
First 40 PCs No Yes Yes Yes
Age X Sex No No Yes Yes
Local authority FE No No No Yes
R2 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.013
N 331299 331299 331296 331241
Notes. This table reports the effect of a mismatch between a participant’s genetic predisposition
and local alcohol availability, measured by the number of pubs in the area, on the probability of
moving to another location. The dependent variable in all models takes value 100 if the participant
moved since the first assessment of the UKB and 0 otherwise. The sample consists of all UKB
participants that are included in at least two assessments. “Pubs within 1km” indicates the number
of pubs within 1000m of a participant’s place of residence. “PGS-DPW” denotes the polygenic
score for the number of drinks per week. “Pubs within 1km × PGS-DPW” is the interactions of the
alcohol availability measure with the polygenic score. Column (1) includes no additional controls.
Column (2) controls only for genetic stratification using the first 40 principal components of the
genetic data. Column (3) controls for genetic stratification and additionally includes “Age × Sex”
fixed effects. Column (4) includes controls for genetic stratification, demographic fixed effects,
and fixed effects for the local authority. Standard errors are clustered at the local authority level.
Significance levels: +P < 0.1,∗ P < 0.05,∗∗ P < 0.01,∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
II. ADDITIONAL TABLES 265
Table A4.6
Probability of Moving as a Function
of the PGS and the Number of Retailers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Retailers within 1km 0.478∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.058) (0.054) (0.049)
PGS-DPW -0.186+ -0.180+ -0.160+ -0.164+
(0.100) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095)
Retailers within 1km × PGS-DPW -0.056∗ -0.058∗∗ -0.053∗ -0.058∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
Constant 8.968∗∗∗ 8.977∗∗∗ 9.007∗∗∗ 8.972∗∗∗
(0.208) (0.200) (0.205) (0.071)
First 40 PCs No Yes Yes Yes
Age X Sex No No Yes Yes
Local authority FE No No No Yes
R2 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.013
N 331299 331299 331296 331241
Notes. This table reports the effect of a mismatch between a participant’s genetic predisposition and
local alcohol availability, measured by the number of retailers in the area, on the probability of moving
to another location. The dependent variable in all models takes value 100 if the participant moved since
the first assessment of the UKB and 0 otherwise. The sample consists of all UKB participants that are
included in at least two assessments. “Retailers within 1km” indicates the number of retailers within
1000m of a participant’s place of residence. “PGS-DPW” denotes the polygenic score for the number
of drinks per week. “Retailers within 1km × PGS-DPW” is the interactions of the alcohol availability
measure with the polygenic score. Column (1) includes no additional controls. Column (2) controls
only for genetic stratification using the first 40 principal components of the genetic data. Column
(3) controls for genetic stratification and additionally includes “Age × Sex” fixed effects. Column
(4) includes controls for genetic stratification, demographic fixed effects, and fixed effects for the local
authority. Standard errors are clustered at the local authority level. Significance levels: +P < 0.1,∗ P <
0.05,∗∗ P < 0.01,∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
266 APPENDIX A4
Table A4.7
Probability of Moving to Another Local Authority
as a Function of the PGS and Licensing Policy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
On-premise licenses (per 1’000) 0.496∗∗ 0.478∗∗ 0.483∗∗ 0.578
(0.157) (0.151) (0.155) (0.671)
PGS-DPW -0.280∗∗ -0.056 -0.043 -0.053
(0.094) (0.096) (0.097) (0.086)
On-premise licenses (per 1’000) × PGS-DPW 0.000 -0.009 -0.010 -0.018
(0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.021)
Constant 4.597∗∗∗ 4.630∗∗∗ 4.616∗∗∗ 4.440∗∗∗
(0.319) (0.309) (0.318) (1.264)
First 40 PCs No Yes Yes Yes
Age X Sex No No Yes Yes
Local authority FE No No No Yes
R2 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.012
N 273283 273283 273281 273236
Notes. This table reports the effect of a mismatch between a participant’s genetic predisposition
and local licensing policy, measured by the number of premises licensed to sell alcohol, on the
probability of moving to another local authority. The dependent variable in all models takes
value 100 if the participant moved to another local authority since the first assessment of the
UKB and 0 otherwise. The sample consists of all UKB participants that are included in at least
two assessments. “On-premise licenses (per 1,000)” indicates the number of premises per capita
allowed to sell alcohol on-premise (including premises permitted to sell alcohol both on- and off-
premise). “PGS-DPW” denotes the polygenic score for the number of drinks per week. “On-premise
licenses (per 1,000) × PGS-DPW” is the interactions of the policy with the polygenic score.
Column (1) includes no additional controls. Column (2) controls only for genetic stratification
using the first 40 principal components of the genetic data. Column (3) controls for genetic
stratification and additionally includes “Age × Sex” fixed effects. Column (4) includes controls for
genetic stratification, demographic fixed effects, and fixed effects for the local authority. Standard
errors are clustered at the local authority level. Significance levels: +P < 0.1,∗ P < 0.05,∗∗ P <
0.01,∗∗∗ P < 0.001.
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